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“It’s not so strange that when your memories change, the world changes.” 
 
—Haruki Marukami, Hard-Boiled Wonderland  
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 The past and the present are never involved in a fixed relation; they are, in fact, 
constantly shaping and affecting one another. As we seek to learn more about the past, 
our perceptions of the present change, and, as we seek to understand more about the 
present, our approaches to (and explorations of) the past alter. There is a mutually 
reinforcing rhetorical force to historical investigations and their connections to 
contemporary ends. Claims about the past set boundaries; when one person (or family or 
nation) makes a statement about history, rhetorical, social and political lines are drawn. 
Maneuvering within and between and around those boundaries is the rhetorical practice 
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of historiography; the results of those rhetorical maneuvers are the political practice of 
historiography. Claims about the past are used to do many things, and this dissertation is 
about those rhetorical uses and the boundaries that they establish.  
 This dissertation is about the epistemological power of historical rhetoric, the 
social and political work done in the present by knowledge claims we make about the 
past. Different ways of talking about the past are both a rhetorical practice (a way to 
construct believable histories) and a source of knowledge. It is important for rhetorical 
critics to recognize that the constructions of history are doing something at the same time 
that they are becoming something for others to use rhetorically, politically, and socially.  
  In this dissertation, I explore four different rhetorics of history: Experienced 
History, Professional History, Collective Memory, and Simulated History. Suggesting 
that effective persuasive arguments are shaped and predicted by the cultures from which 
they stem, I investigate and compare these knowledge claims about the past. Using four 
rhetorical dimensions (Materiality, Perspective, Standards of Practice, and Silences), I 
examine how knowledge claims about the past differ, how the methods work rhetorically, 
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Whence the characteristic hysteria of our times: that of the production and reproduction 
of the real… That is why today this ‘material’ production is that of the hyperreal itself 
(Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation 23). 
 
 When I was very small, I (like most young Americans) loved Disney. We lived 
about an hour away from Disney World in Orlando, so my parents took us once a year. 
My sister and I enjoyed several rides, but my favorite was the “Pirates of the Caribbean.” 
I loved the real-ness of the pirates — their voices, their hairy legs, the lights and action 
and the eeriness of the ride itself.  
  We moved to Alabama when I was seven. Most of my new classmates had never 
been to Disney World, so I held a certain distinction among them. My personal 
experience, my embodied knowledge of the pirate ride (and the World itself) made me a 
kind of second grade expert, so I became the girl “who had seen the pirates.” Therefore, 
when my classmates had questions about the World in Orlando, they did not go to books 
or teachers or movies to know more; they asked me — because I knew things that the 
books and the teachers and the movies could not tell them. I knew how the ride smelled, 
how the seats felt, how the voices sounded, how fast the boat went, and whether or not 
riders were allowed to touch the pirates (not at all). I was a bodily sort of expert, the kind 
of expert who has felt knowledge and can, therefore, deliver a particular way of knowing. 
  When I was in the second grade, I relished this ability, this special knowing that I 
could use to persuade my classmates. Knowing about Disney through my own personal 
experience was an historical rhetoric — let me call it Experienced History. Being able to 
share a specific kind of knowledge with them was powerful; sharing knowledge (or the 
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ability to share knowledge) of any kind is an act of power. These Experienced Histories 
possess a powerful rhetorical force, a rhetorical construction of knowledge gleaned from 
personal, bodily experience: I knew these things because I had felt and done them myself. 
Experienced History is knowledge of the past produced by personal experience, but that 
is not the full extent of the definition. When I told my classmates about Disney World 
from a second grader’s experiential perspective, I provided a personal view. Experienced 
History gets its rhetorical power from the individual, personal nature of the knowledge 
being constructed. 
  Now, Experienced History is not the only way to make claims about the past. 
Some people read books about history; they write papers and conference presentations to 
analyze the past. They make use of the work done by professional historians, and they 
produce a certain kind of knowledge about the past, a verifiable past comprised of 
documentation and dissertations. To get another kind of knowledge, my classmates and I 
went to my father.  
  Daddy’s knowledge was different than mine because he gathered his information 
about the past from other sources, sources like encyclopedias, dictionaries, maps and 
histories — let me call this Professional History. Of course, because he is my father, I 
was convinced that he knew everything, and part of that conviction stemmed from 
Daddy’s ability to tap different resources for information. For example, when we asked 
him about Disney World, he would check credentials, review dates, and explain the 
different historical forces involved in the construction of Disney World. Daddy knew 
about Walt Disney because he had read about him. He knew about the history of Disney’s 
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World because he could check his facts with various encyclopedias, dictionaries, and 
atlases. My knowledge of Disney World was personal and bodily; Daddy’s knowledge of 
Disney was based on sources that were academic and professional. 
  Human beings (children and adults) are intrigued by the things and people that 
have gone before them. We like history,1 and we study it in a variety of ways; history, as 
much as we think of it as conceptual, is also material. Experienced History (like my 
understanding of Disney) makes claims about the past that are experiential and personal; 
when I am doing Experienced History, I am using the material of my body to make an 
argument. Professional History (like Daddy’s understanding of Disney) makes claims 
about the past that are documentable and verifiable; when I am doing Professional 
History, I am using the material of books, maps, and records to make an argument. And, 
although these are both powerful ways to make claims about the past, they are not the 
only methods of describing and knowing the past. Another way to make knowledge 
claims about the past is Collective Memory.  
  Collective Memory is tricky to explain. It’s not that Collective Memory hasn’t 
been theorized, at length. It has. And it’s not that Collective Memory is especially 
distinctive or unique. It isn’t.  Collective Memory is difficult to make into a story because 
it is everywhere — it is cultural oxygen. Like Experienced and Professional History, 
Collective Memory is material; Collective Memory knowledge claims are made of family 
histories, gossip, stories from the “good old days” told by grandparents at family 
reunions. But like oxygen, Collective Memory is present, and necessary, to human beings 
— without being easily detectable. Although each of us has a unique set of memories, we 
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also share memories with the many collectives in which we live, including group 
achievements, group mistakes, shared experiences, and interpretations of historical 
records. Collective Memory is the process of constructing, the act of sharing, and the 
work of retaining group memories.  
  Just as we cannot live without oxygen, we cannot live within a culture or a family 
without some form of Collective Memory. As we do Experienced History, we may be 
adding to Collective Memory. As we do Professional History, we may be adding to 
Collective Memory. For these very reasons, Collective Memory is a slippery notion to 
conceptualize, so my example of Collective Memory departs a bit from the previous 
illustrations. I demonstrate Experienced History and Professional History in a discussion 
of Disney World. Collective Memory, the oxygen of culture, is a story of funerals. 
  Recently, I went to a family funeral in Kentucky. Nanny had been sick for only a 
little while. She was diagnosed with cancer about eight months before she died. She was 
failing for the last few weeks — and we flew into Kentucky the morning that she died. 
Nanny left a very extended family. She had seven children by the time she was twenty-
nine, and each of those children has at least one, if not several, children of their own. 
There are twenty-three grandchildren and thirty-one great-grandchildren all together. 
  The funeral, in typical Southern style, was a two-day affair. On Friday we went to 
the viewing—at which Uncle Bob, the family historian, displayed a montage of family 
photographs starting with Nanny’s childhood in rural Kentucky and ending with recent 
images of great-grandchild Lindsay reading The Giving Tree aloud to Nanny. On 
Saturday we went to the funeral at the church Nanny had attended for the last forty years. 
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It was packed. Six of her children and one of her grandchildren spoke, two grandchildren 
played some of her favorite hymns, and several of the great-grandchildren sang Nanny’s 
favorite hymn—“Jesus Loves Me.” After the funeral we were fed many delectable 
Southern delicacies in the basement of the church; Nanny’s fellow church members 
prepared the spread. We ate in the church basement while we watched some more 
photographic displays and posed for more pictures. 
  We collectively memorialized Nanny all weekend long. At the viewing we met 
and hugged and cried and laughed and ate and chatted and giggled and discussed. At the 
funeral we heard each of Nanny’s sons tell us their version of her, and, although each 
portrait was similar, there were unique perspectives from each man. The grandchild’s 
image of Nanny was another kind of memory. The photographic montage, narrated and 
musicalized by Uncle Bob, told yet another story about Nanny. The church basement 
supper was a particular kind of memory, as well. Each of these memories, related to and 
revolving around Nanny, are a collective construction. She is a part of the family 
speaking, the church cooking, the children singing, the author writing. There was even a 
documentarian (unrelated to the family) at the funeral taping the activities — she is 
making a documentary about Park City, Kentucky. And now Nanny is a part of that 
Collective Memory, too.  
  In these three examples (Experienced History, Professional History, and 
Collective Memory), different interpretations of the past rely on certain first assumptions 
about the world.  Those assumptions, as well as the claims they bolster, make for a rich, 
multi-faceted, and possibly confusing understanding of history. Human argument, as 
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opposed to more formal approaches to logic, is messy because effective human 
arguments are shaped by the cultures from which they spring. Universals, as desirable as 
they may be to mathematicians, do not really work the same way in human argument—
because, as Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin observe in The Abuse of Casuistry, 
human argument is not geometry (25-29).2 When I was little, my argument (that my 
personal, bodily experience was a correct and valid appraisal of Disney World) was 
effective because the culture of my second grade class, the environment in which my 
argument and I were functioning, accepted that bodily, experiential arguments were valid 
ways to make claims. Why, you may ask, did my 2nd grade culture accept my bodily, 
experiential argument? Because the warrants on which those arguments are based are 
culturally specific to the world in which I presented my conclusions.  
 The warrant of an argument, according to Stephen Toulmin, is the base, literally, 
of any argument. The claim (the conclusion or observation being made) is the endpoint of 
an argument. The grounds (the information leading the rhetor to provide a claim) are the 
fill-material of an argument—these are the proof or data used to construct the claim. And 
the warrant is the connection between the claim and the grounds; warrants are 
“statements indicating how the facts on which we agree are connected to the claim or 
conclusion now being offered.”3 The reason it is important for us to recognize the 
structural elements of these arguments is because claims are put to use—observations 
about the world (based on grounds and stemming from cultural warrants)—work to do 
things in the world. They are not just verbal or literal observations. The sources/resources 
of these arguments are the warrants and the grounds—they are the cultural and 
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evidentiary structure of the arguments being made. The claims, on the other hand, are the 
uses to which those evidentiary structures are put. So, for example, when I was a little 
girl, I might have made the claim that Disney World is a good way for children to learn 
about American myths. (I was a very advanced 2nd grader). That claim, then, works to 
persuade different people (my fellow classmates, their parents, our teachers) to take us 
back to Disney World. And the reasons a claim like that might work stem from the 
evidence I provided (my stories of the pirates and the rides) and the warrant bolstering 
those observations (cultural assumptions that my personal, bodily experience was a valid 
method to interpret Disney World).  
 Now, a claim that Daddy might make is that Disney World is a valuable learning 
experience for children and adults. It’s not just full of creepy puppets—there are actual 
family benefits to going to Disney. And he would prove that claim by pointing to an 
article in the New York Times or an essay in Encyclopedia Britannica. These would be 
the grounds of his claim, and the warrant connecting that evidence with Disney as a 
valuable learning experience would be the notion that these books and professionally 
written articles hold some epistemological significance for and relationship to the worlds 
they describe. The use of this claim could be to get more people to visit Disney, or to 
demonstrate that there are other methods of learning that are not only located in the 
classroom, The sources/resources to prove and support those claims are the written texts 
bolstering that argument and the warrant that research written down and systematically 
pursued is educationally more sound than other kinds of research.  
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 A Collective Memory claim will look a bit different than the first two—because 
it’s not about Disney and because Collective Memory is a bit more bendy than 
Experienced or Professional History. So, an example claim might be in response to a 
question about the funeral: why do we always have to have people over to our house after 
the funeral? I mean, we just saw all of them at the church. The response to this question 
will be a claim based in Collective Memory: because that’s how we’ve always done it. If 
we don’t have people over to the house (in a Southern town, at least), people will wonder 
why we didn’t. Now, the fellow mourners will recognize that we are reeling from 
Grandmother’s death, that there are other things that must be done, that Uncle Dan has to 
be taken back to the airport, and that somebody’s still got to call the lawyer… but the 
Southern collective expects certain ritualistic responses to death. In a Southern Christian 
community, burying one of the major players without a house visit is like going to church 
bare legged (wearing no pantyhose). It just isn’t done. 
 The use to which such a claim is put demonstrates the physical and material 
consequences of Collective Memory. The sources/resources from which those claims are 
drawn live in the social material of a Southern, Christian world—we check our individual 
memories, the memories of our mothers and daddys, the memories of Grandmother’s 
closest friends—to verify our interpretations of past events, as well as the historical 
significance of different details of those events. Who will call the preacher? Who will 
bring the peach cobbler? Who’s in charge of the music? Who will drive Mother and 
Daddy to and from the cemetery? There are certain people to whom certain jobs must 
fall, a certain shape to the events of the day—and we check those using old photo albums, 
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church attendance rosters, Grandmother’s Bible (where she took notes and made mention 
of various folks), the local newspaper. Each of these sources and resources provides us 
with the bases of our claims and places us firmly within the historical structures of which 
we are always already an active part. 
 This dissertation is about the epistemological power of historical rhetoric, the 
social and political work done in the present by knowledge claims we make about the 
past. Each way of talking about the past is both a rhetorical practice (a way to construct 
believable histories) and a source of knowledge. It is important for rhetorical critics to 
recognize that the construction of histories is doing something at the same time that it is 
becoming something for others to use.  
Experienced History, Professional History, and Collective Memory are three ways to 
make knowledge claims about the past. In the previous examples, I examine the 
construction and structure of different kinds of argument, suggesting that these arguments 
are persuasive because of the cultural assumptions from which they stem. In the 
dissertation, I examine those kinds of arguments writ large—deconstructing and 
analyzing the rhetorical force of different claims about the past.  
  Claims made by Experienced History, Professional History, and Collective 
Memory are rhetorical—and the methodological construction of these arguments is 
worthy of study. However, that is not the only goal of this project because there is 
another way to make knowledge claims about the past. In this dissertation, I introduce a 
fourth way to talk about history, Simulated History—a knowledge claim that plays with 
and departs from rhetorical and epistemological limitations of the other three historical 
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rhetorics. To explain and compare these knowledge claims about the past, the dissertation 
includes thorough, detailed explanations of each method: how knowledge claims about 
the past differ, how the methods work rhetorically, and how those different rhetorical 
powers create distinct understanding of the past. In this Introduction, I explain each 
concept and their interrelationships briefly. My introduction to the different historical 
rhetorics explores three aspects of their persuasive power: materiality, perspective, and 
standards of practice. In Chapter One, I deconstruct and analyze the uses to which claims 
made by Experienced History, Professional History, and Collective Memory are put, as 
well as the sources/resources bolstering those claims. (Simulated History gets special 
attention throughout the dissertation because it is new and less well theorized than the 
first three).  Materiality, Perspective, Practice, and Silences are different ways these 
rhetorics construct claims (that do things in the world) from the grounds and warrants 
particular to their methods.  
MATERIALITY, PERSPECTIVE, PRACTICE, AND SILENCES 
 First of all, each method relies upon rhetoric of materiality. History is material. 
The rhetorical functions of historical investigation are materially based — meaning, when 
I am doing Experienced History, I am using the material of my body to make an 
argument. When I am doing Professional History, I am using the material of books, maps, 
and records to make an argument. And when I am doing Collective Memory, I am using 
the material of photo albums, memorials, and testimony (to name a few) to make an 
argument. Stories of personal experience make history individual, bringing the ethos of 
witnessing and personal testimony to historical knowledge. Professional History makes 
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history from documentation and verifiability; history as a rational discipline becomes a 
collection of encyclopedias, statistics, and academic papers. Finally, the material of 
Collective Memory exists in families, oral histories, and objects that live in museums or 
homes; the material of Collective Memory is shared and perpetuated in interactions and 
conversations. 
  The second rhetorical element of these knowledge claims about the past comes 
from their professed goals. To say that you know history experientially is to make the 
history yours.  The goal of Holocaust witnesses, apostolic authority, and missionaries of 
all types is to achieve a personal credibility, and therefore, the goals of Experienced 
History’s knowledge claims are difficult to challenge or ignore. Lawrence Langer and 
Patricia Bellamy explore these personal stories of the past, investigating the rhetorical 
power (and dangers) of experiential testimony.4  
 Apostolic authority, too, grows out of the personal, experiential nature of 
Experienced History; it is both an Experienced History and a result of it. Those seeking 
apostolic authority have in mind the goal of personal credibility — apostolic authority 
cannot exist without the rhetorical force of personal experience. (There are two different 
elements of historical interpretation occurring in this section: what Biblical scholars do is 
mostly Professional History; what apostolic authority does is Experienced History. While 
I understand the confusing nature of these divisions, the goal of this section is to 
demonstrate the rhetorical power of Experienced History: the apostles were authorities of 
Jesus because they knew him. Theirs is a performative, ethical claim.) The ability to 
speak and teach Christian thought authoritatively stems from personal experience. To be 
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an apostle, one must experience a personal connection with Jesus, or one must interact 
with a resurrected Jesus. Either way, the goal of apostolic authority focuses on the 
personal, experiential rhetoric of Experienced History. 
  The goals of Professional History differ from the goals of Experienced History. 
Professional History proposes to make a classifiable, testable, verifiable story of the past. 
Professional historians seek documentable, verifiable truth.5 Because of this emphasis on 
the verifiable, this tendency towards scientific rationalism, professional historians seek to 
convince by laying claim to the “truest” versions of the past. Part of that convincing 
comes from the language and practice of history; historians exercise a language of 
scientific reasoning and logic. Their ethos extends from this scientific approach (Najarian 
76). Using evidentiary proof, explaining that proof, and grounding those explanations in 
solid argumentative reasoning, professional historians and historiographers take on the 
responsibility of telling us what happened, when it happened, and why (Gronbeck 48). 
Professional historians recognize the responsibilities that go with explaining the way 
things were, and, in order to bolster their approach and methods, they pursue a science of 
the past. 
  In order to achieve the goals demanded by a science of the past, professional 
historians examine and analyze documents in order to provide a proven, documentable 
version of the past. Theirs is a deliberately linear construction, and the stories that they 
tell stand upon pages and pages of statistics, figures, and facts. On the other hand, 
Collective Memory does a different thing. Its examination of the past provides another 
view of the past, a view that is both problematic and kind of necessary. It is problematic 
 
13 
because it depends upon sources of dubious historical accuracy (witnessing, experience, 
first person testimony and opinion, even, to a lesser degree, scrap booking and photo 
albums and memorials.) It is necessary because we cannot talk about the past without 
talking to the people who were there.  
  The goal of Collective Memory knowledge claims is to put the past to work 
creating identity and identification. Collective Memory must simultaneously separate a 
collective from other collectives and satisfy the collective’s desires for and understanding 
of the past. Because Collective Memory must adhere to the constraints and expectations 
of a collective, it is both concrete (in order to establish and bolster identity) and mutable 
(in order to allow for ever-changing definitions of who belongs, who does not, and what 
those divisions mean to the group members). Collective Memory is a story of the past 
that adapts—to the work of the collective and to the maintenance efforts of the 
individual. It is, therefore, a process of construction, the act of sharing, and the work of 
retaining group memories. Collective Memory connects different stories and makes them 
into different ways of seeing the past. Although each of us has a unique set of memories, 
we also share memories with the many collectives in which we live, including group 
achievements, group mistakes, shared experiences, and interpretations of the historical 
record. 
  In order to achieve the dual goals of group identity and unification, Collective 
Memory makes and depends on collective meanings. In Words and Minds, Neil Mercer 
discusses the fundamental importance of language to the progress and survival of human 
communities. Collective Memory, constructed and maintained by social interaction and 
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shared language is essential for human continuity, both indiviudally and collectively 
(168). Without language, there is no Collective Memory. The process of collectively 
constructing frameworks for the past — to explain what happened, why it happened, and 
what it means in relation to the collective — requires shared language and shared 
meaning. The goal of Collective Memory is to construct and share these collective 
understandings of the past. 
  The third rhetorical dimension of these knowledge claims about the past involves 
standards of measurement: how does each method evaluate the epistemic, the feeling of 
“true-ness” in different versions of the past? For Experienced History, the standards are 
individually evaluated. Experienced History gets its rhetorical power from the individual. 
Individuals who have experienced something are granted a power to explain.  
  If you have done or seen or felt something that I have not, then how can I know 
more than you? Take, for example, the story told to me by a friend. He tells me of an 
acquaintance taking a trip to India. While there, this acquaintance, the tourist, visits 
several tourist hot spots, views historical landmarks, and makes a point to “experience” 
the culture he is visiting. He returns from this trip not, as E.M. Forster might have been, 
impressed with the Indian culture. In fact, according to my friend, the tourist returns 
spouting hateful, racist remarks about the inhabitants of this ancient world. When my 
friend responds with distaste and disbelief, the tourist replies, “Well, now, I was there. 
You weren’t, so how can you know?” Indeed. The tourist has placed his body in the 
moment, he has become the text of his argument — his experience, his personal 
relationship to the culture he toured, supports his racist argument in ways that my 
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readings of A Passage to India never will. His is an experiential way of knowing, a 
rhetoric of Experienced History. The standard of evaluation for performed knowledge is 
the placement and experience of the body. The bodies in a performed argument become 
evidence, as do the experiences of those bodies. In her current book, Barbara Biesecker 
explores the changing tone of WWII rhetoric, and she proposes that one of the big 
differences in the rhetoric now as opposed to a decade ago, is the entrance of a new kind 
of rhetoric: experience-as-proof.6 The rhetoric of experience is now, she argues, 
becoming a kind of evidence in and of itself. 
 Standards of evaluation for Professional History are located in the language and 
process of scientific reasoning. So, the standards of measurement for this historical 
rhetoric involve comparisons between documents, validity tests, formally logical 
conclusions, and clear connections between past and contemporary events. For 
Professional History, the past must be as solid and verifiable as a chemical equation. If 
one of the steps in an historical explanation does not follow, then the conclusions reached 
are not valid.7 Professional History prizes objectivity and disinterest, claiming that a 
scholarly distance makes for a fairer, clearer understanding of the past. The description 
(disciplining?) of historical methods provided by Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman is 
a picture of history’s methodologies as not only dynamic but perfectible (Denying 
History 21). As we progress in our understanding of the past, Professional History tells 
us, we get better at interpreting it or recording it or explaining it. Professional History 
measures different versions of the past against expectations and models of scientific 
reasoning — and places those different versions on an ever-improving continuum. Each 
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explanation is measured against earlier versions, expected to be clearer (or more 
parsimonious, or more elegant).  
  Where Professional History measures knowledge of the past through models of 
objectivity and distance, Collective Memory evaluates knowledge of the past through 
models of intersubjectivity and community. One of the first people to talk about the idea 
of Collective Memory — or at least, one of the first to call it that — was a sociologist 
named Maurice Halbwachs. He proposed that, instead of looking at the past as if it is a 
place that we can explore — easily and rationally — we should think of it as more local, 
more ephemeral, more shared, and more rhetorical.8 The standards of truth applied to 
individual interpretation are applied to the memory of many. Individuals collected into 
groups construct the past through a collective lens, made powerful by feelings of 
collective ownership and individual belonging. Those collectively constructed 
interpretations of the past are evaluated within the group — are the collectively 
constructed interpretations meaningful to all? Do the collectively constructed 
interpretations bolster group identity? Do the collectively constructed interpretations 
strengthen current group connections—while allowing for the inclusion of future 
member?  In a setting of individuals belonging to the group, the standards of evaluation 
are similar to those used for Experienced History — because they must meet the 
expectations of the group to whom they belong. But the standards of evaluation for 
Collective Memory are not the same as standards used to evaluate Experienced History 
because they vary from group to group and change depending upon the uses to which 
each collective puts each memory. The departure of memory from individual to collective 
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is the point most investigated by Halbwachs in On Collective Memory: how do 
individual recollections make sense? His answer to this is, simply, that the sense-making 
of recollection comes by collective comparison; we know the meaning of situations and 
events because we place them in a socially constructed, memorized framework of 
meanings. Collective Memory, in and of itself, is not an endpoint; instead, it is a 
theoretical framework upon which various ideological, rhetorical, social, and political 
purposes may hang. According to Huyssen, “The often-made contention that the past is 
constructed not as fact but as myth to serve the interest of a particular community may 
still sound radical to some, but it cannot (and should not) stupefy historians” (1387). 
Collective Memory is important because it is innately rhetorical; it is designed, 
propagated, and archived with specific persuasive goals in mind.  
  The final rhetorical dimension of these historical rhetorics is Silences. Silences in 
the different versions of the past occur for different reasons and, sometimes, to different 
ends. Silences in Experienced History often take the shape of others’ experiences—if I 
have not seen and done the things that you’ve seen and done, then how can I know what 
you experienced? Holes in Collective Memory emerge when various groups seek to 
display the events of history in the most identity-structuring way: one story of the past 
will depict the family in a good light, one might not. The better version is often the 
historical version constructed by the Collective.  
  Silences in Professional History are usually driven by less (obviously) personal 
reasons: a history book cannot contain all the details involved—or it would never end. Of 
course, there are times when professional histories skip over embarrassing moments as 
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well.9 Civil war recovery and state histories often do not include moments when the 
populace was less than satisfied with decisions of the state.10 Where the holes in 
Experienced History and Collective Memory stem from desires for community peace, the 
holes in Professional History stem from perceptions of objectivity and distance. Histories 
of the Holocaust do not, most of the time, include detailed explanations of personal 
horrors (and, when they do, historians pounce on them—witness the attacks on Jan 
Gross’s Neighbors: the Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland and 
Mark Roseman’s A Past in Hiding: Memory and Survival in Nazi Germany).11 Because 
Professional History puts such an emphasis on the scientism of the discipline, there is 
little room for individual perspectives in knowledge claims made about the past. Thus, 
the holes in Professional History look a lot like societal trends and very unlike the lives of 
people. 
SO WHY THE DISSERTATION? 
  If there are three widely accepted, explainable ways of knowing the past, then 
why write yet another dissertation about the rhetoric of history? For one reason: 
Simulated History. I’ve briefly explained some of the rhetorical uses to which knowledge 
claims about the past are put. Simulated History has recently emerged as a fourth 
historical rhetoric that is epistemologically and theoretically intriguing. It is a break from 
the other rhetorical constructions of history for two reasons: the particular culture in 
which Simulated History thrives and the implications of that culture to the notion that 
rhetorical constructions of history are both resources (of knowledge) and usable (to do 
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political and material work in the present). With those differences in mind, I introduce the 
concept of Simulated History.  
  Simulated History (often called living history ) is a relatively new phenomenon. 
Since the middle of the 20th century, an interest in the performance and re-construction of 
the past has grown among both spectators and participants. Inherent to the rhetorical 
practice of Simulated History is the individual and collective re-production/construction 
of the past. Participants’ engagement with Simulated History spectacles is driven by a 
personal involvement with the past, but the process of Simulated History also makes use, 
at times, of our three historical epistemologies (the material, perspective, and practices of 
Experienced History, Professional History, and Collective Memory). 
  There are a variety of Simulated History events, ranging from American Civil 
War reenactments to twentieth century war reenactments in both Europe and the U.S., 
plantation homes in Mississippi and Louisiana, colonial museums in Virginia, 18th 
century hotels in Livermore Falls, Maine, time-traveling reality TV shows, and 
Renaissance festivals.12 To practice “Simulated History,” one must be willing to spend 
money, allot time, and eschew comfort in the constant search for historical authenticity 
and continuity. Each Simulated History event is valued for its feelings of realness — if 
the uniforms are timely, if the language is period-appropriate, if the products and objects 
made and used are historically and stylistically true to form. The constant search for 
historical authenticity drives living historians to do more research, plan more events, and 
recruit more participants, and Simulated History sites themselves are designed to create 
for the participant a stronger, more coherent sense of both group and individual identity.  
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  Simulated History is the practice of performing and experiencing the past (as it 
was) in contemporary time. To do this, living historians go to some lengths—traveling, 
buying period pieces, reading up on historical details, quizzing each other on authenticity, 
and attending events designed to help them construct more authentic, more historical 
correct elements of dress, life, and personal experience. To do Simulated History is to 
perform moments from the past in order to experience history personally. The way to do 
this is by making those moments from the past as authentic and period-appropriate as 
possible. 
  Previously, I introduce Materiality, Perspective, Practice, and Silences to help 
conceptualize the rhetorical dimensions of Experienced History, Professional History, 
and Collective Memory. Now I use the same dimensions to explore the ways Simulated 
History makes claims about the past.  Simulated History, like Experienced History, 
Professional History, and Collective Memory, uses different rhetorical tactics to make 
knowledge claims about the past. I suggest that Simulated History uses some of the same 
rhetorical dimensions of the other three historical epistemologies, while at the same time 
transcending the limitations of these methods. This is the break—in a Simulated History, 
the boundaries between history as a resource (for knowledge) and a use (for the present) 
get blurred. The blurring of these boundaries works to make Simulated History’s claims 
both persuasive and unobstrusive—some of the most powerful rhetorical effects of 
Simulated History happen incidentally, as if they were side effects of the Materiality, 
Perspective, Practice, and Silences constructed through simulated historical claims. 
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  The first rhetorical dimension discussed is the Materiality of knowledge claims 
about the past. Simulated History is made of actions: events, museums, costumes, 
objects, and bodily demonstrations. In Simulated History, individuals may either 
participate (stay in the 18th century hotel, reenact the battle, work at the museum) or 
watch (view the TV show, attend the battle reenactment, ask the docent about different 
ways to churn butter). But the key material element is the physicality of history. 
Simulated History makes its knowledge claims about the past within a rhetoric of the 
immediate. These claims are made on and around the body — the authenticity of the 
costume, the roughness of the wool uniform, the tiring work of planting a field, the 
exhilaration of “seeing the elephant,” the stench of a chamber pot, the detailed 
explanations of antique medical practices. Each of the materials employed in a Simulated 
History event or museum add to the rhetorical power of knowledge claims. Similar to 
Experienced History, the material of Simulated History is personal and individual. 
  The second rhetorical dimension of knowledge claims about the past involves 
Perspective as it functions within each historical rhetoric. Simulated History has as its 
goals several things: to bring the past to life, to provide individuals with different 
experiences, to lend voice to the marginalized, and to evoke personal and emotional 
interest in the past. Each of these goals is related; the theme of Simulated History’s goals 
is to make the past personal. By bringing history to life, Simulated History events and 
museums give to their participants and spectators the chance to be a part of something 
other than modern day life. Often, advertisements for various Simulated History events 
include references to the dullness and repetition of contemporary suburban living. To 
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escape the drudgery of traffic jams and mindless jobs, one can adventure into the past: be 
a cowboy or a soldier or a southern lady.  
  Another part of Simulated History’s drive to make the past personal occurs in the 
acknowledgement and vocalization given to the marginalized. Instead of learning about 
the exploits of the few and powerful (as one might do in Professional History books), 
Simulated History participants and spectators may learn about the common people, the 
middle class, the downtrodden and disenfranchised—as long as the disenfranchisement is 
emotionally manageable, or the commonality is still classifiably heroic. As a Civil War 
reenactor, for example, a participant can experience the life his great grandfather lived. 
Or, at a Renaissance festival, one need not always be a knight—one can be a serving 
wench or a squire. The goal of Simulated History is to transform the past from a distant, 
impersonal detail into an intimate, experiential kind of knowledge. Like the goals of 
Experienced History and Collective Memory, the goal of Simulated History makes the 
past into something that I can claim as mine. 
  The third rhetorical dimension is Practice—the processes and people involved in 
constructing these “lived” experiences. The big practical player in the evaluation and 
procedure of Simulated History is authenticity. Participants and spectators are constantly 
invited (commanded) to evaluate the “real-ness” of each Simulated History event. 
Comparisons are made between different groups’ uniforms (if the battle occurred in 
1942, are they wearing hats from 1943?), the settings in which events occur (is there 
someone drinking a Coors Light at the plantation house?), the actions of participants (did 
the Confederates really climb over that wall or was that a modern-day moment of 
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excitability?). Similar to the practices of Professional History, questions of validity and 
authenticity are applied to Simulated History events by all the people involved. But 
another kind of authenticity measurement seems, again, to relate to the areas of 
experience and emotion (like the standards used by Experienced History and Collective 
Memory).  
  For a Simulated History event (or museum) to work, it must be emotionally 
satisfying. When asked why they are interested in Simulated History, the reasons given 
by spectators and participants often revolve around emotional/sensory responses. Because 
someone’s family member fought in the American Revolution, she might want to feel an 
emotional closeness to the battle reenactment. If she does not feel it, then she will not be 
persuaded by the knowledge claim being presented. If something does not feel right, it 
will not persuade. The emotional evaluation of Simulated History events is related to 
standards of authenticity, as well: if an event (or a museum or a place) does not feel right, 
then it cannot be authentic. Therefore, the practices and process of Simulated History are 
related to Experienced History and Collective Memory (in that they must pique the right 
emotions and satisfy the collective), as much as they are related to Professional History 
(in that small and large details must be historically verified.) 
  A discussion of the practices and procedures in Simulated History leads into an 
examination of the fourth category: Silences. In order for something to feel right and 
beneficial, it must not be too upsetting. Therefore, in the knowledge claims made by 
Experienced History and Collective Memory, embarrassing or uncomfortable moments 
from the past are skipped over. At the family reunion, we need not discuss great-
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granddaddy’s vocation as a horse thief anymore than we need to mention our cousin’s 
recent and painful divorce. There are certain politenesses required in collective 
interactions—otherwise, there would be very little collective interaction. Silences occur 
in all four historical rhetorics. 
  The silences in Simulated History are particularly fascinating (and disturbing). I 
want to suggest that these holes occur more intentionally, especially in places like Civil 
War and 20th century war reenactments. The representational choices made by 
practitioners of Simulated History depend heavily on the ways in which “marginalized” 
voices get portrayed; later in the Introduction (and in the second and third chapters) I 
discuss some of the contradictions between Simulated History’s marginalia and the 
marginalized voices that continue to go unheard. There are no slaves in Civil War 
reenactments, just as there are no death camps reenacted by modern war enthusiasts. It 
would seem that the reasons for these lacunae might look like the reasons for holes in 
personal epistemologies and Collective Memory—embarrassing or terrible moments in 
the past take away from the glory of the battle, the exhilaration of “seeing the elephant.” 
And, further, there are elements of Professional History’s reasons echoed in Simulated 
History lacunae—individual perspectives included are usually those within the historical 
trends being “lived.”  
 So, as much as living historians emphasize the importance of simualting “ordinary” 
lives, they propagate many of the Silences created by Professioanl History. For example, 
while simulating life on the plantation home or the daily life of a merchant in Livermore 
Falls, ME, living historians focus on the stories of the few and the powerful. There are 
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not Simulated History museums demonstrating, for example, the daily life of individuals 
incarcerated in 18th century debtor’s prisons or the very short and painful lives of children 
in 19th century coal mines. Those moments in history are neither exhilarating nor 
reassuring, so they do not get included. Simulating the past is not only an attempt to 
represent things as they were—there is a pleasurable aspect to these performances that is 
not present in the other three historical rhetorics. Putting on uniforms, running around 
with sabers, riding horses, and eating giant turkey legs are fun. Dying, starving, and 
abuse are not so fun. Reenacting the past, for ostensibly pleasurable reasons, does not 
include the actual blood and guts that happened. Such silences, inserted into these claims 
about the past, result in more than just a “fun weekend outing” because the exclusion of 
the nastier parts of history creates an incomplete past. 
  In the last century or so there have been specific changes to and within historical 
understanding. Professional History and Collective Memory allow for the passage of 
time, the impossibility of being in the past. But Simulated History and reenactment, 
theoretically, allow us to simulate experiences in the past. We feel what historical figures 
felt, know what they know, taste what they taste. The boundaries and limitations of our 
three widely accepted historical rhetorics attract more and more negative attention; it is 
these boundaries and limitations Simulated History seems able to transcend.  
  Experienced History, for example, is by its very nature limited to personal 
experience; always restricted by time and space, experiential claims about the past are 
open to attack from Professional History (for such malleable standards of verification and 
evaluation) and Collective Memory (for an inability to make representative or 
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generalizable stories). Testimonies of Holocaust survivors (as well as the survivors of 
other 20th century genocides and ethnic cleansings) are quizzed about their specific 
memories and experiences: can they recall the exact number of chimneys? Did they see 
others taken into the fields and shot? Can they remember the dates and times at which 
they were accosted? Are their stories the stories of others like them? The difficulty in 
evaluating Experienced History, as well as its very personal nature, leaves room for 
attacks on the veracity and representative-ness of rhetorical and epistemological claims 
made by and from experience. 
  Professional History gets slammed, as well. Human beings no longer accept 
Professional History as the final word on history; there are collective answers and 
interpretations of various historical events that often question and ultimately challenge 
Professional History’s take on the past. For example, discussions of Pinochet’s regime in 
Chile, the political prisoners who disappeared while he was in power, and the ongoing 
ramifications of his reign of terror occur in novels, museums, political protests, academic 
papers, and personal memoirs. Not only is Professional History investigating Pinochet; 
everyday Chileans are. War tribunals and war criminals are no longer the purview of only 
the politically and academically empowered. Groups like the Mothers of the Disappeared 
collectively protest Professional History’s perception Pinochet’s reign, while at the same 
time giving the past a personal, painful, human flavor. The power of Collective Memory 
and Experienced History to question and challenge accepted professionally historical 
conclusions are demonstrated in ongoing historical controversies.13 
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  Like Experienced History and Professional History, Collective Memory has its 
share of detractors. Similar to the attacks lobbed at Experienced History, Collective 
Memory knowledge claims are questioned for their veracity and verifiability. Further, the 
material in which Collective Memory gets located (memorials, stories, family gossip, 
objects) is questioned for the very same reasons it convinces: collective biases. When 
Maya Lin’s design for the Vietnam Veteran Memorial was chosen, people from a variety 
of perspectives attacked the choice — they said that it was not patriotic enough, or that it 
was too idealistic, or that it was too patriotic, or that it was not idealistic enough. The 
same sorts of complaints occurred in and around the debate over the World Trade Center 
memorial. Who gets to say what the general feeling is? Which collective feels the most—
or has the most representative understanding — or needs the most acknowledgement? In 
such traumatic moments (as the bombing of the WTC or the Vietnam War), 
fragmentation of national identity into many different groups with many different 
versions of the same story makes Collective Memory into a morass of Us vs. Them 
arguments.14 
  We cannot believe a story that is so foreign as to be unrecognizable because we 
have no context for the events or the characters. The reason that we like stories of the past 
is because, most of the time, we know somebody who did that — or we can check the 
details in our favorite history of the world — or we can ask our mothers and best friends 
and mentors if they have ever heard of those things. The different persuasive powers of 
each historical rhetoric come from their interdependence, as well as their isolation; if 
there were no Collective Memory, we could not speak to one another. If there were no 
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Professional History, we could not understand the similarities between our own cultures 
and the cultures of the world. If there were no Experienced History, we could not hear 
and feel the individual effects of history on each other and ourselves. 
 Simulated History provides a basis for rhetoric, using (and, through simulation, 
transcending) the rhetorical and epistemological tools of Experienced History, 
Professional History, and Collective Memory. First-person interpretation in Simulated 
History presentations is a process designed to provide an “authentic” individual 
experience for the participant (Anderson Time Machines 48). Variations on the first-
person theme include living in the historical manner of the event by only allowing 
participants to speak, act, dress, eat, and sleep accordingly. Living historians pride 
themselves on their ability to live as if they were in the past. For example, Livermore 
Falls, ME, invites guests to spend forty-eight hours in 19th century rural Maine life. Their 
web site describes the experience as follows:  
Imagine waking up and it is 1870. You are on the farm and the chores are waiting. 
The stove needs to be lit, water needs to be brought in, the cows need tending, and 
eggs need to be collected…Over the weekend… each individual becomes a 
member of a 19th century farm family in the Washburn family home and, as a 
member of the family, you will help with farm chores, cooking and cleaning, play 
games of the period and attend school… Live-in participants should be open to 
trying all new experiences. While there was little leisure for a farm family, free 
time has been scheduled. 
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Sleeping accommodations are old-fashioned bunkhouse style. Bathroom facilities 
are chamber pots and privies.15 
While the allure of chamber pots and privies may not be obvious to some, there are 
increasing numbers of people interested in experiencing these things for themselves. 
 An industry marketing the past is thriving: manufacturers, hotels, movie makers, 
clothiers, gun-makers, and animal handlers, just to name a few, are contemporary 
occupations at which people work on and profit from the consumption of history 
(Weeks). Other people who make up the players in the Simulated History industry 
include employees of Simulated History museums, battle reenactors (Civil War, WW II, 
American Revolution, and French and Indian War included), and documentary 
filmmakers. Of the Simulated History market, Civil War studies comprise a major 
element, and it is an area of historical obsession open to study. The practice and 
production of Simulated History result in manufactured, simulational knowledge claims 
about the past. 
 A study of Simulated History, both a market for the past and a new kind of 
historical rhetoric, leads us into the key question: How does Simulated History, then, get 
away with turning a simulational experience into the basis for a rhetorical and 
epistemological appeal? Here I suggest that this is so because, for the first time ever, we 
live in a largely simulational culture—this is a preview of the main argument because, in 
a simulational culture, simulation has epistemic power. In a world where shows like 
Survivor and events like mission trips serve as arguments about the “way the world really 
is” (or could be), Civil War reenactment does not seem so wholly un-convincing. It is a 
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simulated performance in an ever-more simulational culture. The Experienced History 
reenactors construct is not, in fact, experiential. They cannot be in the War; they cannot 
go back in time. But the power of their performance stems from the rhetorical and 
epistemological tools provided by personal epistemology, Professional History, and 
Collective Memory. 
  For example, through the simulation of Civil War reenactment, reenactors and 
spectators of the Civil War know the war—through the individualized experience of the 
reenactors, through the thoroughly researched details of the historical events, and through 
the group’s accepted definitions of the past. In the intersections between Experienced 
History, Professional History, Collective Memory, and Simulated History is the 
argumentative force of simulation. It is a three step process: first, we have to believe that 
there is a real; next, we accept that the simulation is as good as real; and finally, we are 
convinced by the real-ness of simulation. In those three steps, the argumentative logic 
changes — it is not a narrative logic, nor is it a logic of public deliberation. To be 
persuaded by a logic of simulation, we must be a part of the simulation, or grant 
epistemic powers to those who are — which isn’t that hard to do. Barry Brummett in The 
World and How We Describe It, explains that subjectivity, in a simulational world, is 
constructed from signs with no corresponding grounding in reality. “Simulation is the 
realm of masks; in it, the subject is all mask, all appearance and presentation, all style and 
image” (76). Thus, rules of argument change in a simulational world. Conviction stems 
not from rational choice or narrative fidelity; instead, we must be persuaded by the real-
ness of the simulation.  
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  Simulations convince us because they demonstrate, they perform, they show us an 
argument. If we are moved by the show, if we buy the performance, we will be convinced 
of the argument — and we may not even be aware that an argument was going on. In the 
dissertation I will unpack the argumentative force of simulation, but here I introduce the 
concepts located in a rhetoric of simulation. Experienced Histories, then, are a kind of 
argument in which the major players are similar to other argumentative devices—in that 
they must persuade on different levels. The warrant must be accepted, in Toulmin’s 
argument structure, for the data and the claim to be connected. And the data must be seen 
as valid in order for the claim to be accepted. These are different levels of persuasion. 
The same kinds of levels must be addressed in Experienced History — but they involve 
the construction and maintenance of a simulation. 
  Simulated History in general, and Civil War reenactment in particular, is an 
historical chimera, a strange mixture of research and experience, authenticity and fakery. 
It is a combination of the three historical rhetorics — but with a difference. Instead of 
actually “living” the history, people who do Simulated History are feigning it. 
Participants of Simulated History use the rhetorical and epistemological tools of 
Experienced History, Professional History, and Collective Memory to simulate the past. 
Simulated History gets its rhetorical power from simulation. By proposing to “live” 
historical experience, Simulated History transcends the rhetorical and epistemological 
claims of the other three rhetorics and creates a new way to make knowledge claims 
about the past: Simulated History.  
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 Simulation, as an argumentative environment, looks and feels an awful lot like 
quicksand. In discussions of simulation, words like “endless repetition,” “empty 
signifier,” and “the omnipresence of the medium” are used to describe notions of un-
parse-able existence. Contemporary humans, argues Baudrillard, create the imaginary in 
order to demonstrate that we know the difference between it and the real. In a discussion 
of the empty social capital conferred on graduates by modern universities, Baudrillard 
laments (and simultaneously) acknowledges that argumentative power exists in 
simulation: in the simulacra of school work, the simulacra of diplomas (Simulacra and 
Simulation 156). The process of simulation becomes, in and of itself, a kind of argument. 
We believe simulated events because we make them believable. We are persuaded by 
simulation because we grant it the power of experiential, argumentative, and social 
persuasion. 
 Simulated History is history performed and re-presented as contemporary 
experience. Because it is a simulation of the past, it gets rhetorical power from the very 
fact that it claims to be historical. As I mention earlier, the search for authenticity—
through the tools of Experienced History, Professional History, and Collective 
Memory—grants Simulated History a kind of rhetorical power that the other three 
historical rhetorics possess. Because Simulated History uses the dimensions of the other 
three historical rhetorics, it can lay claim to the same kinds of argumentative forces. 
Further, because Simulated History transcends the limitations and restrictions binding the 
other rhetorics because it is simulated—and because it adheres to a set of simulational 
rules and constraints. 
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  Below is a chart depicting the rhetorical dimensions of these claims about the 
past, and demonstrating the ways in which these historical claims differ from one 
another.  
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There are similarities between the knowledge claims made by each method, but there are 
differences, as well. Because the process of Simulated History is a feigned process, the 
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rhetorical and epistemological claims made by Simulated History are strange — they 
simultaneously use and transcend the rhetorical dimensions of the other three. In the 
following section I introduce my case study (a particular example of Simulated History), 
and I briefly discuss the ways in which Simulated History can transcend the limitations of 
the other three methods.  
CIVIL WAR REENACTMENT 
 The credibility of Simulated History increases in a simulational culture, and in the 
Second Chapter of this dissertation, I develop the idea of a simulational culture in more 
detail. The knowledge claims made by Simulated History are not isolated phenomena. 
“Survivor” and “The Real World,” both simulations of worlds that do not exist (deserted 
islands full of genetically blessed and mentally deranged people, houses full of 
genetically blessed and mentally deranged young people) allow viewers to “watch” a 
“lived” experience as if the audience were part of the scenery. They are simulational 
shows that get high ratings because of the “realness” of the simulations they convey. 
Another popular form of simulation, to depart a bit from Baudrillard, is mission trips. 
High school students and college students go to Costa Rica (or you may fill in the blank 
with any other underdeveloped country in either Central, South America, or Africa) for 
weeklong mission trips and come back telling their friends that they really “understand” 
indigenous culture now. These weeklong excursions are simulated experiences, providing 
the students with a “lived” experience of worlds they are not, in fact, a part of.  
  One of the most rapidly growing forms of Simulated History is Civil War 
reenactment (both in this country and in others). The performance and practice of Civil 
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War reenactment is a particular example of the rhetorical, epistemological uses to which 
Simulated History may be put. Because Civil War reenactment is only one aspect of 
Simulated History, I do not want immediately to conflate the rhetorical and 
epistemological goals of reenactors with the rhetorical and epistemological goals of 
Simulated History in general, but there may be room for generalization later. However, 
because examples are helpful in demonstrating larger implications of these rhetorical and 
epistemological trends, I introduce the practice of Civil War reenactment, as well as some 
of its unique qualities, into a broader discussion of Simulated History. 
  The first time I saw the Civil War re-enacted was early 2004. It was so cold out 
that we could see our breath as we walked to the battlefield: a fitting temperature for time 
travel. There is something frozen about the American Civil War to many American 
citizens. For some it is a chilling moment of national division and dissension. For others 
it is a bitter recollection of racial strife and bloodletting. And for still others it is a 
moment in time in which men were men and heroes were Confederates. The focus of this 
project is the latter group — the people who remember and enact a different war. To 
them memories of the Civil War are glorious and should be presented as such. Their war 
was a battle for sovereignty and control, a struggle for dignity and glory. On that cold 
morning I saw history frozen solid—taken out, dusted off, and re-enacted for a whole 
new generation. 
  The tents were already set up when we arrived. As we got out of our car, in the 
distance we could see smoke from campfires, flags snapping in the frosty wind. To the 
right of the tents soldiers were drilling. Officers rode prancing horses back and forth 
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across our field of vision, giving us an eerie sense of temporal vertigo; we parked our 
Nissan in 2004, but we walked into 1864. The setting of the scene had begun on 
Thursday. It was Saturday and everywhere we looked we saw the sights of an old 
America. I’m glad that we got there early; as the day wore on, more and more civvies 
arrived bearing handheld cameras and corndogs. But the sights and sounds of a mid-
nineteenth century war camp dominated the early morning. 
  The vast majority of soldiers were wearing gray. According to some of the 
soldiers with whom we spoke, the vast majority of soldiers were also fairly inauthentic. 
The hardcore troop in the middle, a group of about seven men, prides themselves on their 
dedication to “true” Southern memory. They snicker at the other people on the field, 
calling them re-enactors. “We,” said one of the hardcore, “are living historians.” 
  Civil War reenactment simultaneously uses and transcends the limitations of 
Experienced History, Professional History, and Collective Memory. Hardcore Civil War 
reenactors thrive on the authenticity of their performance. They pay strict attention to 
historical detail — down to the buttons on their coats and the stitching on their britches. 
They know much more about the war than most average Americans do, and they hold 
conferences to discuss and debate different conceptions of the past. Hardcore Civil War 
reenactors take reenactment very seriously; they see themselves as teachers and 
historians, while at the same time they avoid addressing the political problems posed by 
an overwhelming majority of white men, reenacting white men — who wear gray. The 
majority of reenactors are men. The majority of reenactors are Confederates. The history 
that they tell is a particular version, told in a way that leaves little room for debate or 
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doubt or questioning. What is the rhetorical power of these individually performed, 
professionally detailed, collective exercises? If these teachers and historians leave out 
important parts, will the spectators know that there are important parts missing? Civil 
War reenactment is a form of Simulated History. It is not an Experienced History or a 
Professional History or a Collective Memory, but it cannot convince without the 
rhetorical/epistemological tools of these methods.  
  The growing acceptance of simulation as “just as good as the real” signals 
changes in the rhetorical power of knowledge claims about the past. Not only does the 
collective often persuade us, as a culture, we have come to value simulational experience 
more and more. In light of these changing cultural trends, I propose a hypothesis: In a 
simulational culture, Simulated History is as rhetorically powerful as (and perhaps more 
rhetorically powerful than) the three main historical rhetorics described. In order to 
prove this claim, I propose three research questions: 
1) What are the dimensions of each method’s (Experienced History, Professional 
History, Collective Memory, and Simulated History) knowledge claims about the 
past?  
2) How has Simulated History come to be regarded as rhetorically valid/convincing? 
(i.e. what are the reasons (bases) for its increasing rhetorical validity?) 
3) What are the effects of simulational argument on the difficult questions of the 
past? (i.e. when there are no slaves at Civil War reenactments, for example, what 




This hypothesis, and its attached research questions, open room for other discussions — 
such as the ways in which we manipulate the past in order to shape the present, the ways 
in which historical silences (like slavery in Civil War reenactment or economic 
stratification in plantation homes and Livermore Falls) are erased in order to make the 
simulated past more pretty and palatable — and, perhaps, more convincing. Over the 
course of the dissertation, I hope to address these concerns. But they are the result and 
outgrowth of my hypothesis: simulation makes Simulated History more persuasive.   
CHAPTER LAYOUTS 
  This section describes the theoretical layout of each chapter. 
Chapter One: Summary and literature review of Experienced History, Professional 
History, and Collective Memory. In this chapter I explain and unpack each of the 
dimensions mentioned above. I also compare and contrast the different weights of each 
dimension, specifically examining the ways in which each historical rhetoric relies more 
or less on Materiality, Perspective, and Practitioners—as well as how the Historical 
Silences work within and between different claims about the past. 
Chapter Two: In this chapter, I do three things. First, I discuss the concept of simulation 
both as it relates to concepts of culture and parameters of argument. Second, I define the 
term “simulational culture,” proposing that certain contemporary cultural elements meet 
that definition. Finally, I provide and explain different examples of Simulated History 
within contemporary cultural experience. 
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Chapter Three: The case study — Civil War reenactment. In this chapter I analyze 
interviews with reenactors and discussion of reenactment in various media in order to 
explore the rhetorical dimensions of this Simulated History. 
Chapter Four: Conclusion.
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One: Convincing Histories 
 
Every important new discovery about the past changes how we think about the present 
and what we expect of the future; on the other hand, every change in the conditions of the 
present and in the expectations for the future revises our perception of the past (Breisach 
2).16 
  
  History is persuasion. To be considered “real history”—what really happened, 
different versions of the past must convince. The relation and reconstruction of past 
events is a careful task—performed by professors, parents, and football fans alike. 
Because our understanding of the present rests on our interpretations of the past, because 
history is the place where people go to “find out what happened,” and because we 
consider history to be ours—when we tell it, when we experience it, when we hear/read 
about it—explaining or interpreting the past becomes a very powerful rhetoric. In this 
dissertation I interrogate that power.  
  I want to understand how we are persuaded by different methods of historical 
investigation, and, in the process of doing that, explore the rhetorical ranges of different 
historical methods. By rhetorical range, I mean the ways in which people accept certain 
versions of historical events as real or meaningful. My definition of rhetoric, then, is 
broad, and I borrow from Wayne Booth’s latest book, The Rhetoric of Rhetoric:  
The entire range of resources that human beings share for producing effects on 
one another: effects ethical (including everything about character), practical 
(including politics), emotional (including aesthetics), and intellectual (including 
every academic field). (xi)  
The difference here is that the rhetoric I’ll be examining pertains particularly to historical 
perception and investigation. Because Booth’s definition is so broad, it allows the 
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discussion of different argumentative tools used by our historical rhetorics to address a 
wide variety of possible persuasion. Each method of historical knowledge claims 
addressed in this dissertation constructs and uses a different rhetoric of history. The 
fourth historical rhetoric, Simulated History, will be addressed specifically in the second 
chapter because, as I said earlier, it is a break from the first three—and its novelty has 
been less well-theorized. For now, I examine the argumentative parameters of 
Experienced History, Professional History, and Collective Memory. 
  The ways in which different versions of the past persuade us are related. As I 
mentioned in the Introduction, stories about the past are both sources (for knowledge—
places where people go to learn about history) as well as uses (claims designed to do 
something in the present—political or material or social). To explore the different ends to 
which these sources and resources are put, as well as similarities among and differences 
between Experienced History, Professional History, and Collective Memory, I identify 
four major dimensions within each rhetoric. Presented in the Introduction, these 
dimensions are umbrella terms, designed to categorize and group similar rhetorical moves 
serving a specific purpose. In this case, the specific purpose of each dimension refers to 
each rhetoric’s (Experienced History, Professional History, and Collective Memory) 
construction and application of knowledge claims about the past. The four dimensions I 
discuss in this chapter are Materiality, Perspective, and Practitioners, and Silences. 
  The form of these dimensions varies according to each rhetoric's historical claims. 
I preview the different constructions here—they are more fully developed later in the 
chapter. Dimensions of Materiality and Perspective in Experienced History look like 
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human bodies and sound like discussions of ownership. The practitioners of Experienced 
History are the people involved in constructing popular understandings of the past, the 
democratization of historical scholarship. In the rhetoric of Professional History, 
dimensions of Materiality and Perspective depend upon notions of writing and 
objectivity, and the Practitioners are experts trained in specialized methods of interpreting 
the past. Finally, Materiality and Perspective in Collective Memory rely on group 
identification and emphasize the function of empathy, while the Practitioners of 
Collective Memory are subjects—members of groups interested in explaining and 
interpreting the past according to the expectations of the groups to which they belong. 
The forms of these categories vary depending on the method at hand, but, I argue, these 
four dimensions connect the ways in which each method invokes credibility. 
  The reason that I choose these four dimensions is because constructions of each 
argument are substantive, ideological, and participatory. The substance, the basis, for 
each rhetoric’s claims to credibility is the material from which they make their claims. 
These are the sources and resources used—the grounds and the warrants that make claims 
believable and appropriate. Materiality refers to the tangibility of resources; the stuff of 
which these claims are constructed works to support and supplement their knowledge 
claims about the past. The tactile, tangible nature of a human body or a written text or a 
constructed group identity is a kind of rhetorical move that each method must make in 
order to convince. Such tangibility depends upon the different grounds being used—and 
the grounds must be warranted, there must be some connecting link between the grounds 
and the claims. So, like the warrant that made my stories of Disney World believable, the 
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warrants of Experienced History must connect bodily experience with claims based on 
such testimonies.  
  The ideological takes form in two of the dimensions: Perspective and Silences. 
While Materiality refers to the physical manifestation of each rhetoric (the body, writing, 
or group identity), Perspective and Silences, I argue, relate to the perceived (and 
received) intentions of the teller. Materially, for example, Experienced History exists in 
the human body. The understanding of that stance, then, must focus on the particularity 
of each body’s viewpoint; in that rhetoric, then, the Perspective is one of ownership. 
Professional History, firmly placed in the authority of writing, takes the perspective of 
objectivity. And Collective Memory, standing in the middle of group identification, sees 
the past through a lens of subjectivity.17  
  Finally, it is important to note that, while Materiality and Perspective are 
functional elements of credibility claims, the Practitioners might be better described as 
the performed use of these different claims. The Practice of each claim, as well as the 
people who put those claims into practice, display the contemporary ends to which 
historical knowledge claims are put. Materiality and Perspective connect to the 
ideological substance of historical claims. The Practitioners, on the other hand, 
demonstrate the ways in which those historical claims get used—the material and 
viewpoints that create argumentative environments in which each rhetoric gets 
performed, literally and practically, by the people involved in making claims about the 
past. Each rhetoric’s use of Materiality and Perspective are connected to the way that 
they rhetoric the past, but the Practitioners of each rhetoric are the results of those 
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rhetorics. So, the people who create these versions of the past, the Practitioners, display 
the practical performance of each theoretical step. Without the bodies of Practitioners, 
Experienced History would have no claims to tangibility. Without the people to train, 
Professional History could make no claims to expertise. And without the groups to which 
each member belongs, Collective Memory could not rely on empathy and identity. 
  Silences are performed, implied ideology. They are harder to pinpoint (because 
they’re silent), and they’re more difficult to notice (because they’re silent). The Silences 
implicit to different versions of the past are ideological in their invisibility. It is difficult, 
at times, to argue with different rhetorical re-constructions of the past—because their 
sources and resources are so convincing. We are schooled in the experiential nature of 
history—as children, we learn that Experienced History is credible and dependable 
because it is based in personal observation and interpretation. We are taught to expect the 
objectivity of Professional History. We are also taught to respect our elders; when they 
tell us that family has always performed Passover in this way, we must practice that 
Collective Memory as well.  
  But, as always, there are holes in every history: stories not included, perspectives 
overlooked, interpretations deemed unworthy. The responsibility for parsing these 
unmentionable moments and people weighs each version down—whether or not there are 
acknowledged silences, as one might see in any of the first three rhetorics (we’ve skipped 
this part for these reasons…), or the silences go completely unspoken, it is the critic’s 
duty to recognize the holes, call attention to them, and provide some explanation as to 
their existence. As Shermer and Grobman mention when they talk about historians, the 
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true historian is a real revisionist—constantly changing the shape of the past based on 
new discoveries and revelations. The same is true of the rhetorical critic—we are not 
doing our jobs if we miss the gaping Silences functioning in different versions of the past. 
Because the construction of history depends upon the acceptance of each version, 
telling stories about the past is a struggle over meaning. As I describe each of the 
different rhetorics (Experienced History, Professional History, and Collective Memory), I 
highlight the basic, underlying cultural assumptions (warrants as sources for knowledge) 
for each. The resulting uses to which those assumptions and conclusions are put may be 
political or social—but there are uses, ends, for these stories of the past. So, the struggle 
over meaning and historical significance is an important one. In this final section, I 
examine the import of stories that don’t get mentioned—the historical details and people 
who do not make the final cut. For whatever reason, each of the rhetorics decide which 
meanings apply and what stories should be included. The holes in history, the stories that 
don’t get chosen to be a part of the past, are possibly the most interesting elements of any 
rhetorical investigation of history because they often reveal the unspoken assumptions 
about the histories being told. 
  Of course, the differences between rhetorics of history sometimes pale in 
comparison to the similarities they share. Keeping those relationships in mind, though, 
should not preclude an analysis of the methods, the sources, resources and uses—how 
they work, what tools they use, what their professed goals are, how those goals become 
part of the persuasion. I do not mean to imply that there are clear, impermeable 
boundaries between each and every historical claim. Part of the persuasiveness of each 
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method arguably comes from their permeable boundaries—the rhetorical elements they 
share with each other—because when a warrant (a culturally bound assumption about the 
world) works for one kind of claim, then it may also work for the claims made by other 
kinds of historical rhetoric.  
  Studying the past and its role in contemporary social and political action is 
important, but that is more of an historian’s task. This is a rhetorical examination, and the 
goal of examining history from a rhetorical perspective is interpretation—to  locate the 
specific moments at which different versions of the past are most effective, how those 
versions get constructed, and what might be the intersections between the timing and 
constructions of different histories. In this project I examine the rhetoric of historical 
claims. When we write stories of the past in term papers, what are we doing? Alternately, 
when we tell the story of the past from our own individual understandings, how are we 
shaping the past? When we call the past individual or national or memory, what purposes 
do those labels serve? What are the persuasive argumentative mechanisms of these 
different rhetorical packages? 
  In this chapter I explore these questions, using the dimensions of Materiality, 
Perspective, Practice/Practitioners, and Silences to guide me. The first section focuses on 
Experienced History—its emphasis on the human body and its invocation of ownership to 
persuade. The second section focuses on Professional History’s uses of writing and 
objectivity. The final part of the chapter explores the function, in Collective Memory, of 
group identification and subjectivity. Each section defines the terms at hand, examines 
their function within the rhetoric, and analyzes rhetorical connections between each 
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method’s uses of these dimensions. The goal of this chapter is to pull apart the rhetorical 
construction of the past (both how it gets done and how it gets used) in Experienced 
History, Professional History, and Collective Memory in order to establish the 
argumentative structures of each. Before we can understand the rhetorical functions of 
different histories, we must grasp the various, interlocking parts of each argument. 
EXPERIENCED HISTORY 
  To begin the analysis, I explore the rhetoric of Experienced History. Experienced 
History is the histories told by individuals—they are personal revelations and relations, 
shared through the lens of lived experience. Examples of Experienced History include, 
but are not limited to, tales told by survivors and veterans, eyewitness testimonies, and 
grandparents’ campfire stories. The rhetoric of Experienced History appears to be the 
simplest, most straightforward rhetoric; whether or not Experienced History is the most 
straightforward of these historical rhetorics, its appearance, as such, makes it look very 
convincing. Because Experienced History emerges from the mouths of people who lay 
claim to certain events as their own, Experienced History is the rhetoric more and more 
people find convincing (Champion 153-154). 
  In this chapter, I examine four rhetorical aspects of Experienced History: the 
body; notions of ownership; and growing interest in popular history. Each of these 
aspects adds to the rhetorical power of Experienced History. Therefore, as we dissect the 
argument construction of different historical investigations, it is imperative that we 




Materiality: The Body 
  The first rhetorical aspect of Experienced History has to do with its bodily nature. 
Using the body to prove an argument is not a new phenomenon. Tattoos, sex worker art 
shows, mission trips, and lynchings all work as bodily kinds of arguments—and in 
contemporary discussions of identity politics, social movements, and traumatic histories, 
bodies work as evidence, warrant, and data;18 each of these arguments depends upon a 
body or bodies as argumentative devices. In this project, I explore the body as historical 
evidence—as a resource for proving claims about the past. Contemporary audiences 
believe bodies. We are taught that the scientific method with its rigorous adherence to 
practices of observation are more reliable than the texts of history books or even the 
memories of digital databases. What we can see and feel is what we can believe; anything 
else might be tampered with and is, therefore, unreliable. From contemporary TV shows 
to biblical claims of apostolic authority to atrocity survivor testimonies, claims of the 
body (experience, survival, pain, action, sacrifice) are fore-grounded as the most credible 
kind of evidence. For example, television programs like CSI and Law & Order19 rely 
upon the notion that a body (either a body of evidence or a body itself) work to convince. 
In fact, at times, these bodies are more reliable and convincing, according to the 
television characters, than the testimony of witnesses or details found in calendars and 
taken from cameras.  
  Debra Hawhee’s (and others) quest for understanding the historical connections 
between rhetoric and the body demonstrate the connection between the rhetorical devices 
one uses to persuade and the bodies from which those devices issue. The entire Spring 
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2006 issue of Rhetoric Society Quarterly is dedicated to the notion that bodies are not 
merely a casing for the voices persuading, they are often part and parcel of the entire 
rhetorical endeavor. Rhetoric is intimately linked to the feelings of the body. What kind 
of histories “ring true”? What, exactly, is rung by the “trueness”? The rhetorical push of 
Experienced History lies in those intimate intersections. The persuasion might work 
something like this:  
1) I have a body.  
2) And my body knows what it is like to cry—or be scared or hurt or amused. 
3) Therefore, when you use your body as an example—use your experience as a 
rhetorical tool—I may believe you more than I would if you showed me a 
book written about this… because the shared rhetorical device is our similar 
belief in and reliance on experience.  
Belief in the rhetorical power of bodily experience is one of the driving forces behind 
ever-increasing efforts to collect and compile Holocaust survivor and witness 
testimonies. An understanding like this might be the impetus behind the Lanzmann’s 
“Shoah” and the Yale Project—to record and document the stories of Holocaust 
survivors.20 In The Survivor: An Anatomy of Life in the Death Camps, Terence Des Pres 
describes the survivor’s drive to tell the story of survival: 
Through survivors a vast body of literature has thus come into being—diaries, 
novels, documentary reports, simple lists and fragments, books in many 
languages, which all tell one story. This kind of writing is unusual for the 
experience it describes, but also for the desire it reveals to remember and record. 
 
51 
The testimony of survivors is rooted in a strong need to make the truth known, 
and the fact that this literature exists, that survivors produced these documents—
there are many thousands of them—is evidence of a profoundly human process. 
Survival is a specific kind of experience, and “to survive as a witness” is one of 
its forms (30). 
In this excerpt the witness is a survivor, determined to relate stories of horror most people 
will never experience (bodily) for themselves. However, the power of this witnessing, the 
rhetorical force of these stories comes from their humanness—we are persuaded by the 
bodies doing the speaking, the experiences of those bodies. The relation of pain, the 
explanations of bodily degradation and humiliation, the ongoing suffering survivors 
experience all add to the bodily conviction of survivor testimony.  
  Trauma is one of the most powerful of bodily rhetorics. Telling stories of illness, 
war, and death is impossible without using the body to do so. In The Wounded Storyteller 
Arthur Frank, himself a cancer survivor, explores the ways that people use their bodies to 
tell “illness stories.” He writes of the narrative contradictions between what, to medical 
professionals, is a body to be fixed and what, to individuals suffering, is their interaction 
with the world.  
The body is not mute, but it is inarticulate; it does not use speech, it begets it. The 
speech that the body begets includes illness stories; the problem of hearing these 
stories is to hear the body speaking in them. People telling illness stories do not 
simply describe their sick bodies; their bodies give their stories their particular 
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shape and direction. People certainly talk about their bodies in illness stories; 
what is harder to hear in the story is the body creating the person (27).  
Frank describes the processes of people attempting to come to terms with their pain and 
suffering through stories.  
  He also addresses the rhetorical implications of such bodily stories, citing the 
importance of a “pedagogy of suffering” in a world where hospitals are turning more into 
for-profit endeavors. “The pedagogy of suffering is my antidote to administrative systems 
that cannot take suffering into account because they are abstracted from the needs of 
bodies. When the body’s vulnerability and pain are kept in the foreground, a new social 
ethic is required” (146). In this new social ethic, constructed from the Experienced 
History of ill bodies, the interaction between medical authorities would be driven not 
only by an urge to eliminate and eradicate sickness, but also by an ethic informed and 
upheld by rhetorical constructions of individual suffering.  
  The rhetorical force of these body stories comes from their grounding within the 
body. A body persuades us because we understand the notions of pain and suffering for 
ourselves—but at the same time, we recognize the impossibility of feeling that pain in the 
exact same way it gets felt by the other body. The class of bodily knowledge is what gets 
us to defer to individual/other claims—and to insist on our own. Body rhetoric of this 
kind is contradictory: it is inclusive and exclusive; it is universal and particular; it is 
public and private—all at the same time. Anatole Broyard discusses the impossibility and 
rhetorical power of suffering in Intoxicated by My Illness. He describes the emotional 
highs and lows of living with a disease that will eventually take his life. Each of the 
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stories he shares, all of the observations he makes, is driven by the body he lives in, and 
he recognizes the strange contradictions that occur in a rhetoric of Experience. 
I’ve had eight inch needles thrust into my belly, where I could feel them tickling 
my metaphysics. I’ve worn Pampers. I’ve been licked by flames, and my sense of 
self has been singed… Now at last I understand the conditional nature of the 
human condition… As I look back at how I used to be, it seems to me that an 
intellectual is a person who thinks that the classical clichés don’t apply to him, 
that he is immune to homely truths. I know better now.  I see everything with a 
summarizing eye. Nature is a terrific editor (3). 
Broyard’s revelations as he gets sicker and sicker are intimately connected to his 
onotological status—as much as Cartesians tell us over and over that we are separated 
mind and body, Broyard and the storytellers of bodily suffering remind us that the bodies 
we inhabit shape us. And just as we are shaped by those bodies, we are persuaded by the 
rhetorics we see and hear emerging from them.  
Perspective: Ownership 
  Basing claims of ownership in the substance of the human body makes each story 
personal; ownership also means deferring to the property rights and claims of another. As 
we see above, Experienced History’s rhetorical construction of credibility places itself 
firmly in the body of the story-teller, or the historian. Such a bodily stance creates a 
Perspective of ownership: the stories I tell about my body and the past are mine. And that 
is a powerful kind of credibility. 
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  Philosophically, the association of ownership with Experienced History is also a 
Cartesian notion. According to Lauren Marino, analyzing the position of a speaker stems 
from Descartes’ belief in the private minds of individuals: “The mind has thoughts that it 
conveys to the world through language. I have a thought inside my mind which I then 
translate into language. Words stand in for these ideas, ideas to which only the speaker 
has access” (“Speaking for Others,” 36). Because the thoughts in my head are directly 
related to the experiences of my body—the mind translates the experiences, remembers 
them, and then composes them into language for transmission to the outside world—the 
translated experience is mine and mine only. I am the only one who can tell the complete 
story from my speaking location, and, therefore, the story that I tell is rhetorically 
individualized. 
  Possibly one of the most well-known examinations of rhetorically powerful 
proprietary stories occurs in Alcoff’s “The Problem of Speaking for Others.” In her 
discussion of the crisis of representation, Alcoff explains the psychological and socio-
political problems associated with groups and individuals who attempt either to speak for 
or about various other groups and individuals: “This act of representation cannot be 
understood as being founded in an act of discovery wherein I discover their true selves 
and then simply relate my discovery… such representations are in every case mediated 
and the product of interpretation (which is connected to the claim that a speaker’s  
location has epistemic salience)” (9). Implicit in these observations is an assumption that 
a speaker’s individual location grants that speaker the power to speak authentically and 
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truthfully about her own experiences. Authenticity and truth are powerful rhetorical 
elements of such claims to ownership.  
  A powerful demonstration of the intimate connection between the Material of the 
body and the Perspective of ownership exists in the literature of apostolic authority. This 
literature is an example of the often unspoken, intimate connections between bodily 
experience and “ownership” of the past. In discussions of claims to apostolic authority, 
Biblical redactors (and contemporary hermeneuts) examine the personal, bodily 
experiences of Jesus’ apostles in order to reveal his or her “true” understanding of 
Christian teaching. Apostolic authority, then, grows out of the personal, experiential 
nature of Experienced History; the authority to know and teach Jesus stems from the 
owned experiences each apostle had with Jesus before and after his death. Those seeking 
apostolic authority have in mind the goal of personal credibility—apostolic authority 
cannot exist without the rhetorical force of personal experience: the apostles were 
authorities of Jesus because they knew him. Theirs is a performative, experiential claim.  
  Many feminist Biblical scholars examine the apostolic authority of Mary 
Magdalene, in comparison to the male apostles who either wrote, or are quoted in, the 
gospels. In Mary Magdalene, The First Apostle, Ann Graham Brock examines the ways 
in which apostles gained apostolic authority—usually through a close, personal 
relationship with Jesus and manifested by a sighting of him after the crucifixion. In this 
work, Brock examines the Petrine claim to authority in contradistinction to Mary’s claim 
to authority. Demonstrating the diametric opposition created and sustained by the gospels 
between these two characters in Jesus’ life, Brock suggests that Mary’s diminution in 
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scripture is directly related to notions of gender and power at the time in which the 
gospels were written. Noting the varying portrayals of Mary and Peter in the gospels, 
Brock observes that Luke is very pro-Peter, while John is more pro-Mary—and each 
gospel alters the wording and depiction of certain events with a seeming intent to 
diminish and/or elevate the status of one of these two apostles.  These observations 
display the structure around which images of Mary as a valuable teacher and founder of 
the Church are formed and disseminated. 
  Such claims to authority do more than provide an opportunity for Biblical 
scholars to write papers pitting one understanding of Jesus’ life and work against another. 
There are major historical, political, and social implications for these Experienced 
Histories. As we know, the textual shape of the Bible forms the ideological shape of 
much Western thought. The “rock” of the Catholic Church is Peter; if he is no longer the 
most favored apostle—if, in fact, his place is taken by a woman, then that changes the 
historical coloring book significantly. These aren’t just textual mistakes being corrected, 
these are doctrinal foundations being questioned—and it’s a big deal. In this example, we 
begin to see the ideological power of Silences. The silent position of women in the 
majority of the King James Bible is a loud performance of their submissive and 
immaterial function in the biblical world. Because Experienced History only allows for 
one particular version of the events experienced, there is room for quite a bit of 
hindsight—and, in the case of apostolic authority, ideological correction. 
  Other writers address Mary’s claim to authority. Susan Haskins explores the Mary 
figure throughout art history and calls for Mary’s return to authority within the Church, 
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making her a touchstone of women’s religious and cultural authority. Mary Thompson 
proposes that, based on her analysis of early Church records, Mary Magdalene be 
awarded the “following titles: Apostle, because she had seen the Lord; disciple because 
she had followed the Lord; deacon because she had ministered to him and to his other 
disciples; evangelizer because she was sent out with the message that Jesus Christ had 
risen; and leader because the written evidence portrays her thus” (119). Her position 
within the earliest history of the Church makes Mary Magdalene a suitable legitimation 
of female power and spiritual leadership. Both the Experienced History of Mary and the 
claims made by these biblical scholars are put to use in contemporary thinking. These 
uses are the results and uses of such argumentative constructions. As I mention in the 
Introduction, this is the structure of such arguments—the warrants and grounds are the 
sources/resources from which the claims get their persuasive pull, while the persuasion 
occurs in the claims constructed from those sources. Those claims are then put to use—to 
do some work in the present. 
  The sources of these arguments stem from personal Experienced History. The 
hermeneutics of apostolic authority center on the figure of Mary Magdalene and the 
overriding importance of personal Experienced History. Authority stems from (and 
through) a close, personal relationship with Jesus and is manifested by a sighting of him 
after the crucifixion. The ability to speak and teach Christian thought authoritatively 
stems from personal experience. To be an apostle, one must experience a personal 
connection with Jesus, and one must interact with a resurrected Jesus. Either way, the 
goal of apostolic authority focuses on the individualized rhetoric of Experienced History. 
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  Speaker placement and perceptions of Experienced History ownership are closely 
related to the uses and arguments surrounding the body. The rhetorical force of 
Experienced History also comes through in any sort of ethnographic data. Ethnography 
is, by its very nature, a study of the individual storyteller. The tales told to ethnographers 
are invested with an ethical credibility because, as Alcoff states, the place a speaker 
inhabits has epistemic salience, and that salience is rhetorically powerful. Ethnography 
bases its theoretical understanding on this epistemic salience. But more than that, the 
persuasive power of ethnography (a scholarly way to “speak for the other”) is itself based 
in the rhetorical sources of Experienced History. Recognizing that the historical, social, 
and individual stories collected through ethnographic research are mediated—constructed 
between the individual being interviewed and the researcher—ethnographers and oral 
historians cite the importance of hearing the voices of those who disappear from history 
books. In “Telling our Stories: Feminist Debates and the Use of Oral History,” Joan 
Sangster writes, 
The feminist embrace of oral history emerged from a recognition that traditional 
sources have often neglected the lives of women, and that oral history offered a 
means of integrating women into historical scholarship, even contesting the 
reigning definitions of social, economic, and political importance that obscured 
women’s lives. The topics potentially addressed… the possibilities of putting 
women’s voices at the centre [sic] of history and highlighting gender as category 
of analysis; and the prospect that women interviewed will shape the research 
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agenda by articulating what is of importance to them; all offer challenges to the 
dominant ethos of the discipline. (5-6) 
Sangster goes on to discuss the costs and benefits of such research—exploring the 
varying degrees of verifiability, the relationship between power and research, the 
function and form of newer research methods in academe. She also touches on the power 
of historical Silence—the “often neglected lives of women” in Professional History are 
fodder, she proposes, for examining their histories in a different way. Each of these 
problems, though, with oral history and its results, revolves around the notions of 
ownership, specifically: to whom do these body stories belong?  
  There is a visceral feeling of truth to oral history and ethnography—which is 
often one of the reasons provided for doing ethnographic research.21 In the debates about 
oral history’s role in historical investigation, the reasons supporting its inclusion are the 
same as the reasons provided by its critics. Ethnography depends upon the embodied 
experience, as well as the realization that philosophers and scientists are not the only 
people capable of critical thought; ethnography is the notion that a body capable of 
experience is also capable of relating that experience—in some ways more capable than a 
distant academic or another member of the same group.  
  This differentiation, the critical separation between the Experiencer and the 
Interpreter of that Experience, is important to the credibility claims of Experienced 
History. In ethnographic studies this line is a delicate one to walk. For example, Aaron A. 
Fox, in Real Country, examines a culture of working class Texans by living in and among 
people who represent their lives as “country.” The challenge, Fox writes, of 
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understanding through ethnography is to be simultaneously aware of both body and 
soul—the person speaking and the place from which the person speaks. 
[C]ulture theory has no monopoly on abstraction, nor academic social science on 
intellectual argument. Ordinary life is shot through with both momentary and 
sustained critical reflexivity… [T]he analysis of cultural mediation entails a 
dialogic calibration of the theoretical abstractions of social science (e.g., “class,” 
“culture,” “emotion,” “art”) and the theoretical abstractions emergent from 
particular domains of practice and discourse (e.g., “redneck,” “country,” 
“feeling”). (35) 
Each of these differentiations highlights not only conceptual differences between theory 
and practice, but the ways in which those theoretical differences are argued. To 
understand the boundaries between “class” and “culture” (as well as the permeability of 
those boundaries), researchers and oral historians must grant their subjects argumentative 
believability. I am not saying that ethnographers automatically and unquestioningly 
accept every statement made by subjects; however, the first assumption of ethnography 
underlines the first-person ethos of Experience History. That the subjects individually 
“own” their stories makes the stories believable. 
  The practice and procedure of collecting history orally also lends rhetorical power 
to the credibility of individuals speaking history. As the researcher collects testimonies 
and data, she becomes a sort of field-worker through the past. Paul Thompson in The 
Voice of the Past describes the transformative power of oral history research within 
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historical fields particularly, but also within the practice of individual historical research 
generally. 
The immediate environment also gains, through the sense of discovery in 
interviews, a vivid historical dimension: an awareness of the past which is not just 
known, but personally felt… It is one thing to know that streets or fields around a 
home had a past before one’s own arrival; quite different to have received from 
the remembered past, still alive in the older people of the place, personal 
intimacies of love across those particular fields, neighbours [sic] and homes in 
that particular street, work in that particular shop. (10-11) 
As researchers gather information about each individual experience of history, the 
process of history itself is recognized as experiential. The rhetoric of Experienced History 
draws its power from the notion that this experiential quality can be made into 
individually owned, bodily versions of the past. Further, where history sometimes gets 
understood as the chronicling of kings and heroes, oral history collection expands 
historical investigation into the ordinary, the everyday. History as history is the chronicle 
of kings—limited to the Carlyle perception that history is made and written by the few 
men who run the world. History as human reminds historians and students/readers that 
the people who lived history were very much like us. They lived, breathed, loved, 
suffered. However, because of the separations of body and time, people who lived in the 
past felt and experienced the world differently. History was experiential and ordinary and 




Practitioners: Mass Culture Consumers 
  A discussion of Experienced History as personal perspective leads into the final 
persuasive element of experience: the growing interest in popular histor(ies). In the last 
few decades changing methods, academic interests, and technological advances have 
heightened public interest in learning and knowing the past.  “History [has] become, to 
put it simply, more democratic.” (P. Thompson 9)  
  In an essay discussing World War I battlefield tourism, Jennifer Iles examines the 
practices and procedures of commercial bus tours through the Western Front battlefields 
of World War I. The impulse to attend these battlefields in person, she writes, is driven 
by historical curiosity. But there are other impulses at play, as well. 
All kinds of people are attracted to the area. There are the historians and military 
enthusiasts; others may have a literary interest in the war, stirred by the work of 
“trench” poets such as Wilfred Owen and Siegfried Sassoon; others have 
undertaken the trip on the recommendations of friends and family; many are there 
solely to accompany spouses and friends… For others, the now quiet towns and 
fields represent an important part of family history. (“Recalling the Ghosts of 
War” 165)  
Each of these groups is driven by a personal, embodied desire to feel history more 
closely. And they are made to believe, by the tour guides and the other tourists, that a 
personal connection with the past is not only desirable, but possible. The passengers are 
expected to be involved with the information shared on the buses, as well as the 
discussion of certain battlefield details. As much as the tour guides are the “experts,” the 
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tourists are made to feel more informed and knowledgeable—just by being there. It is a 
group effort at history, a shared drive to make the history of the war both personal and 
immediate. 
  Another aspect of current trends in popular history occurs on television. Jerome 
de Groot’s “Empathy and Enfranchisement: Popular Histories,” explores the newest ways 
in which history gets packaged for popular consumption. 
Over the past decade, “history” has become a leisure activity as never before. 
“History” as a brand or discourse pervades popular culture from Schama to 
Starkey to Tony Soprano’s championing of the History Channel, through the 
massive popularity of local history and the internet-fuelled genealogy boom, via 
million-selling historical novels, television drama and a variety of films.(391-392) 
The list of popular histories, ranging from television programs like “Manor House” to 
Tom Brokaw’s The Greatest Generation make history seem more approachable, more for 
the people. While many historians lament the clear ideological bent of certain popular 
histories, the fact remains that history for the people is a much-desired and sought-after 
product. 
  The growing interest in popular history, as well as the feeling that history can 
belong to “popular culture” as much as it belongs to historians and academics, works as a 
persuasive tool for Experienced History. As soon as an audience believes that history is 
exciting, history is personal, and history is something everyone can learn and understand, 
the “popular” in history becomes even more convincing. Because Experienced History is 
individualized (the body’s experience makes the story more believable) and because 
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personal history is privately owned (the individual perspective is lauded over the 
community of research), the notion that history made for and distributed to the public 
works. Everybody gets a piece, and everybody gets to feel something historical. Feeling, 
as we see above, is persuasive.  
  History, the reconstruction of events in the past, is no longer left only to the 
experts. The Practitioners of Professional History and Collective Memory, as we will see 
in the next two sections of this chapter, are more specialized and particular than the 
people who construct and consume Experienced History. For better or for worse, the 
increasing numbers of people who research their family genealogies, read bestselling 
history books, and watch the History Channel indicate that the domain of historical 
investigation is becoming more democratic. According to Michael Frisch in A Shared 
Authority, the impulse to construct and explain history according to notions of popularity 
and publics is dialectic: 
[N]ew forms of public history have waged a kind of guerilla war against … 
notion[s] of professional scholarly authority: the promise of community history, 
of people’s video, of labor theatre, of many applications of oral history, has been 
empowerment—returning to particular communities or generating from within 
them the authority to explore and interpret their own experience… [But] the 
power of populist self-empowerment through public history can be as easily and 
romantically exaggerated; there is something offensively patronizing in the notion 
that ordinary people and communities have little capacity for communicating with 
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and incorporating approaches to … history originating outside their own 
immediate experience and knowledge. (xxi)  
On the one hand is the attractive idea that popular history opens the past up to voices and 
groups typically unheard from; on the other hand is the parochial assumption that 
democracy means lowest common denominator, that the groups traditionally ignored by 
History are only able to tell a narrow, singular story of experience. These opposing 
thoughts drive debates within and outside of the academy. They also demonstrate some of 
the different ways in which these methods of historical investigation construct their ethos. 
Popular history (via Experienced History) belongs to the people—and they know about 
their own experiences, so they should be believed. These separate experiences, however, 
are inherently limited. The limits of my body abrogate the historical interpretations I can 
create and explain. 
Silences: Limited Experience 
  The interesting bit about Experienced History’s Silences is that they have to be 
there. While we are instructed (in history classes, in family gatherings, in movies about 
the past) to keep in mind that there may be other tales of the past to be told, we cannot be 
expected to know them experientially. The source of Experienced History’s Silence is 
both innate and necessary. Individuals are silent about the pasts they did not experience 
because there is a limit to what we can know personally. Because the body cannot have 
been anywhere and seen everything, there are experiences that cannot be shared by 
survivors and witnesses. Such limitations, though, still present an ideological form: 
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people begin to assume that, because they have not experienced something personally, 
then it is not believable.  
  A good example of these ideological limitations occurs in discussions of race. 
Such a physically-focused rhetoric as Experienced History is rife with constructions, 
depictions, and presentations of race. There are, however, silent elements of racialized 
histories. Whiteness, for example, is often assumed, and in its great invisibility (and 
representational difficulty), whiteness shapes many stories of history. Carrie Crenshaw, 
discussing the function and form of whiteness, examines the ideological struggles that 
happens around and in between cultural assumptions about meaning. She writes, 
“Ideological struggles are struggles over meaning. Meaning is a social production, a 
practice of making the world mean something, and this meaning is produced through 
language” (“Resisting Whiteness’ Rhetorical Stance 256). The cultural production of 
history produces certain ideological meanings that then function rhetorically to persuade. 
Each aspect of these ideological stances may not be overt—in fact, sometimes the 
unspoken, indirectly referenced aspects of ideologies may be the most persuasive. As 
Edward Said mentions in his investigation of ideology, cultural imperialism (and other 
forms of ideological domination) exist within the silences and between the lines of 
culture.  
 Openly racialized understandings of the past are an aspect of Collective Memory 
that demonstrates these strategic choices. The racialized feel of these constructed 
identities and strategic silences stresses the different roles played by whiteness and 
blackness. Whiteness is often the Silent Establishment of cultural and historical studies. 
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Rarely, if ever, are there open discussions of what it means to be white, or what the 
rhetorical power of whiteness brings to interactions between people. Just as there is little 
open discussion among Professional Historians (or Americans in general) about the status 
of whiteness, there is a growing scholarly interest in the rhetoric of whiteness. Carrie 
Crenshaw, in “Colorblind Rhetoric,” explains the depths and extent of racism in everyday 
language, noting that silence about the power of whiteness is part and parcel of racist 
linguistic constructions: 
Though there is much evidence that ‘race’ is a biological fiction, the language of 
‘race’ or ‘race talk’ continues to inscribe a sense of natural difference in discourse 
thereby veiling hidden relations of power and knowledge… Racism in America is 
much more complex than the conscious conspiracy of a power elite or the simple 
delusions of a few ignorant bigots. It is part of our common historical experience. 
(246-247) 
The language and consciousness of racism is part of our histories. But such language and 
consciousness are often hidden by the incommensurability of individual Experience with 
historical range. Experienced History, in its drive to document the feel of history, 
sometimes skips over the larger implications of such a myopic focus on the past. 
The physicality, ownership, and popularity of histories constructed by Experience 
are populated by the Silences of abject bodies, who never get to own or talk about their 
personal experiences of the past. There are some places where those kinds of histories get 
told—but in a rhetoric that depends so strongly on personal, individual understandings of 
the past, the voices of the abject and the absent must often be mediated. And with 
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mediation (especially if the media are trying to project a neutral projection of different 
events and voices) there is an innate obstacle to their accepted evaluation by Experienced 
History’s standards. As alluring as direct experiential observation may be, the historical 
events are often beyond and around and before the individuals experiencing those pasts. 
One answer to Experienced History’s Silences is Professional History. The 
process of scientizing the past, making the events of history documentable and verifiable, 
is the proposed agenda of Professional History. It goes beyond individual experience—
seeks to fill in the Silences and Popular Histories constructed by Experience—but, as we 
will see in the next section, Professional History suffers from its own limitations. 
PROFESSIONAL HISTORY 
  Professional History lives (most of the time)22 in the Ivory Tower, where 
knowledge claims about the past are expressed in a variety of ways. As Experienced 
History relies upon the embodied knowledge of its audience, Professional History 
depends upon its audience’s Cartesian divorce from the body. Persuasion, in the realm of 
the academic, occurs in different forms. In this section I explore four dimensions of 
Professional History’s historical knowledge claims: documentability, objectivity, and 
specialization, and silences. The Materiality of Professional History exists in the 
mountains of papers, books, and statistics created by research. The ethos of documents is 
related to the ethos of bodies: whereas Experienced History relies upon the believability 
of experience, Professional History relies upon humanity’s faith in expertise. Second, 
rather than notions of historical ownership, the rhetoric of Professional History relies on 
objectivity and specialization. There are two aspects to Professional History’s 
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construction of credibility (as opposed to Experienced History’s singular notion of 
ownership) because the rhetoric of Professional History depends on exclusivity: the 
rhetoric of the experts must be taught—and to teach objectivity, Professional History 
must discipline the past. 
  Because expertise is fundamental to the credibility of Professional History, 
notions of training are important to its rhetoric. Further, Specialization and Silences go 
hand in hand. The training of experts in the language of Professional History creates 
another level of credibility for this method of interpreting the past. Professional History 
narrows its focus on training and language to include only the people emerging from 
contemporary history education. The increasing disciplining and division of educational 
fields marks the death of the generalist. But, as academia moves away from teaching the 
whole person how to be a person, the argument that we will eventually answer all the 
questions we have gets more seductive.  Specialization may mean that different areas will 
not understand the solutions and conclusions reached by their counterparts; it also 
implies, however, that the mystery is related to credibility. The priesthood of academia is 
a persuasive rhetorical device indeed.23 In the following sections I explain and define 
first, authoritative notions of writing, as well as the rhetorical relationships between 
Professional History’s reliance on objectivity, specialization and silences. 
Materiality: Writing 
  Professional History is a rhetorical system based on the primacy of writing. In that 
rhetorical system, then, the construction and dimensions of truth and believability are 
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based on the persuasive power of writing things down. As Experienced History privileges 
experience of the body, Professional History privileges the written word. 
  The Materiality of Professional History takes the form of written statements about 
the past. Historians document their arguments in books and conference papers, lists of 
statistics and figures, papers about the where and when of past events. Unlike the 
persuasion of bodily evidence (like we see in academic discussions of apostolic authority 
or in lay conversations about CSI or Law and Order), often “official” histories are sort of 
bodiless. This bodilessness does not negate the materiality of history, or the effectiveness 
of bodies as persuasion, but it takes a different form—and often attempts to disguise it. 
Justin Champion’s discussion of the textual developments and invention in historical 
scholarship highlights the importance of writing as a medium for Professional History’s 
claims to truth. 
A brief survey of the growth of the literary forms of historical scholarship and 
criticism from antiquity to the twentieth century (in simple terms the transition 
from scroll to codex) would tell a story that bound up the increasing credibility 
and authority of historians with the invention of literary devices… [T]he 
invention of the footnote [for example] was a manifestation of a culture of 
witnessing, testimony, and citation, which was rooted deep in the rhetorical 
foundations of historical thinking. Although footnotes are fundamental to the 
invocations of a creditable and ‘true’ history, they are still only a historical 
product… Over the centuries historians have been clever at developing cultural 
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strategies for avoiding the charges of bias and subjectivity. (“Seeing the Past” 
156)  
In this excerpt, Champion stresses the invented power of Professional History’s chosen 
medium: the written text. Each claim to truth, written and verifiable, works rhetorically 
within the written medium to bolster both the stance of historians as well as their 
“objective” positioning. These are the sources and resources of Professional History—
this is where academic historians shop for basic and credible grounds. In the next part of 
this section, I examine the interaction between writing and objectivity more thoroughly 
(the basic warrants behind Professional History’s constructions of the past), but before I 
do that, I elaborate on the rhetorical power of writing’s perceived immutability.  
  To document a history is to collect and interpret (or relate) the different meanings 
of these materials, a collection of enunciative statements about historical events and their 
results. According to Michel Foucault’s discussion of the statement’s enunciative 
materiality, statements are materially “specific and paradoxical objects” (“The 
Enunciative Function 105). Statements function with two seemingly paradoxical sets of 
limitations: first, the statement is not “defined by the space occupied or the date of its 
formulation; but rather by its status as a thing or object” (102). The second set of 
limitations/constraints is contextual: 
those that are imposed by all the other statements among which it figures, but the 
domain in which it can be used or applied, but the role and functions that it can 
perform. The affirmation that the earth is round or that species evolve does not 
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constitute the same statement before and after Copernicus, before and after 
Darwin. (103) 
So, the statement, as a thing or object, is affected and shaped by the contexts in which it 
appears. The Materiality of history—as a series of collected statements—is shaped, then, 
by the times and spaces in which it is uttered. History is the statements, Professional 
History is the collection of those statements. 
  Professional History is a rhetorical construction of the past from varying scientific 
investigations and documentations. Professional History and Collective Memory are 
often described as opposites because Professional History, in this binary, seeks 
documentable, verifiable truth (Gronbeck 49). The emphasis here is on the 
“documentability” of the past. Historians, like most contemporary theorists and 
laypeople, assume writing to be a legitimate representation of knowledge.  
  Over the last few decades, philosophers interested in deconstructing and 
interrogating the relationships between writing and claims to truth have suggested that 
writing may not be the direct route to truth it is often assumed to be. In fact, they suggest, 
claims to truth in writing seem to be dicey, at best. Paul Damerow, in an online essay 
about the study of proto-languages examines the epistemological assumptions 
surrounding language. Traditional philology proposes that written languages correspond 
to spoken languages, and, as the thoughts are translated into writing, the logic of 
representation is fairly equal. 
From such a point of view, the philological perspective appears to be an  
interpretation of writing as a representation of knowledge, that is, as a written 
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instantiation of the representation of knowledge in oral language… Historical 
epistemology poses the questions of when, where, why and how writing was 
invented  in view of the broader perspective of studying writing as a means of 
representation and the historical transmission of knowledge  that may or may not 
be  intimately linked to language as a means of oral communication. (2)  
In this essay, Professor Damerow is discussing the benefits and trials of studying proto-
languages—how they work and why they should be classified differently than many of 
the more familiar ancient languages. The thrust of his talk, though, is based upon the 
assumption that there is something solidly epistemological about writing. That, if we 
study the writing (and languages) of the ancients, we will know them better. 
  Professional History bases its rhetorical claims to truth on the firm foundation of 
knowledge through standardized education. Because, as Professor Damerow mentions 
above, knowing a culture and knowing its writing are so intimately linked, educational 
theories and notions of cognitive development have developed around (and depend upon) 
the centrality of literacy. In Rhetoric and Reality, his study of American writing 
pedagogy, James Berlin explores the different methods of teaching writing. This kind of 
exploration is important, he writes, because “Literacy has always and everywhere been 
the center of the educational enterprise. No matter what else it expects of its schools, a 
culture insists that students learn to read, write and speak in the officially sanctioned 
manner” (1). The primacy of writing to a culture, as well as the understanding of that 
culture’s truths cannot be overstated. Learning how to write, learning how to read, 
learning how to interpret cultural texts: all of these tasks are taught to students throughout 
 
74 
the world. The unspoken assumption here is, of course, the epistemological trueness of 
writing. Such assumptions emphasize the primary position of writing to understandings 
of the past while they simultanesouly offer a preview to the existence of (and the reasons 
provided for) Professional History’s Silences. To put so much pedagogical emphasis on 
writing is to emphasize writing’s inseparability from truth. 
  Writing’s centrality in the educational process outlines certain epistemological 
functions of writing within cultural systems, according to Berlin. Each time we teach our 
students to privilege a specific style of writing, each time we tell our students how 
important are their interpretations and creation of texts, he writes, we are re-minding 
them of the shape of the world in which they live. Echoing Burke, Berlin continues, 
A way of seeing, after all, is a way of not seeing, and as we instruct students in 
attending to particular orders of evidence—sense impression, for example, in the 
injunction to “be concrete”—we are simultaneously discouraging them from 
seeing other orders of evidence—in the present example, the evidence of private 
vision or of social arrangements. (7) 
Each of these pedagogical demands, then, predicts and prescribes students’ understanding 
of knowledge, as well as the forms in which that knowledge may come. History (as a 
series of statements) may not be writing—it could be architecture or DNA or wine—but 
Professional History is always, always written down. That which does not get written 




  The pedagogy of writing is a rhetorical system in and of itself. Here, though, I 
draw attention to the rhetorical import of writing. Professional History writes things 
down—and investigates written documents and records details and facts in writing. This 
documentation privileges the very nature of documentation; the audience, instructed in 
the ways and methods of writing, sees knowledge in light of its documentability.  
This is possible because every rhetorical system is based on epistemological 
assumptions about the nature of reality, the nature of the knower, and the rules 
governing the discovery and communication of the known… A particular rhetoric 
thus instructs students about the nature of genuine knowledge, or truth—
sometimes, for example, located in the material world, sometimes in a private 
perception of a spiritual realm, sometimes in group acquiescence, sometimes in 
one or another dialectical permutation of these elements. The nature of truth will 
in turn determine the roles of the interlocutor (the writer or speaker) and the 
audience in discovering and communicating it. (Berlin 4) 
Professional History’s claims to truth are grounded rhetorically in the connection 
between writing and epistemology.  
  Paul Veyne in Writing History grapples with the contradictions brought about by 
Professional History’s reliance on text. Because the job of the historian is to narrate the 
past, he writes, Professional History’s version of events will necessarily look different 
from the testimony of event participants. Writing history is like writing a novel—
insomuch as there is required simplification and detail-smoothing (4). But here’s the real 
kicker: Professional History’s search for the truth of the past is complicated not only by 
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the writing of history but by the dependence of historians’ on written text. In recognition 
of the boundaries of history, the limits of this rhetorical system’s claims to truth, Veyne 
explains: “That limit is that in no case is what historians call an event grasped directly 
and fully; it is always grasped incompletely and laterally, through documents or 
statements, let us say through temkeria, traces, impressions… [H]istory is knowledge 
through documents… [I]t is diagesis and not mimesis” (4-5). Because Professional 
History depends upon extant documents and statements, the interpretation of writings 
from years and cultures gone by, there is a space between their claims to truth and the 
experiential claims to truth of event participants. Such spaces, while they are not a part of 
the source/resource rhetorical constructions of Professional History, add to the Silences—
the spaces live around and under and within the uses to which Professional History’s 
claims about the past are put.  
  Professional History’s claims to truth, however, are powerful; writing, 
fundamental to cultural and educational rhetorical systems, steps into the space between 
experience and narrative. Once in that space, Professional History bases its claims to 
truth in the documentability of research, the comparability of texts, and the fundamental 
status of writing to the educational rhetorical system of which Professional History is a 
part. The space between experience and narrative, occupied by Professional History, is 
plagued by issues of direction and perspective. How, then, can Professional History lay 
claim to their interpretation of history? If all they’re doing is telling a story of the past, 
then why does their dependence on writing even matter? The answer: another aspect of 
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Professional History’s credibility construction lies in their scientific assertions of 
objectivity. 
Perspective: Objectivity 
  Objectivity, as opposed to ownership, is the Perspective constructed and presented 
by Professional History. Claims to objectivity, and its rhetorical power, are based upon 
distance; where ownership gets its rhetorical power from being close to its object, 
objectivity depends upon the perceived distance between the object and its interpreter. 
Objectivity, related to the nature of writing, relies upon the increasing human belief in the 
knowability (through the scientific method) of all things. As Professional History tells us, 
just as ownership is persuasive, so is the Perspective of the unbiased. Because of this 
emphasis on the verifiable, this tendency towards scientific rationalism, professional 
historians seek to convince by laying claim to the “truest” versions of the past. Part of 
that convincing comes from the language and practice of history; historians exercise a 
language of scientific reasoning and logic. Their ethos extends from this scientific 
approach (Najarian 77). Using evidentiary proof, explaining that proof, and grounding 
those explanations in solid argumentative reasoning, professional historians and 
historiographers make the claim that they will tell us what happened, when it happened, 
and why (Bellamy 90; Guttenplan 14). In this line of thought, professional historians 
recognize the responsibilities that go with explaining the way things were, and, in order 
to bolster their approach and methods, they pursue an objective science of the past. 
  Objectivity persuades in two different ways. The first way it can be read refers to 
biases (or the lack thereof). In this understanding of objectivity, the objective historian is 
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one who researches an event without any investment in the possible end results—other 
than that those end results provide a true account of “what really happened.” Objectivity, 
in this sense, requires a sort of omniscient understanding of not only the event but the 
actuality of the event: details leading up to it, people involved and affecting its outcome, 
and the changes wrought by its occurrence. Writing objectively about a topic, a historian 
observes and concludes without the input of bodily or ideological leanings. Objectivity is 
a powerful rhetorical device—if objectivity is indeed possible, then this would be the 
most appropriate way of approaching and describing any sort of historical event, 
according to modern philosophers of “history as science.”  
  Pierre Nora explores the concepts of history as opposed to memory in “Between 
Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire.” His examination of the different drives 
behind history and memory touch on history’s current reliance on this first definition of 
objectivity. “At the heart of history is a critical discourse that is antithetical to 
spontaneous memory. History is perpetually suspicious of memory… History’s 
procurement, in the last century, of scientific methodology has only intensified the effort 
to establish critically a ‘true’ memory” (9). The pursuit of a scientific, historical 
methodology puts at its forefront an emphasis (and belief in the possibility of) objectivity.  
  The second definition of objectivity relates to perceptions of materiality. In her 
“Objectivity and its Politics,” Linda Martin Alcoff defines the concept clearly. 
The… less common reference of objectivity does not concern the comportment of 
knowers but of the known, that is, the object-world. This sense of objectivity is 
therefore a metaphysical one. To claim that set of knowledge or values is to claim 
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that they refer to the world of external objects, to the way things are in 
themselves, beyond the reach of human interpretation and thus the possibility of 
distortion. Here the contrast is drawn between the objective world of externality 
and the subjective world of our own conscious states to which we have 
immediate, undistorted, access. (840) 
As opposed to the argumentative power of experience and body proposed by Experienced 
History, the power of this second objectivity lies in the interpretative power one has to 
understand an external world—if one has an objective approach to it. This is the 
underlying warrant of Professional History: that the objective external world is different 
from subjective interpretations, that it is possible to interpet the worlds we observe 
without either changing or being changed by those worlds. So, the more objectively (in 
the first sense) I observe and describe the world, the more likely I am to reach an 
objective (in the second sense) understanding. It is a convincing and tautological logic. If 
one sense of objectivity exists, then it is the way to get at the other sense of objectivity. 
The only way. 
  The issue I’d like to address here is not whether or not objectivity is possible—or 
even desirable. The important factor in this discussion is that objectivity persuades. In 
“Gnawing at History: The Rhetoric of Holocaust Denial,” James Najarian discusses the 
rhetorical power of objectivity. It is a tone adopted by the social sciences, he writes, and 




The social science industry legislates ‘modernist’ assumptions, but the style has 
invaded most academic writing. It tries to impart objectivity by imitating 
scientific prose with a flat tone, chains of prepositional phrases, absence of the 
first person, and passive voice. It self-consciously wants to make itself disappear, 
so facts, figures, and numbers will seem to convince the reader, and the prose 
itself. The ideal prose would seem to be a neutral conveyor of fact. (76) 
Najarian addresses the basic powers of objectivity: its neutrality and relationship to 
“fact.” Each of these elements adds to the rhetorical power of objective perception. 
Further, the desire of “social science” to write in such a way conveys its importance as a 
rhetoric of academia. In order to be persuasive, according to Najarian, one must appear to 
be scientifically, objectively inclined. 
  The relationship between objectivity, in both senses, and writing leads us into the 
next sub-section of this chapter, the Practitioners. Because the emphasis on objectivity as 
a disappearing style of prose is so innate to the style of writing in social science, we begin 
to see the fundamental importance of objectivity to argument construction within 
Professional History. And that argument construction is bolstered not only by the 
objective style of writing, but also by the disciplining of Professional History within the 
halls of academia. 
Practitioners: Disciples 
  Practitioners of Professional History are members of History as a Discipline—
trained disciples in the study of the past. Writing and objectivity are not the only 
persuasive elements of argument construction in Professional History. In fact, their 
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privileged position in the aforementioned educational system is another aspect of their 
ethos—and the subject of this section. Writing and objectivity work together to bolster 
the position of Professional History within the framework of educational disciplining. 
Recognizing how the argument construction of disciplinization works will help us see the 
whole picture of Professional History, as opposed to Experienced History—which prizes 
and frames the body as central to their ethical construct. For Experienced History, 
Materiality (the experience of the body, visceral and personal) trumps other kinds of 
argument construction; Professional History elevates the importance of Perspective. 
 Concerning the changing nature of historical scholarship, Michael Shermer and 
Alex Grobman discuss conflicts and changes in historiography over the last two centuries 
in Denying History. They delineate and define three approaches to historiography, each a 
phase of historical understanding. The first is historical objectivity: “by the late 
nineteenth century most Western historians believed that history had become an objective 
science … just present all the facts and let them speak for themselves” (21). The second 
is “historical relativism”: “History, then, is reconstructed not from the original events, but 
from the documents that describe them.  Further, history is not what happened then; it is 
what we now think happened then, based on current beliefs and interpretations” (24). The 
third tier, the critical one “where history and science meet” (29), is the requisite approach 
to historical documentation and research: “[H]istorical science is the … tier where all 
historians reside when they are truly practicing history” (30). Historians doing historical 
science understand the problematic nature of historical interpretation, citing a need for a 
“convergence of evidence” (31): “Obviously there is a difference between reinterpreting 
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the specific facts of some historical event within the context of the larger historical 
picture and denying those facts altogether” (30). The very construction of historical 
interpretation lends itself to questions and revision, and then revision itself becomes a 
demonstration of the scientific rationalism of history. The key to this careful (and 
necessary) revisionism, though, is the practice and discipline of historiography. 
 The development of Professional History over the last few centuries calls 
attention to the different ways we approach the past, and the development of a rational 
discipline calls for an explanation of itself. This approach to history is a teleological 
approach. In the description (disciplining?) of historical methods provided by Shermer 
and Grobman can be seen a picture of history’s methodologies as not only dynamic but 
perfectible. As we progress in our understanding of the past, historians tell us, we get 
better at interpreting it or recording it or explaining it. Professional historians are on a 
rationalistic path towards an ever better, ever clearer view of “the way things were” and 
how that shapes the world we inhabit now.  
  Professional History examines and analyzes documents in order to provide a 
proven, documentable version of the past. Theirs is a deliberately linear construction, and 
the stories that they tell stand upon pages and pages of statistics, figures, and facts. On 
the other hand, according to professional historians, Collective Memory does a different 
thing. Its examination of the past provides another view of the past, a view that is both 
problematic and kind of necessary. It is problematic because it depends upon sources of 
dubious historical accuracy (witnessing, experience, first person testimony and opinion, 
even, to a lesser degree, scrap booking and photo albums and memorials.) It is necessary 
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because we cannot talk about the past without, at some point, talking to (or reading, or 
researching the lives of) the people who were there. So, professional historians accede the 
simultaneous necessity and danger of things like first-person experience. First-person 
experience, as subjective as it may be, is useful—as long as it’s mitigated by the careful 
observation and objective analysis of Professional History’s Disciples. 
  An emphasis on specialized training shapes the orientation of Professional 
History. The notion that a certain perspective shapes more than one’s view of events is 
not a new one to rhetorical studies. Kenneth Burke spent his whole life exploring the 
ways in which the appropriate and the inappropriate predict and prescribe human 
interaction. His examination of situational interpretation and orientation can inform a 
discussion of Professional History’s hyper-emphasis on specialization. Regarding 
specialization, orientation is the rhetorical shaping of a method of analysis. The 
orientation of Professional History—as can be seen in the naming and discussion of 
historical science—is exclusive. At the same time that historians recognize their 
situatedness, they must also strive for “a convergence of evidence” when putting together 
their versions of the past. In Permanence and Change, Burke writes, 
Orientation is thus a bundle of judgments as to how things were, how they are, 
and how they may be. The act of response, as implicated in the character which an 
event has for us, shows clearly the integral relationship between our metaphysics 
and our conduct. For in a statement as to how the world is, we have implicit 
judgments not only as to how the world may become but also as to what means 
we should employ to make it so. (14) 
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In this passage, Burke explains the function of a Perspective on both the methods used to 
analyze and the results of those methodical investigations. It is imperative that we 
recognize the fundamental importance of method to the disciplining of history. Because 
Professional History strives to maintain a distance from other forms of historical 
investigation—although they may employ different aspects of those investigations—their 
results and their measurement of those results will look different. “We discern situational 
patterns by means of the particular vocabulary of the cultural group into which we are 
born” (35). Now, here, Burke is talking about a larger environment of cultural 
interpretation, but the description can apply to smaller slivers of culture—like academic 
disciplines or different methods of historiography.  
  Professional History, with its trappings of academe, employs a language of 
science and objectivity. The credentials of Professional History depend upon and draw 
their argumentative power from the rhetoric of specialization—or mystification.  
The mystic seeks a sounder basis of certainty than those provided by the flux of 
history. He seeks the ultimate motive behind our acts; that is, he seeks an ultimate 
situation common to all men… The identity between motives and situations 
should suggest why the modern sciences of statistics tend to turn up conclusions 
of a strongly mystical cast. By examining a multitude of situations, individually 
distinct, the scientist attempts statistically to extract a generalization common to 
all. The mystic makes somewhat the same attempt by looking within and naming 




Burke compares the mystic and the modern statistician to demonstrate the similar drives 
assigned to them. The rhetorical significance of those assignations is that the underlying 
persuasion of the historian doing historical science is almost the same as a priest 
discussing the Trinity. The audience, in order to believe, must already be persuaded that 
the Perspective taken and the situational interpretation occurring are the way “that things 
should be described.” Professional History is a priesthood; to do history the right way, 
according to the priesthood, one must speak the language and to speak the language, one 
must be a part of the educational specialization. 
Silences: Disciplinarity 
We have already noted the fact that silence is a powerful rhetorical tool. Barry 
Brummett, in “Towards a Theory of Silence as a Political Strategy,” outlines the contexts 
in which silence is most powerful rhetorically, “when people expect talk and get none” 
(290). The real import of strategic silence happens because it violates expectations, “the 
critic must remember… the principle of relative silence: Silence is relative to what might 
be said” (290). The strategic application of silence communicates a variety of possible 
meanings, among them mystery, uncertainty, passivity, and relinquishment. In the 
context of political speech, these varied meanings occur in different contexts, argues 
Brummett, and he is interested in the significance of silence as opposed to, say, physical 
action or hurled invective. His discussion of strategic silence is particularly useful to my 
discussion because it grants silence an equal sort of power. Just as language, action, 
sensation, and feeling can be rhetorical, so can silence.  
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 Brummett’s discussion of silence highlights the powerful. Rod Hart talks about 
power in relation to seduction and simulation in Seducing America. Particularly, he is 
interested in the silences of the powerful, arguing that sometimes silence is the ultimate 
demonstration of social, economic, and political power: 
It is within [the Silent] Establishment that true power lies, even though its 
members characteristically flee the public stage. Typically, they do not grant 
interviews, do not make public speeches, cannot be seen on the nightly news, 
make few ceremonial appearances, and do not author memoirs. Theirs is an 
anonymity of power. (142) 
These folks do not need to worry about rhetorical strategies, silent or not. Anonymity is a 
luxury that few can afford. But the fact that silence exhibits and enforces power speaks to 
my project. Experienced History cannot tell certain stories—its warrants and grounds are 
based entirely in the individual. The holes in Experienced History, therefore, are 
perspective-based. Because an individual only knows what happened to her/himself, then 
the history will be missing the understandings and interpretations of others. These holes 
are sometimes easily solved, therefore, by including the stories of others—the 
interpretations of other experiences and the witnessing of other historical consumers.  
The issue of power, as addressed by Brummett and Hart, speaks specifically to the 
history shaped by Professionals. As much as there are individual viewpoints missing 
from Experienced History, there are entire ranges of historical interpretation missing 
from Professional History’s descriptions of events. The disciplinarity of Professional 
History—as it adds to the rhetorical power of such histories—conversely erases much of 
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the historical conversations that do not pertain to the practice of disciplining history. The 
silences in Professional History often occur because of the grander scope, the “objective” 
stance, taken by historians. In its quest for detail and description, Professional History 
leaves out bumpier bits. As much as Professional History may allow for differing 
perspectives and understandings, its adherence to specialization and objectivity precludes 
more individual minutiae. Because the rhetoric of Professional History relies on its 
distantiation, its objectivity, and its disciplining, the Silences of such histories—even as 
they are sometimes mentioned in footnotes—get swallowed by the Ivory Tower’s 
impression of complete understanding. If it isn’t written down, it must not be worth 
knowing.  
The Silences of Professional History, then, are left to be answered, often, by 
Collective Memory. Without the dangers of speaking for others (because the Collective 
purports to speak to and for itself) or the exclusion of different methods of 
memorialization (because the Collective looks to and for a variety of historical material 
from which to re-construct its past), Collective Memory presents a past filled with 
multiple voices and numerous standards of verification. 
COLLECTIVE MEMORY 
  Collective Memory employs versions of the past in order to construct group 
identity. Experienced History, with its reliance upon bodily perception and ownership 
exists, is part and parcel of history as an ongoing process. Later in this section I 
investigate theoretical understandings of individual memory processes—how they work, 
what they do, and why they are so important to the survival of individuals. Arguably, 
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Collective Memory, premised as it is on the structural functioning of various groups, is as 
important to the survival of collectives as individual memory is to the survival of people. 
Professional History, with its reliance upon documentability and objectivity exists to 
explain, rationally, the ways in which individual actions shape the world. Both of these 
endeavors are valuable to human understanding of the world. But Collective Memory 
shapes the motives and perceptions of groups within and through interpretations of 
history as a collection of events.  
  As I explain in the Introduction, Collective Memory is the process of 
constructing, the act of sharing, and the work of retaining group memories. Collective 
Memory, or the construction and iteration of group rememberings, serves materially to 
create and use identification within groups. The rhetorical power of Collective Memory’s 
Perspective relates to its perceived empathetic quality—because a Collective Memory is 
the outgrowth of individuals making a memory together, Collective Memory takes on the 
rhetorical qualities of shared feeling. The practice and Practitioners of Collective 
Memory, quite opposed to Professional History, constructed a subjective understanding 
of history as it relates to and builds on identity. The Silences of those constructions relate 
to thos identities, as well. In this last section, I explore the argument construction within 
Collective Memory, examining the ways in which different resources/sources bolster the 
uses to which claims get put. The sources I examine are spoken language and empathy, 





Materiality: Spoken Language 
  In The Collective Memory, Maurice Halbwachs examines the ways in which 
Collective Memory (contra history or historical memory) gets constructed and 
maintained. He discusses effects of time and structure on memory. In his words, “What 
stands in the foreground of group memory are remembrances of events and experiences 
of concern to the greatest number of members. These arise out of the group life itself or 
from relationships with the nearest and most frequently contacted groups” (43). Memory 
is a collection of interpreted events, shaped by time and structure, describing and 
prescribing identity.  
  Halbwachs iterates the function of memory in identity construction. Identities are 
fluid because memory is fluid; they change depending upon the group within which one 
acts and the ways that group functions as a whole. He acknowledges this changeability, 
saying, “that each memory is a viewpoint on the Collective Memory, that this viewpoint 
changes as my position changes, that this position itself changes as my relationship to 
other milieus change” (48). Similar to the rhetoric of Experienced History, each 
individual memory is an offshoot of the greater collective; different from Experienced 
History, group memory serves to bolster or establish a set of identity characteristics. 
Finally, he discusses the role of oratory in memory, writing that all the orator need do, in 
the search for persuasive common ground, is give his “listeners the illusion that the 
convictions and feelings he arouses within them have come not from him but from 
themselves, that he has only divined and lent his voice to what has been worked out in 
their innermost consciousness” (45). The Materiality of Collective Memory lies in this 
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un-noticed, unnoticeable, and vocalized reiteration of remembrances, re-shaped and 
displayed as discovery. Resources and use seem to merge in the construction and 
distribution of Collective Memory for a couple of reasons. First, because the sources used 
to bolster different claims depend upon group identity and identification. Second, because 
the claims constructed get put to work establishing, justifying, and extending those group 
identities. And finally, because Collective Memory depends heavily on the interplay 
between history as a source of proof and history as a prescription for the present.  
 Collective Memory makes and depends on collective meanings. In Words and 
Minds, Neil Mercer discusses the nature of community-thinking and proposes that the 
real nature of Darwin’s survival of the fittest is in the function of group meanings:  
Evolution is not about individual survival, but the continuation of families and 
communities of related individuals over generations. Language enables 
individuals with diverse talents, dispositions and experiences to collaborate in 
sophisticated ways when solving problems. It transforms a group of diverse 
individual into complementary contributors to a collective mind. (168) 
Language is key to Collective Memory. The process of collectively constructing 
frameworks to use for comparisons and sense making cannot happen without the 
intervention of language. In “Reading the Past against the Grain,” Barbie Zelizer notes, 
“Arendt… demonstrated that there can be no remembrance without speech. Speech, she 
said, is needed to materialize and memorialize all actions” (228). Where writing is 
fundamental to the construction of Professional History’s credibility, speech is the 
fundamental aspect of Collective Memory. The shared meanings of individual memories, 
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the relationship between individuals and the collectives of which they are a part, the 
various versions of each Collective’s past—all of these stories get told and re-told 
through the lens of the group identity. 
  Collective Memory functions differently in different fields,24 and changes in 
memory predict changes in elements as far-reaching as individual identity, group 
formation, political action, monument and memorialization, legal history, and popular 
culture.25 As the power of Collective Memory manifests itself through language, the more 
covert the presentation, the more powerful it will be. In On Collective Memory, 
Halwachs suggests that Collective Memory is strongest when it becomes common sense. 
Institutions of the present “appear so well adapted to what these believers expect of them 
and the idea they have of them is so closely linked to all their other thoughts that these 
institutions’ historical colour becomes effaced in their eyes and they are able to believe 
that these institutions could be no other than they are” (99). The manifestation of 
Collective Memory as an underlying assumption is what gives those who construct 
Collective Memory such rhetorical power.  
 The conception that things could be ‘no other than they are’ is a powerful 
comment on the ideological/rhetorical function of Collective Memory construction and 
maintenance. Collective Memory often serves an ideological function. In “The Whites of 
their Eyes,” Stuart Hall observes that “ideologies ‘work’ by constructing for their 
subjects (individual and collective) positions of identification and knowledge which 
allow them to ‘utter’ ideological truths as if they were their authentic authors” (32). The 
innateness of Collective Memory is rhetorical: “Collective memories allow for the 
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fabrication, rearrangement, elaboration, and omission of details about the past, often 
pushing aside accuracy and authenticity so as to accommodate broader issues of identity 
formation, power and authority, and political affiliation” (Zelizer Remembering to Forget 
3). Just as individual memory works to connect and construct conceptions of self, the 
rhetoric of Collective Memory works as a social adhesive (again, here it’s both a source 
of proof and an end to which that proof might be put), establishing connections between 
various entities and individuals.  
 Memories are markers, as well. Because memories often depict moments of 
conflict, they serve to demonstrate “not how accurately a recollection fitted some piece of 
a past reality, but why historical actors constructed their memories in a particular way at a 
particular time” (Zelizer Remembering to Forget 5). The particularity of memory directs 
our attention to the reasons why, at certain times, elements of past events were 
emphasized or diminished. Vamik Volkan addresses the rhetorical and socio-political 
choices made by groups to elevate certain memories over others in Bloodlines. 
Sometimes, he writes, there is a particular event (most often some sort of group trauma) 
over which the group fails to mourn successfully (45). The memory of such a “chosen 
trauma” becomes a rhetorical tool for group identity, and the chosen traumas get used by 
later generations to justify political choices (sometimes in such a way that later 
generations are not even aware of the rhetorical comparisons being made). According to 
Volkan: 
For instance, a political leader may reignite a dormant group memory that affects 
collective thinking, perceptions, and actions. When such a shared mental 
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representation of the original injury is reactivated, it may distort a large group’s 
perceptions. New enemies involved in current conflicts may be perceived as 
extensions of an old enemy from a historical event… [T]he function of the mental 
representation of it changes, now serving to bond the individuals in the group, 
paradoxically raising their self-esteem and fueling their attempt to reverse their 
ancestors’ humiliation. (47) 
These re-membered traumas become tools for later generations to shape group perception 
and prescribe group actions. Memory as a marker marks not only the group 
understanding of its own history but of its present and future, as well. 
Perspective: Empathy 
  Group understandings of the past and the present lead into a discussion, once 
again, of the value of verifying memory. Debates about accuracy and verifiability echo 
concerns felt by psychologists and sociologists interested in the study of autobiographical 
memory: what are the limits of memory accuracy? And, is accuracy all that important? 
Accuracy does not necessarily predict usability, and, in fact, cementing memory by 
making it verifiable (and then calling it accurate or inaccurate) may lead to social fissures 
(Huyssen “Present Pasts”; Volkan Bloodlines). Rather than the documentability and 
verifiability so prized by Professional History, the empathetic nature of Collective 
Memory makes it rhetorically powerful: to feel the pain or joy of the others in one’s 
group makes the memory Collective.  
  Barbie Zelizer  notes in a discussion of war and personal/Collective Memory that 
the individuality of memory is sometimes its most persuasive element. Particular 
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memories “tend to shatter or reinforce certain moral, cultural, and political consensus” 
(“Reading the Past against the Grain” 231). On the other hand, the perceived universality 
of memory tends to persuade by generalization, “for the particularistic event is enveloped 
by a universal aura that attaches itself to memory work… This universal dimension of 
remembering fashions events into generalizable markers about suffering, joy, 
commitment, and endurance” (231). Collective Memory persuades on singular and 
general levels because it languages the experiences of more than one person at a time. It 
can incorporate the language of individual and collective, all at once. 
 In Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory through the Camera’ Eye, Zelizer 
goes on to tells us that he persuasive nature of Collective Memories lends to their 
messiness. “Individuals,” she writes, “might thereby share memories of the past with 
certain persons with whom they share ethnicity, with yet others via a shared age bracket, 
and with still others through a common nationality” (4). The ways in which memory 
functions as a social adhesive vary from group to group. Just as Halbwachs argues that 
identity is not a fixed thing, Zelizer demonstrates the fluid nature of memory 
identifications. Collective Memory is bendable and, therefore, group acceptance is the 
standard of measurement. Its persuasive messiness, its ability to incorporate the particular 
and the general, to shift angles, to move from one group to another, to modify its shape 
and form in accordance with the group to whom it belongs adds to its rhetoricity at the 
same time that it makes measurement and explanation complicated. 
 Many theorists of Collective Memory address the impossible simultaneity of 
memory: we build memorials and monuments, we buy memory artifacts to 
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commemorate, we tell stories of the past, but all the while, there are great forgettings 
occurring at the same time. It is not possible to document the past objectively because we 
bring to past events varying perspectives embedded with varying reasons and 
explanations.26 This drive to explain past events creates a crisis of memory (Huyssen  
36). There is an ever-increasing drive to document the past, an almost obsessive need to 
connect ourselves with some sense of historical continuity and the generations before us. 
The empathetic appeal of Collective Memory feeds this need—at the same time that it 
enhances the drive to remember. 
Practitioners: Kin 
  The Practitioners of Collective Memory are members of the colletive—they are 
related rhetorically. They are kin. This final aspect of Collective Memory is the 
trickiest—and, I think, the most persuasive. That Collective Memory seems familiar and 
intersubjective lends to its rhetorical power. Because the memories constructed by groups 
are shared in ways that resemble (or are described as resembling) the function of 
individual memory, these memories become more familiar. The rhetorical illusion of 
Collective Memory is that it is a model and extension of individual memory. Because 
Collective Memory is so messy and difficult to define, often people assume that 
individual and collective rememberings are, in some way, substitutions for one another. 
That being said, I will try to define theories of each in order to delineate them. I don’t 
think they’re identical, but the assumption that constructions of Collective Memory (by a 
Kinship) and individual memory (by members of the Kinship) are the same is a 
rhetorically powerful notion. 
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 Individual memory is a topic that has been studied by theorists interested in 
literature, art and art history, mythology, psychology, pathology, history, sociology, 
anthropology, and philosophy (Schacter Searching for Memory). More recently, 
individual memory has been allocated mainly to the fields of psychology, education, and 
literature. Considered to be a fallible but necessary aspect of historical research, as I 
mention in Professional History, individual memory is often considered to be a measure 
of information retention. In this kind of an assumption are the beginnings of possible 
Silences in Collective Memory. That memory often plays the role of retention and 
recitation makes it possible for holes in the memory to be excused—these Silences 
belong, then, to the collective responsible for such memory. Individual memory is a 
rhetorical element of both history and Collective Memory—it also bears the weight and 
rhetorical function of duty. Often, memory works as an act of personal responsibility, a 
singular moment in a group of singular moments. According to Barbie Zelizer, “personal 
memory … refers to an individual’s ability to conserve information” (“Reading the Past 
Against the Grain” 214). The process of individual memory is an activity of retention, 
although it is fraught with problems of intent and elaboration. In fact, many of the 
problems associated with personal memory (verifiability, factuality versus fictionality, 
appropriation and assimilation, and mutability) are those associated with Collective 
Memory. Still, the warrants (underlying cultural assumptions) that individual memory are 
both an act of conservation and retention is very persuasive. A reiteration of events 
important to the group assumes that those events could have happened no other way—
 
97 
and that the individual in charge of those recollected events is responsible to the past in a 
way that no Professional Historian ever is. 
 In Searching for Memory, Daniel Schacter describes the physiological as well as 
social purposes of individual memory: it is a reconstructive drive, a human need to 
contextualize the past. Memory drives our ability to function in the world; without 
memory of all kinds we would die of constant surprise. We need memory to do language, 
interact socially, and survive; memory is necessary to our living in the world. Take, for 
example, a trip to the grocery store. In order to go to the grocery, you might do several 
things. First, you might make a list—which requires memory to retrieve the names of the 
items needed, the items themselves, the writing of the items, the functions of pen and 
paper, the location of pen and paper. Then, memory will be needed to get you to the 
grocery—will you drive? Ride the bus? Walk? Each of these actions requires memory of 
a different kind. The list of memory-driven functions in a simple trip to the grocery is 
endless, and I will not continue ad nauseum. Suffice it to say, individuals who suffer 
problems with memory retention—from amnesiacs to aphasics to congenital memory 
deficiencies—are at a significant disadvantage in the world (Damasio Descartes’ Error). 
 Above I discuss some of the functional, physical reasons why we remember, and 
how those physical memory functions might be related to  as well as some of the 
problems that occur when memory does not work. Another problem associated with 
individual memory as it pertains to this study relates to the emotionality and subjectivity 
of memory. Individuals remember past events from their individual perspectives, and 
their memories spring from those experiential positions. These perspectival shifts in 
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memory demonstrate some connections between individual and Collective Memory. 
Schacter notes the major element of individual event-recall: 
[T]here is something special about the subjective experience of explicitly 
remembering past incidents that separates it from other uses of memory [like 
driving a car or typing a paper], something that is often overlooked in scientific 
analyses that portray memory as a device for storing and retrieving information. 
In order to be experienced as a memory, the retrieved information must be 
recollected in the context of a particular time and place and with some reference 
to oneself as a participant in the episode. (16-17, italics added) 
Schacter explains the absolutely fundamental importance of subjectivity to the process of 
individual event-recall. We cannot but place ourselves in our memories of events in 
which we participated (or watched or felt). The context of individual memory is the 
background against which memories are played. The contextual nature of individual 
memory does not mean that individual event-recall will always be incorrect or 
implausible, it just means that there may be differences in our individual memories from 
the memories of others. We remember events from our own perception, and we color our 
memories with those perceptions because “[f]or better or worse, our recollections are 
largely at the mercy of our elaborations” (Schacter 56). The stories we tell of our pasts 
are just that, stories of the past. They are dependent on individual perspective and recall, 
as well as the emotions felt at the time and the reasons for those emotions.  
 Individual memory constructs and depicts the past in several ways.27 Researchers 
in autobiographical memory propose that there are four types of autobiographical 
 
99 
knowledge which are arranged hierarchically from the highest, most general level of 
knowledge called lifetime periods through the more specified, middle level known as 
general events to the most particular, pinpointed level of knowledge called event-specific 
(Conway, Singer, and Tagini 496-498). The order and construction of such various recall 
levels serve different purposes in the process of individual memory, ranging from self-
conception to world-perception.  
   Memory studies problematize the value of accuracy measurements, although 
many scholars continue to design verifiability measures of different types. This is an echo 
of concerns felt in both Experienced History and Professional History—memory and 
history must be verifiably measured, in some way. Those ways may be unique to the 
method at hand, but in order to know history, we must be able to differentiate between 
what is true and what is not. Interestingly, the varied standards of verification allow for a 
multitude of “true” histories—especially those pertaining to cultural perceptions of the 
past. In the early 20th century, Sir Fredric Bartlett asked readers of an American Indian 
story called “War of the Ghosts” to recall and rewrite the story. On the results of the 
study, Schacter writes:  
[P]eople rarely recalled all the events in the story accurately; they often 
remembered occurrences that made general sense or fit their expectations of what 
should have happened, but were not part of the original story. Bartlett also 
observed that the recollections of his participants changed, sometimes 
substantially, across multiple  retellings of the story… He argued that the 
experience of remembering is shaped as much by the rememberer’s ‘attitude’—
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expectations and general knowledge regarding what should have happened and 
what could have happened. (100-101) 
The recall of these readers was colored by their cultural perceptions, their personal 
interests, and their cultural expectations of narrative. Rather than telling each detail as it 
was, each reader elaborated on the tale, bringing into the story his or her own perceptions 
and leaving a little of themselves behind. Accuracy is such a powerful word; we value the 
correct and documentable. However, because of the turn in the study, the recall of 
participants may, in fact, have been documenting other kinds of fact. Bartlett’s attempt to 
measure the accuracy of recall became less a study of memory verifiability and more an 
exploration of cultural context. Measuring and verifying the cultural interpretation of the 
story was an unintended and revealing result of Bartlett’s efforts. One wonders might 
have happened if the readers were allowed to re-imagine the “War of the Ghosts” 
collectively. 
 Maurice Halbwachs wanted to know more about the vicissitudes of memory, too. 
Contrary to many thinkers of his time, Halbwachs believed that there was very little 
individual in the process of society. Rather, the forward motion of history and society 
was driven by the social, the group. His research focused on the specifics of memory 
construction, as it happens both in the heads of individuals and in the social space 
between those heads. Halbwachs offered an alternative to individual memory 
construction, saying that it is impossible for an individual to walk alone, anywhere, that, 
in fact, the memories being constructed in each individual head are fed by social input. 
As an example of this interaction between the individual and the social, Halbwachs 
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provides a “collective” walk through Paris. When one is walking through Paris alone, one 
is not alone mentally. Every observation is fed by the contributions of others. Every 
observation (of architecture, of fashion, of people and places, of food and drink) is 
interpreted through a socially constructed memory framework (The Collective Memory 
15-19). In this move, memory departs from the individual and becomes an act, a 
construction, of the collective. The departure of memory from individual to collective is 
the point at which Halbwachs locates most of his contemplation: how do individual 
recollections make sense? His answer to this is, simply, that the sense-making of 
recollection comes by collective comparison; we know the meaning of situations and 
events because we place them in a socially constructed, memorized framework of 
meanings.  
 He explains that the sense-making occurs in three ways, which correspond to the 
three types of autobiographical memory mentioned earlier. First, a recollection makes 
sense when we place it and ourselves in the social framework to which it and we belong: 
“[R]ecollections are to be located… with the help of landmarks that we always carry 
within ourselves, for it suffices to look around ourselves, to think about others, and to 
locate ourselves within the social framework in order to retrieve them” (The Collective 
Memory 175). In this interpretive step the individual places the recollection within a 
lifetime period framework; the recall of events and objects is compared to other, larger 
frameworks in the individual’s life. The second placement of recollection corresponds to 
the general event: “[T]hese landmarks become multiplied in proportion as our memory 
explores regions closer to our present, to the point that we can recall all the objects and 
 
102 
all the faces on which yesterday our attention was even slightly focused” (175). As the 
placement of recollection becomes more specific, the concept of time (moving forward 
and affecting us) gets more noticeable. The notion of yesterday, a longer moment in 
which objects and events were catalogued more particularly, demonstrates the closer, 
smaller framework against which memory is defined. The movement of Collective 
Memory recollection follows the movement of individual memory, because events and 
objects can only be defined against collective frameworks. 
 Finally, the third step of recollection conforms to the event-specific: “[I]t is 
through a series of reflections that we have the impression of passing from one object to 
another and from one event to another as if we think of the object and its exterior aspects, 
of the event and of its place in time and space, at the same time as we think of their 
nature and significance” (175). The placement of memories within a chronological frame, 
the definition of that chronology, as well as the names and descriptions of each object and 
event are all related to the larger social definitions. And the specified nature of this third 
step speaks to the event-specific phase of autobiographical memory: just as event-specific 
memory produces a “lived-in” feeling through memory, the final step of Halbwachs’s 
memory sense-making creates a particular, individual feeling of memory for each 
member of the group.  
 The final step of sense-making demonstrates the literal crossing over between 
individual and Collective Memory construction—it is through the rhetorical construction 
and process of kinship, membership in a collective, gets enacted. Where the individual 
crosses the collective is where the meaning happens; the images get compared to each 
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other based on the social framework in which those images occur. In his words, “objects 
and events become arranged in our mind in two ways: either following the chronological 
order of their appearance, or by the names we give them and the meaning that is 
attributed to them within our group” (175). The construction and description of memory, 
the sense-making process, then, happens in the interaction between the individual’s 
perception of objects or events and the group-based interpretations of similar objects or 
events.  
Silences: The Grass Is Never Greener 
  The explanation for Silences in Collective Memory might look like the antithesis 
to a common proverb: The grass is NEVER greener on the other side. In this anti-proverb 
lives the justification for in-group interpretations of the past. Because there is a specific 
understanding of the world, shaped by ideology and identity, to each Collective’s 
interpretation of the past, each version becomes the Collective’s only acceptable version. 
Now, on the surface, that might seem like a fine thing—I mean, who’s to say what 
different families should make of their own histories? But Silences in Collective Memory 
are just as important as the Silences occurring in other historical rhetorics because widely 
differing versions of the past sometimes cause more than just debate. The war between 
folks keen on establishing a Palestinian state and folks interested in finishing the job the 
Nazis started is a good example of Collective Memory gone bad. Meaning and memory 
are closely related, and friction between these two has caused more than one bloody war. 
Struggles over meaning between the stories of Holocaust and stories of cultural 
imperialism stress the tensions between the powerful and the powerless. Dana Cloud 
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discusses the silences of vernacular discourse in relation to mill worker strikes in North 
Carolina during the last century. Her analysis revolves around the silences of the 
powerless, and her study points to the play of power in and around silences: “Silences in 
the vernacular discourse of the subordinate point to these contexts of economic 
exploitation, race- and gender-based oppression, and the terrain of silencing discourses” 
(“The Null Persona” 179). Here we see some of the problematic overlaps between 
silences of Professional History and the silences of Collective Memory. The discussion of 
power—and its relationship to stories getting told—reveals the choices made by 
Professional History as well as Collective Memory. Each of these rhetorics must abide by 
the rules and structures in which their warrants and grounds function. Professional 
Hisotry, bolstered by notions of objectivity and discipline, limits the histories it tells to 
the items that can best be proved by the grounds that meet these requirements; 
documents, lists, geneologies—historical records that are verifiable, according to the 
boundaries created and prescribed by Professional History, are suitable proof. Everything 
else becomes hearsay. The holes in Professional History, therefore, occur when the 
powerful members of a discipline decide that certain parts of the past are un-
documentable. Similarly, the holes in Collective Memory emerge from the decisions 
made by the group—to bolster its own identity, as well as the veracity of the group’s 
historical interpretation of history—the collective excludes details and items from the 
historical record that either do not support its particular voice, or depart from the warrant 
supporting group testimony as a fitting response to the stories of the past.  
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Such Collective understandings of the past habitually work to construct versions 
of history that are taken-for-granted. These strategic silences, as I mention earlier, are 
powerful rhetorical devices. The most powerful kinds of ideology, in fact, are the ones 
we take for granted. Because they are taken-for-granted, there is less effort required to 
make them effective: it is difficult to debate (or question) the invisible. And the rhetorical 
power of invisible ideologies comes from the shaping they do of our understandings and 
perceptions of the world. Crenshaw describes the influence of ideologies: “intentions are 
formed within pre-existing ideologies because individuals are born into them. Ideologies 
live within what we take-for-granted” (“Resisting Whiteness’ Rhetorical Stance” 256). 
We are born into ideological structures and persuaded by the very (inescapable and 
invisible) constructions in which we function—and which are explained, depicted, 
performed, and constructed in different kinds of historical rhetoric. One of these 
assumptions in Experienced History is that I cannot know or interpret that which I have 
not experienced—the dangers of “speaking for others” lead into other kinds of dangers: 
those Others may never even get heard. A similar danger exists in the rhetoric of 
Collective Memory, with a kick: the Other version of events is not only incorrect, it’s a 
challenge to group identity and existence.  
CONSTRUCTING CREDIBLE HISTORY 
  The construction of knowledge claims about the past relies on four rhetorical 
dimensions: Materiality, Perspective, Practice/Practitioners, and Silences. Each of these 
dimensions makes the different rhetorics believable. The substantive, ideological, and 
participatory aspects of knowledge claims about the past shape their reception, as well as 
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the ways in which they get used. Claims made by practitioners of Experienced History 
serve to explain the world from the Perspective of the individual—knowledge produced 
bodily and owned subjectively is one way to talk about the past. Professional History’s 
knowledge claims about the past depend upon the perceived immutability and objectivity 
of writing—from the codex to the computer screen, the disciplinization of history has 
produced knowledge claims designed to describe, objectively, a past that can be codified, 
verified, and improved upon. And the kinship claims of Collective Memory are the 
substance of identification—the history posited by collectives is multi-voiced, shaped 
empathetically to build rhetorical bridges between the individual and the collective and to 
construct sense-making connections between the past and the present. 
  These links between the past and the present are some of the main reasons behind 
a study of history. As George Orwell observed, “Those who control the present, control 
the past, and those who control the past, control the future.” Claims about the past shape 
our understanding of the world in which we live, as well as the worlds we hope to see. 
But, on the other hand, how much does the world in which we live shape our reading of 
the past? Orwell, prescient as he may have been, wrote 1984 in 1949. Firmly ensconced 
in a culture of mass reproduction, a society recovering from (and, arguably, attempting to 
forget) a war that shook the modern world to its core, and an environment of strict social 
mores, his observations were as much a product of the world in which he dwelled as they 
were predictions of the future. Experienced History, Professional History, and Collective 
Memory are not the only available methods of interpreting the past. In the next chapter, I 
introduce and interrogate another way to make knowledge claims about the past—one 
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that demonstrates the present culture from which it springs just as much as the past it 
proposes to describe. In fact, Simulated History may be a perfect representation of 
Orwell’s aphorism—the past made present, literally. 
                                                
Notes 
16 Breisach, Ernst. Historiography: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1994. 
17 I choose the term subjectivity to draw attention to the similarities between Collective 
Memory's take on the past and Professional History's take. Historians and rhetoricians are 
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two sides of the same proverbial coin. In this chapter, I adhere to that notion: Professional History 
uses objectivity to make its claims; Collective Memory, on the other hand, makes its claims from 
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as Another: From Social Movement to Experience Movement." Current Sociology 52 (2004): 
575-593. University of Texas At Austin, Austin, TX. 8 July 2007. 
19 Another pop cultural example of bodily argument can be found currently on YouTube: 
a recent video details the rise and fall of Britney Spears’s career—as it relates to Kevin Federline. 
The video, compiled by some dedicated fan, depicts a changed and changing physical 
countenance. Britney goes from young, happy, nubile pop star to aged, bedraggled, teary-eyed, 
bloated, smoking celebrity. The warrants (spoken and unspoken) relate to and revolve around her 
doomed marriage to Federline. In this movie, found at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VoFsOxkwyIM&search=britney%20spears, the audience is 
persuaded by the changing body of Britney—as well as by the unspoken warrant that her body 
tells us how her mind and marriage and life are working. 
20 For more on the rhetorical connections between suffering, believability, and 
experience, please see Lawrence Langer (Holocaust Testimonies: the Ruins of Memory), Joshua 
Greene and Shiva Kumar (Witness: Voices from the Holocaust), and Charlotte Delbo (Auschwitz 
and After). 
21 For some examples of these justifications and explanations, please see the works of 
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Stand). 
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23 For more on the rhetorical nature and power of mystification (or the rhetorical 
construction of priesthoods), please see Burke, Kenneth. A Rhetoric of Motives. Berkeley: 
University of California P, 1969. 
 24In Professional History, Collective Memory is sometimes portrayed as the enemy—
memory becomes the strawman against which historians must use scientific method to defend 
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(Nora “Between Memory and History”; Shermer & Grobman Denying History). On the other 
hand, some historians view Collective Memory as the counterpart to history, the 
personal/individual interpretation of larger narratives (Davis & Starn “Introduction”; Huyssen 
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generational continuity (Bodnar Remaking America; Connerton How Societies Remember; 
Halbwachs On Collective Memory, The Collective Memory). Among critical scholars, Collective 
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Remaking America; Eagleton Ideology, After Theory; Edensor National Identity, Popular 
Culture, and Everyday Life; Lipsitz Time Passages). To rhetorical scholars, memory is 
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understandings of the world (Gronbeck “The Rhetorics of the Past”). 
25 For more information about Collective Memory and identity formation, please see 
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World War II”); Terry Eagleton (Ideology and After Theory); Tim Edensor (National Identity, 
Popular Culture and Everyday Life); Jackson Lears (“Power, Culture, and Memory”). For more 
information on the relationships between memorialization practices and the 
construction/interpretation of monuments, please see Barbara Biesecker (“On the Lookout,” “Of 
Historicity, Rhetoric,” and “Remembering World War II”); Peter Ehrenhaus (Commemorating 
the Unwon War,” “The Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial,” and “Why We Fought”); Susan A. Owens 
(“Memory, War, and American Identity”); and Barbie Zelizer (Remembering to Forget). For 
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Two: Argument, Simulation and Simulated History 
[A]n immense uncertainty… lies at the heart of the present operational euphoria… 
[and] has given rise to a definitive state of uncertainty about the reality of the object and 
the (objective) reality of knowledge. (Baudrillard Transparency of Evil 42) 
 
  Arguments are intimately related to the cultures in which they live. For an 
argument to be effective, it must fit the culture of its audience, and if an argument does 
not fit the culture of its audience, then it will not work. In this project, I am exploring the 
notion that certain simulational arguments work because the culture in which they are 
constructed provides the operational tools to make them effective. The previous chapter 
outlined three contemporary ways of making claims about the past: Experienced History, 
Professional History, and Collective Memory. In this chapter I return to a fourth category, 
Simulated History, suggesting that this fourth area, similar in some ways to the other 
three, needs a more thorough and separate definition for two reasons: first, Simulated 
History uses (and transcends the uses of) the other three historical rhetorics; and second, 
Simulated History arises from new cultural conditions of simulation. Simulated History, I 
suggest, is a new kind of historical rhetoric—it mixes different aspects of Materiality, 
Perspective, Practice, and Silences in new ways.  
 The function of Simulated History, like other kinds of historical rhetoric, is 
dependent upon and shaped by the culture in which it exists. Therefore, in this chapter I 
do three things. First, I discuss briefly the relationship between argument construction 
and culture. Second, I examine theories of simulation, demonstrating the contemporary 
simulational culture in which we are currently living. Finally, I explain the concept of 
Simulated History and introduce my case study. By providing different examples of 
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Simulated History and examining the ways in which simulational arguments get 
constructed, I explore the rhetorical and argumentative differences and similarities 
between Simulated History and other ways of making claims about the past. 
ARGUMENT CONSTRUCTION AND CULTURE 
  As I mention in the Introduction, the foundational element of Toulminian 
argumentation theory is the warrant (Toulmin “Uses of Argument” 790). His model of 
human argument consists of three major parts: the claim (the conclusion of the 
argument—the statement being proved), the grounds (the information leading an arguer 
to make a claim—the “facts we appeal to for the claim”) (789), and the warrant. 
Warrants, according to Toulmin, are “rules, principles, inference-licences [sic] [designed] 
to show that, taking these data as a starting point, the step to the original claim or 
conclusion is an appropriate and legitimate one” (789). The cultural factor inherent to 
warrants is that they are normative. A normative function is controlled and specific; to 
normalize an event or object is to regulate it. A warrant, therefore, is a mode of 
culturally-specific argument regulation—it is the foundation of and reasoning behind the 
claims being put to use. The warrant serves to connect the data and the claim, as well as 
justify the construction of the argument itself. Warrants are the sources and resources of 
an argument, the rhetorical places we shop for argumentative conviction and logical 
support. Claims, on the other hand, manifest the uses to which these arguments are put. 
Without a bolstering warrant, an argument can be neither connected nor convincing.  
  Audience adaptation (or warrants designed to appeal to and sway certain 
audiences) is a rhetorical litmus test of culture. What I mean when I call them litmus tests 
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is this: to test the theoretical first assumptions of a culture (notions of fairness, for 
example, or justice), one may examine the warrants (spoken and unspoken) used to 
persuade. Warrants are the theoretical links between claims made and the grounds used to 
demonstrate that those claims are true, and, because they connect claims and grounds, 
warrants (like audience adaptation) often embody cultural assumptions related to shared 
cultural knowledge or experience. Joel Best, discussing the function of warrants in a 
public campaign about missing children, writes,  
Warrants have a special place in Toulmin’s scheme; they are statements which 
justify drawing conclusions from the grounds. Disputes about grounds… need not 
damage conclusions. A claims-maker might argue, for instance, that even a single 
child abducted by a stranger is one too many, and that, therefore, something must 
be done. But concluding that something must be done demands that one accept… 
the problem deserves attention. (“Rhetoric in Claims-Making” 108) 
For a warrant to work, the audience must recognize or share the speaker’s cultural 
assumptions—and different fields of argument demonstrate the various warrants that 
work, according to rhetorical adaptation. Another way to think about these cultural 
assumptions, in Toulminian terms, is to differentiate between the different kinds of 
backing behind the warrants proposed:  
A warrant and its backing are related in very similar ways in many different 
contexts of argumentations. But ths kinds of substantive considerations that 
actually support our warrants vary greatly between … fields of argument: in 
scientific, medical, and legal arguments, in dicussions about sport, art or business, 
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in abstract discussions of pure mathematics, and in the practical judgements of 
everyday life. (Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik An Introduction to Reasoning 67) 
The cultural shapes and sounds of these varying assumptions change from field to field. 
Such fields of argument, then, “must be understood sociologically; within specific social 
units, members hold particular lines of reasoning to be valid. Thus … the [audience] to be 
persuaded must ordinarily belong to a field which deems the warrant valid” (108). The 
backing and the warrants, each audience-adapted source of argument, shapes the claims 
(and predicts the grounds) of different cultural rhetorics. 
A reference to this kind of sociological understanding places argument 
construction within both a rhetorical arena (think Burke’s “equipment for living”) as well 
as within the sociological frame. The intersection between rhetoric and the social is a 
situated, cultural space, and warrants, similar to Burke’s explanation of proverbs as 
equipment for living, shape audience (and rhetor) responses to situations. When Burke 
discusses the function of proverbs in rhetorical/sociological theory, he might also be 
discussing the cultural construction and social application of warrants. Proverbs, he 
argues in The Philosophy of Literary Form, are directions; they are designed to provide 
rhetorical instructions to handle different situations. The point of proverbial “medicine” is 
that it applies and adapts, depending upon the situation and individual using them. One 
use of proverbs, then, is to explain recurring human situations: 
Social structures give rise to ‘type’ situations, subtle subdivisions of the 
relationships involved in competitive and cooperative acts. Many proverbs seek to 
chart, in more or less homey and picturesque ways, these ‘type’ situations. I 
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submit that such naming is done, not for the sheer glory of the thing, but because 
of its bearing upon human welfare… [T]he names for typical, recurrent situations 
are not developed out of ‘disinterested curiosity,’ but because the names imply a 
command (what to expect, what to lookout for). (293-294) 
In this excerpt proverbs serve as the rhetorical equivalent to the warrant as the 
source/resource for argument. “Proverbs,” writes Burke, “are strategies for dealing with 
situations” (296). Just as a gift exchange may symbolize a rite of passage, a poetic device 
such as a proverb may serve a rhetorical, cultural purpose—it is a strategy for interpreting 
and explaining, or admonishing, or foretelling, and these strategies demonstrate the 
cultural first assumptions at work in the mix. Each of these tasks can be accomplished by 
a proverb because they are cultural patterns of action, designed to help cultural 
inhabitants perceive and understand the world around them. To assign an action symbolic 
heft (as in a gift exchange or rite of passage) is to warrant its cultural significance. 
Cultural patterns of action and cultural first assumptions are related—they are essentially 
the same thing. To act in a culturally specific manner is to assume the basic 
argumentative and symbolic tenets working in the culture—otherwise the argument, or 
interpreted pattern of action, wouldn’t work symbolically.  
 The culture in which an argument grows—from which the warrants and proverbs 
stem—predicts the uses to which an argument might be put (as well as the sources of 
support for that argument). Cultural roots of a warrant are not only rhetorical, they are 
also intimately related to Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. A cultural assumption to which 
Toulmin refers, on which theorists of audience adaptation rely for the shape of effective 
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argument, is a cultural pattern of action, a habitus, that allows cultural inhabitants to 
perceive, interpret, and act upon symbols within and outside of the culture. These cultural 
patterns of action are tools, sets of skills and understandings that shape our ability to 
function in the world. In other words, cultures engender strategies of action that are 
transformed by cultural actors into “infinitely diversified” ways of reading the world 
(Bourdieu Outline 82-83). We act in the world, and we interpret those actions through our 
specific cultural lenses. If you recall Sir Fredric Bartlett’s memory study, mentioned in 
the first chapter, our cultural assumptions shape not only our actions (habitus) but our 
readings of (and reasons provided for) these actions. These patterns of thought and 
action, warrants and habitus, differentiate and rhetorically form the worlds in which we 
function. 
 Warrants, then, as well as the arguments they bolster, work as equipment for 
living—they shape and construct evaluations of the world in which both arguer and 
audience function. They are not always said out loud; warrants can be unspoken and just 
as effective. The job of the critic, then, is to recognize and identify the argumentative 
shaping as it occurs. Whether a warrant is explicit or implicit, if it is to be effective, a 
warrant must be designed culturally and adapted to specific audiences. As a part of 
audience adaptation, warrants work as cultural markers, shaping the rhetorical responses 
(and expectations) of their users and delineating the cultural boundaries between effective 
arguments and ineffective ones.  
Warrants, cultural litmus tests that they are, reveal more than just the arguments 
they inhabit—they are also capable of showing critics the underlying assumptions of 
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claims, as well as the structure and connections between differing grounds used to prove 
those conclusions. In the previous chapter, I examine the argumentative structure of 
Experienced History, Professional History, and Collective Memory, and as I talk about 
each of the rhetorics, I discuss the ways in which they formulate their arguments—as 
well as the reasons why those arguments are rhetorically believable. The discussion of 
warrants in this chapter, though, begs a question: what do the warrants in the previous 
three rhetorics look like? At this point in the project, it would be beneficial to name 
explicitly some of the warrants under girding Experienced History, Professional History 
and Collective Memory—in order to compare and contrast them with some of the 
warrants we might see in a simulational culture, or a Simulated History. 
 Warrants live in between claims proposed and the grounds provided. The three 
dimensions of each history (Materiality, Perspective, and Practitioners) are composed of 
all sorts of different, interwoven claims, warrants, and grounds. For the sake of space and 
parsimony, I will dissect one aspect of each rhetoric—naming and labeling the claim, the 
grounds, and the warrant (or warrants) used to connect each claim with its corresponding 
grounds. I choose each argument specifically—because it reveals some major, culturally 
specific claim of each rhetoric. Moreover, each of the arguments diagrammed below 
displays an aspect of the culture in which that argument (and its warrants) thrive. I begin 
with Experienced History. 
 Experienced History, because it is based so much in the rhetoric of the body, 
bases most of its claims on the indivisibility of sense and sense-making. The arguments 
of Experienced History grow in a culture of suspicion; the desire to hear and believe 
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stories of Experienced History springs from vague distrust of historically official 
institutions (like the White House or the Ivory Tower). In such a culture, credibility 
occurs in generalizable, familiar, bodily stories—tales with which everyone can relate.  
To tell a story of experience, then, one must possess and express some intimate, 
tangible interaction with a historical event. Therefore, a claim made by Experienced 
History might look like this: “The United States government treats its veterans badly.” In 
the first chapter, I explore the rhetorical links between, say, the testimony of a body and 
descriptions of suffering or trauma. The grounds used to support such a claim, that 
personal stories are simultaneously universal and individual, vary from moment to 
moment. The grounds for this particular claim would be related to experience with the 
entities and events mentioned: “I, a veteran of Iraq was wounded and stuck in a creepy 
vet hospital just like my friend, Dale—a veteran of Vietnam who was mistreated and 
ignored by the American government.” In one instance, the grounds might be a 
sympathetic appeal—something like, we all know what it is to be heartbroken—issuing 
from the lips of a melancholy singer/songwriter onstage. Or, at another point, the same 
grounds might be provided by a scientist explaining the latest advances in emotional and 
palliative care for a bereaved widow. Or, these grounds might emerge from a student 
attempting to negotiate a more forgiving testing environment. Each of these grounds is 
used to support the “bodies are believable” claim proposed by Experienced History.  
 Now, in order to make the inferential leap between such a claim and the grounds 
provided by the arguer, we need a warrant. The warrant, connecting claim and grounds, 
must demonstrate that such experience is, in fact, predictive of historical similarities. I 
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propose that warrant might look like this: “Personal experience of anything sanctions 
individuals to makee assessments of government actions.” Here is the argument put 
together: 
Claim: The United States government treats its veterans badly. 
Grounds: I, a veteran of Iraq was wounded and stuck in a creepy vet hospital just 
like my friend, Dale—a veteran of Vietnam who was mistreated and ignored by 
the American government. 
Warrant: Personal experience of anything sanctions individuals to makee 
assessments of government actions. 
The warrants of Experienced History, occasionally mentioned but often unspoken, look 
like this. They must connect the individual to the general—and prove that certain specific 
events and understanding are generalizable to more than the moment in which they occur. 
 Professional History warrants look a little bit different because the culture in 
which Professional History lives is distinctly (and purposefully) separate from the 
everyday experiences of individuals. The claims of Professional History depend upon, as 
I mention in the first chapter, the notion that certain, specially trained individuals are best 
prepared to make observations about the past. The primacy of writing, the possibility of 
(and desire for) objectivity, and the importance of disciplinization all lend to Professional 
History’s claims about the past. Whereas Experienced History places its credibility in the 
shared/sympathetic understanding that bodies everywhere act or feel similarly, the 
arguments of Professional History attempt to diminish this universalizing push. Control, 
specialization, and particularity are the bywords of History as Discipline. So, for 
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example, a claim made by Professional History might be: “Major historians say that Iraq 
is not like Vietnam.” This claim works to sharpen the lens of historical observation at the 
same time that it grants believability to a certain group—the only group capable of either 
correctly using (or interpreting correctly) the information gleaned from such a directed 
inspection of the past. 
 The grounds used to support such a claim must demonstrate that this group of 
experts does, in fact, observe the past correctly: “According to the historical tomes I’ve 
studied, Vietnam was a particularly situated war in a particularly situated country with its 
own particular set of socio-political and historical problems.” Sounding the call of 
academics and scientists everywhere (Professionally trained experts draw correct, 
objective conclusions about the area for which they are trained), these grounds work to 
do two things. The first thing that they do is make correct and objective desirable; the 
second thing that they do is create a space (a specific area of training) in which being 
correct and being objective are both possible and almost the same.28 Such a claim, 
supported by data that makes the possibility of objectivity automatically correct, would 
best be connected by two warrants. Here is Professional History’s argument diagrammed: 
 Claim: According to military historians, Iraq is not like Vietnam. 
Grounds: According to the historical tomes I’ve studied, Vietnam was a 
particularly situated war in a particularly situated country with its own particular 
set of socio-political and historical problems. 




The warrants for Professional History’s claims work to make the space of historical study 
smaller and smaller. The focus on training, the focus on discipline, the focus on control—
each of these claims are bolstered and made possible by warrants in which specialization 
and training are highlighted, to the exclusion of all other kinds of historical investigation. 
To build a case for specialists and members of the discipline, warrants for Professional 
History emphasize the particularity of skills required to interpret history correctly. 
Warrants for Collective Memory, at times directly opposed to Professional 
History, highlight the intersections between individuals and larger groups. While 
Professional History designs its arguments for a culture of specialists and Experienced 
History thrives in a culture of suspicion and sensation, Collective Memory must do a 
complicated (and impressive) little dance between these two ways of talking about the 
past. Because, on the one hand, Collective Memory must allow for the shaping, 
transformative power of collective interpretation on the words of the individual witness. 
On the other hand, though, Collective Memory is the collection and validation of 
individual historical interpretations; therefore, its warrants must demonstrate a faith in the 
experience-based claims about the past. 
The culture of Collective Memory, then, is a culture in which the story of 
experience is placed at the forefront—but with a difference. Here, the culture (and, thus, 
the warrants) works to create an environment of mutual culpability (everybody in the 
group may participate in the construction of memory) and necessary exclusivity (such 
memory constructions may ONLY come from within the group). Like Experienced 
History, Collective Memory values individual testimony and strives to demonstrate the 
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pertinence of the particular to the universal. However, like Professional History, 
Collective Memory must also abrogate the boundaries of historical interpretation; stories 
of individuals must pertain to, and help shape, the group’s historical interpretation. To 
that end, an exemplary claim about Collective Memory would look like this: “Veterans 
agree that Iraq is just like Vietnam.” This claim, a basic one that often underlies many of 
the arguments presented by proponents and sharers of Collective Memory, reveals a 
culture of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion—because the grounds that support this 
claim are designed to demonstrate the line between Collective Memory and other, more 
official, ways to interpret the past. And the warrant, then, must justify the lines drawn 
between these historical accounts—as well as provide the reasoning for such a division. 
Here then, is a diagrammed argument for Collective Memory: 
Claim: Veterans agree that Iraq is just like Vietnam. 
Grounds: All the veterans in my family agree that the two wars are more similar 
than they are different. 
Warrant: My family’s historical claims aare justified by both experience and 
intersubjective agreement. 
This argument construction places Collective Memory on the fine line between those who 
tell the stories and those who decide which stories to tell.  
Each version of the past presents a certain ideological front; every historical 
account of every historical event provides an audience with a particular way to see the 
past. The warrants provided by Experienced History, Professional History, and Collective 
Memory are clues about those ideologies, and they are demonstrations of the cultures 
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from which they come. But there are different ways to argue—and there are new ways to 
think about the culture of such arguments. In the next section of this chapter, I examine 
theories of simulation, suggesting two things: first, that we live in a simulational culture; 
and second, that living in such a simulational culture causes us to privilege simulational 
warrants. Because, if this is a simulational culture, and warrants are part and parcel of the 
culture from which they spring, then simulational arguments will be far more effective 
than they would in the three previous historical cultures. Similarly, the kinds of warrants 
that work to bolster and corroborate arguments made in Experienced History, 
Professional History, and Collective Memory will not be so effective in the construction 
and explanation of Simulated History. 
SIMULATION 
In this section, I define and diagram the argumentative construction of 
simulation—and the ways in which simulational arguments exist and persuade. First, I 
provide several definitions of simulation, highlighting the two major elements of 
simulation (represent-ability and performativity). Next, I discuss the advent and 
progression of simulation—as seen in Jean Baudrillard’s theoretical exploration of the 
concept. Finally, I investigate the ways in which the arguments of a Simulated History 
are constructed, presenting different examples of Simulated History and introducing my 
particular case study, Civil War reenactment.  
There are many different understandings and definitions of simulation. 
“Simulations are controlled representations of reality” (Ochoa “Simulation and Gaming” 
104). Simulations are “prosthetic experience[s] of collective power… [or] collective 
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desire” (Buck-Morss Dreamworld and Catastrophe 148). Simulation is similar to, but 
different than, reality; it consists of  
images… [that] depict or re-present realities but are not themselves realities. We 
usually know the difference. If an image depicts a place we have visited or 
reminds us of something that once happened to us, or something we could 
imagine happening, we call it realistic. But that is still not “real.” (Gitlin Media 
Unlimited 22) 
Simulation is an experiential laboratory, a research method establishing the difference 
between textual investigation and experiential data—a way of “rediscovering data that 
had been lost from traditional written and iconographic resources” (J. Anderson Time 
Machines 85).29 “Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a 
substance. It is the generation of models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal… 
It is… the precession of simulacra…” (Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation 1). In each 
of the previous definitions of simulation, the differences (and intersections) between 
simulation and representation are shady theoretical places to dwell.  
Often, discussions of simulation focus on characteristics and descriptions rather 
than definition, but I think, at this point, a definition of simulation will be helful, so I 
define simulation as follows: simulation is the process of feigning (through re-
presentation and performance) a real. Clearly, my definition, along with the rest of the 
previous statements, deserves some further clarification. Most definitions of simulation 
play with the fine lines between the “real,” the “representation,” and the results of such a 
representation. The first definition, that simulations are controlled—comes from 
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“Simulation and Gaming: Simile or Synonym?,” a 1969 article about the uses and abuses 
of simulation in educational situations. A more philosophical conception of simulation 
often links it with concepts of virtuality, as in the second two definitions—simulation as a 
kind of experiential prosthetic (an observation made by Susan Buck-Morss, when she 
discusses the various political ideologies represented in cinematic simulations of Soviet 
and American identity), and simulation as a collection of “realistic” images (a definition 
proposed by Todd Gitlin in a discussion of over-mediated contemporary culture). The 
fourth definition, taken from a book about living history, touches on the notion of 
experience, as well—echoing both Ochoa (the educator) and Buck-Morss (the political 
theorist), Jay Anderson describes simulation as a valuable and experiential learning tool. 
The final definition is taken from Jean Baudrillard’s Simulacra and Simulation 
and is a more ontological description of simulation—placing simulation within the 
practices of culture, Baudrillard’s definition departs a bit from the others but still hits on 
the two main elements of simulation included in my definition: represent-ability and 
performativity. Although there are many different definitions of simulation—across 
scientific, philosophical, and educational circles—a “notion that appears persistently is 
that simulations are representations of reality” (Ochoa 104). Another notion that appears 
in definitions and conceptions of simulation is simulation’s dependence on performance 
and performativity. Simulation, then, is the performative process of re-presenting a real—
when the real is some concept of “things as they are” or “things as they could be.” In 
these figures (things as they or could be), the argumentative structure depends upon both 
the realistic power of representation—to demonstrate, realistically, some idea about the 
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world being simulated. There must be a represent-ability to the real things being 
simulated, or the simulation will not convince. Second, simulation’s argumentative 
structure also depends upon the convincing power of performance—to experience, 
realistically, some idea about the world being simulated.  
Simulation, a performative process of representing the real, gets used in a variety 
of ways. As we see above, simulation is an educational tool—simulating controlled 
situations in the classroom is a classic pedagogical device to place students in different 
environments. Simulation also works as a research method—to fill in, as Anderson 
suggests, theoretical gaps with experiential information. These two uses of simulation 
demonstrate its persuasive, practical, performative power: simulation convinces (works) 
because it is practically and performatively applicable. The more theoretical definitions—
exploring the cultural, cinematic, or technological reach of simulation—emphasize 
simulation’s representative power; in these definitions, simulation convinces (works) 
because it effectively re-presents the realistic and realist expectations of its audience. 
Whether the simulation occurs in a classroom environment (to teach students about the 
functioning of the stock market) or in a national identity (to teach citizens about the true 
purposes of democracy), simulations are persuasive. 
 Before I explore the argumentative dimensions of simulation, though, let’s 
investigate the ontological force of simulation. Jean Baudrillard, throughout his career, 
struggled to elucidate the connections between the cultural phases and philosophical 
facets of simulation. The basic definition of simulation, according to Jean Baudrillard, is 
that simulation was once the process of making a copy, a referential territory in which the 
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symbol or thing being produced had some real relationship to that it which it represented. 
Simulation has become, however, a symptom of the hyperreal: “the generation by models 
of a real without origin or reality… [a] map that precedes reality—precession of 
simulacra30—that engenders the territory… It is the real, and not the map, whose vestiges 
persist here and there” (Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation 1). This definition of 
simulation, then, is twofold. First, it is a regressive process. And second, it is 
argumentatively powerful because it plays upon the concept of the real—which is a 
powerful postulate—and because it allows for (requires? Cannot be without?) a 
multiplicity of meaning. In Symbolic Exchange and Death, he introduced the notion of 
simulation as a progression; each step proceeds, he argues, further and further from the 
actual reality it seeks to represent. The problem with simulation is that it creates its own 
reality—and once it has created that reality, simulation becomes a representation of only 
itself. Simulation becomes more real than, more exact than, more perfect than, the real, 
and, in so doing, simulation usurps the real it purports to represent.  
 Baudrillard’s discussion of simulation and its stages changed throughout his life. 
At the earliest, he describe the historical stages of cultural simulation in this way: 
1) Simulation stands in for reality 
2) Simulation hides the absence of reality 
3) Simulation produces its own reality 
In the 1990’s Baudrillard introduces a fourth stage, the stage in which we currently find 
ourselves—the viral or fractal or simulacral stage. This stage stems from the third stage—
a metamorphosis into the simulacral form.  The orders of simulation are really a kind of 
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ontological precession of reality—in that each step causes a regression overwhelming the 
relationship between reality and its others in the previous stages. Each stage eats the 
previous stage; this is the hyperreal. This is where simulation is so endemic, so big, that 
it’s eaten all the real before, and there’s really no way of getting back to the real.  
 Simulating something real and simulating something that is itself a simulation may 
be different kinds of endeavors. The logic and function of simulation is to re-produce a 
real event or item, but this kind of simulation gets swallowed and metamorphosed by the 
logic of contemporary simulations, the hyperreal. The logic and function of the hyperreal 
revolves around the simulacra—a symbol that represents only itself. According to 
Baudrillard, this kind of simulation is based on the precession of the model, meaning 
essentially, that the construction of models means that the models begin to generate their 
own reality (Simulacra and Simulation 16). Rather than an eventual interruption by the 
real, Baudrillard argues, the process of simulation is only always interrupted and re-
structured by constructed simulations—each construction a simulacrum of no thing 
before it. It is a constant cycle, a constant pattern—it is a cultural simulation and a 
simulational culture, both at once. The argumentative force (and the ontological power) 
of simulation lies in its perceived capacity to represent. (This capacity to represent is the 
warrant fundamental to a simulational culture). However, the backing for such a warrant, 
the representational capacity of various simulations, goes further than an audience’s 
belief in simulation’s realistic representation. Indeed, the argumentative force of 
simulation exists in its ability to go beyond representation: a simulation is a reality made 
of representations. In a simulational logic, definition of events (as well as the application 
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of those definitions) does not adhere to any one set of established rules; simulational 
logic, instead, allows for simultaneous, infinite variations and explanations of both the 
rules at hand and the definitions of the events being explained.  
 This is not to say that there is no real to simulate,31 this is to say that a logic of 
hyperreal simulation is only (can only be) comprised of infinitely repeating models of 
itself. Baudrillard describes this endless sequence of models as a “Hell of simulation 
which is no longer one of torture, but of the subtle, maleficent, elusive twisting of 
meaning” (Simulacra and Simulation 18). The elusive twist of meaning does not mean 
that there is not a real—it just means that the construction of meaning is itself another 
level of simulation—difficult, if not impossible, to language. Moreover, we should 
recognize, at this point, that reality is, itself, a performative entity. The two elements of 
our simulation definition, represent-ability and performativity, are both elements of the 
real, as well. Definitions, understandings, theories, histories, stories—each of these “real” 
parts of the world are performed, and they are assumed to be representative. The real can 
be made artful and artfully—a history is only one product of these performed 
representations of “things as they are/were/could be.” The simulation of a real history and 
the artful construction of a real history may be different things—despite Baudrillard’s 
arguments to the contrary. But, in order to accept a simulational argument, an audience 
must be familiar with (and persuaded by) the warrants and claims of a simulational 
culture.  
  For example, say one goes to a popular, crowded gym. Outside, the weather is 
rainy and cold, but as you walk into the gym, you are immediately warmed by both the 
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heaters running in the building and the body heat of the people working out. You show 
your ID to the desk clerk and walk to the machine you’ve chosen to use (a treadmill, an 
elliptical machine, a stair climber, a leg press.) You set down your plastic bottle of water 
and your ID, your keys and your towel. You remove the sweatshirt of your alma mater 
and place your IPOD earbuds into your ears. As you exercise, you listen to some 
randomized collection of songs that your computer has shuffled for you, and you begin to 
glance around at the other people in the gym. Each person has a plastic bottle of water 
and an ID, keys and a towel. Each person is wearing earphones, isolated and sweating, 
just like you. You are running. Your body gets tired and your muscles begin to hurt. And 
you see yourself, in various shapes and sizes, suffering in the same way on the machine 
next to you—and the one next to that. On the TVs in front of the machines are dramatic 
depictions of lawyers, or cops, or talk show hosts, or chefs at work. There are 
advertisements and E! True Hollywood episodes peopled by impossibly beautiful beings. 
You are running in order to look like them—and you never will, but you continue to 
watch the television sets. And you continue to run. 
  This scenario is a sequence of simulations. First, you walk into the simulated heat. 
Then, you present your ID—a simulated likeness of your face that the gym requires in 
order to minimize fraud. Then there are the sets of machines. Then there are the people 
and the earphones and the TV sets and the commercials and the plastic water bottles. The 
reality of pain in your legs and shallowness in your lungs are not diminished by the 
simulated patterns of action in which you find yourself. You are really suffering in that 
gym, but the gym’s mechanism of meaning is not yours. The function of the gym is not to 
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be real—it is a model. The element of simulation that I want to emphasize here, and in 
the rest of my project, is on production—the process of production, the creation of 
moments, the definitions of those moments—this is the definition of simulation that, I 
think, fuels our contemporary simulational culture. Acting, painting, photography, 
photocopying,32 going to the gym, watching the news, performing the role of teacher in to 
an online discussion, drinking a no-fat, sugar-free vanilla latte in a coffee shop that looks 
exactly like the coffee shop one block over—these acts of production and re-production 
are examples of Baudrillard’s “many simultaneous meanings that destroy each other” 
(Simulacra and Simulation 40). A simulational culture depends not only on the constant, 
regressive cycle of meaning but also on the processes of re-presenting those meanings, of 
seeming to drive those cycles.  
  The interaction of media with the construction and repetition of models is another 
important element of these simulated productions. The production and distribution of 
simulacra depends on the dissolution of differences between sender and receiver, medium 
and message:  
It is the whole traditional world of causality that is in question: the perspectival, 
determinist mode, the “active,” critical mode, the analytic mode—the distinction 
between cause and effect, between active and passive, between subject and object, 
between the end and the means. It is in this sense that one can say: TV is watching 
us, TV alienates us, TV manipulates us, TV informs us… implosion—an 
absorption of the radiating mode of causality, of the differential mode of 
determination… an implosion of meaning. That is where the simulation begins… 
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Everywhere… in which the distinction between these two poles can no longer be 
maintained, one enters into simulation… not into passivity, but into the 
indifferentiation of the active and the passive. (Simulacra and Simulation 31). 
Production and reception melt into each other in the constant revolution of models. 
Models are the mode of meaning through which simulated culture gets its 
understanding—these are the cultural patterns of action, as well as the modes of 
interpretation and reception. And the meaning being constructed and re-constructed 
through these models is not attributable to the activity of actors—or the passivity of 
audiences—the implosion of difference between acting and being acted upon is an effect 
of simulation.  
  In Simulacra and Simulation, Baudrillard attacks the simulational land of Disney, 
but he notes that Disneyland is not the only imaginary machine set up “to rejuvenate the 
fiction of the real.” As noted above, there are simulations available around every corner. 
Contemporary humans, argues Baudrillard, create the imaginary in order to demonstrate 
that we know the difference between it and the real. He uses Disneyland as a classic 
example of this; Disneyland “exists in order to hide that it is the ‘real’ country, all of 
‘real’ America that is Disneyland (a bit like prisons are there to hide that it is the social in 
its entirety, in its banal omnipresence…)” (12). A simulation is the production (re-
production) of a reality it works to distract us from: it is the ends and the means 
simultaneously. Simulation is both the process of producing, as well as the production 
itself. When we are in a simulation (like Disneyland), we are a part of the simulation 
machinery because we become parts of the process.  
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It is important to differentiate between the two kinds of simulation discussed by 
Baudrillard—the dangers and seductions of the hyperreal are bolstered by the 
remembered simulations of the real. We are persuaded by simulation and the warrants of 
simulated experience (that running on a treadmill will work, that we can all cook like 
Rachel Ray, that classes in public speaking will teach us how to speak, that the grocery 
store produce aisle is fresh). “Everywhere,” Baudrillard writes, “we must recycle 
[psychic] waste” (13). The persuasion of simulation exists in this psychic waste—if it 
was, at one time, possible to simulate reality, then the argumentative power of simulation 
may extend to the creation and construction of many different imaginaries. As gyms are 
the recycling of the celebrity imaginary (we run so that we can look like Jessica Biel and 
Gerard Butler), so is Disneyland the recycling of the American imaginary.  
On a mental level, Disneyland is the prototype of this new function. But all the 
sexual, psychic, somatic recycling institutes… belong to the same order. People 
no longer look at each other, but there are institutes for that. They no longer touch 
each other, but there is contactotherapy. They no longer walk, but they go 
jogging, etc. Everywhere one recycles lost faculties, or lost bodies, or lost 
sociality, or the taste for lost food. (13) 
These recycling processes, like the endless repetition of meaning, are produced and 
experienced by the same audiences. Those audiences are persuaded that simulated 
experiences will stand in for the real experiences. Argumentative power exists in 
simulation—it creates results—through schoolwork, on the treadmill, from diplomas 
(156). The process of simulation becomes, in and of itself, a kind of argument. We 
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believe simulated events because we make them believable. We are persuaded by 
simulation because we grant them the power of persuasion. These constructions are 
simulational performances, performative rhetorics of different imaginaries—and their 
warrants are constructed in a simulational culture. 
  In The World and How We Describe It, his discussion of reality, representation 
and simulation, Barry Brummett explores the suspicion with which simulated material is 
met. Because we assume a reality, as Baudrillard demonstrates, we are wary of simulated 
persuasion. However, simulation gets its persuasive power from that very assumption—
because we expect the real to exist, we can be convinced by simulation. And, for that 
very reason, some are on the alert for the rhetoric of simulation. Brummett explains, “Of 
course, someone who insists on a dualist world in which representations are held 
accountable for re-presenting the world will condemn the easy, unfettered changeability 
of simulation… The whole process of simulation itself is seen as lies and deceptions” 
(58). Because simulation brings to bear the inevitability of constant change, the 
impossibility of established meaning, simulations are cause for Cartesian concern. But 
this concern does not remove the rhetorical force from simulation; the concerns felt by 
dualists intent on re-presentational culpability may, in fact, reinforce the rhetorical and 
epistemological force of simulation. The performance element of simulational rhetorics 
makes them sources of powerful warrant and argument construction.  
 To live in a simulational culture is to live in a culture of constantly performed 
simulacra—the precession of models to which Baudrillard refers as the simulation of the 
hyperreal. This is the culture of Disneyland and tourism and gyms and E! True 
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Hollywood stories. A culture that fosters simulation, on the other hand, is more related to 
media. The media through which we read our world (and in which we act) shape our 
habitus and our understanding. The key to our new simulational culture exists in the 
progress and invention of technology; simulation is especially dependent on technology. 
As Marshall McLuhan wrote: “The personal and social consequences of any medium—
that is, of any extension of ourselves—result from the new scale that is introduced into 
our affairs by each extension of ourselves, or by any new technology” (7). Walter 
Benjamin, discussing the ramifications and implications of a culture focused on technical 
reproductions in “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” notes that 
technological advances increase the ability to copy originals at the same time that they 
change the way in which both the originals and the copies are viewed. Audience 
perception of original and reproduction are colored by understandings of both 
authenticity and the real:  
The presence of the original is the prerequisite to the concept of authenticity… 
The whole sphere of authenticity is outside technical—and, of course, not only 
technical—reproducibility. Confronted with its manual reproduction, which was 
usually branded as a forgery, the original preserved all its authority; not so vis a 
vis technical reproduction. (220)  
Benjamin goes on to name the twofold reason for these changed readings: precision and 
placement. The precision to which he refers exists in the greater details allowed for and 
sought by photographers—the angles, the scope, the range of photographs exceeds the 
capability of the human eye. And the ability, with technical reproduction, to make 
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available works of art to audiences heretofore unreachable is the second facet of 
Benjamin’s twofold reason. 
The technological advances of a culture fostering simulation create the possibility 
for a simulational culture. Cultures define identities, predict “equipment for living,” 
shape social and economic structures. The purpose of cultural study, argues Raymond 
Williams, is “the exploration and specification of distinguishable cultural formations… It 
is often as much in movement, tension and contradiction within major institutions as in 
their undifferentiated dominance that we find the significant specific relations” (7). 
Williams defines cultural theory as the exploration and explanation of relationships 
between various social and economical structures within a culture—to recognize the 
interaction between a simulational culture and a culture fostering simulation is to draw 
attention to those relationships. So, we look at the movement of mediated re-
presentations of reality, examining the tensions between those re-presentations and the 
worlds they seek to re-present. A contemporary example of Williams’ significant special 
relations between the simulated Third World and the existing Third World demonstrates 
the mediated tensions, movement, and contradictions between what is and what is 
simulated. Recently, the popular TV show American Idol presented a special show called 
American Idol Gives Back in which the normally petty, ridiculously superficial hosts 
Ryan, Paula, Randy, and Simon travel to various parts of the world and the country, 
visiting some of the poorest places on the globe. They interact with an African woman 
who is very sick—we learn on the post-show that she died of HIV-related illnesses. They 
visit a food distribution warehouse in California—blocks away, Simon tells us, from his 
 
135 
neighborhood. They go to New Orleans to see the Katrina-devastated regions that are still 
unsafe for human habitation (but humans are living there). And the show itself, populated 
by various singers and performers, is designed, they say, to get Americans economically 
involved in aiding these various people and places. Each phone call they receive, rather 
than going to support the callers’ favorite idol performers, will add to the donations 
American Idol  sends to these places—and Ford and Coca-Cola, the bankrolloers of the 
American Idol juggernaut, will match the donations Idol makes. 
 The result, viewers learn on the next show, is about $70 million raised. That 
money, once mentioned, disappears. We do not see where it goes; we do not know who 
receives what part of the money. We do not hear about the taxes or the salaries of the 
hosts—but we are part of a simulated effort. Through the eyes and voices of Simon, 
Paula, Randy, and Ryan (as well as the numerous members of the camera crews they take 
with them), we see the piles of garbage (a.k.a shantytowns) in which millions of HIV-
positive African children play. We are told that the New Orleans clean-up crews are hard 
at work. We hear the story of a southern child who wants to learn to read. And then we 
get back to the performances.  
 Theoretically, the audience, sitting in their comfortable American couches, eating 
various salty snacks, have seen the world outside. They have been informed of the 
suffering in the world—seen it with their own eyes—and they have acted. And it’s all 
happened on the screen in front of them. It is an entirely mediated experience of the 
world outside American living rooms, bolstered by the simulational culture in which we 
live, and made possible by the technology we have created. 
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Mark Poster, in The Second Media Age, discusses the changing nature of our 
cultural patterns of action. The focus on language as a problematic leads him into an 
examination of “virtual reality.” 
‘Virtual reality’ is a … dangerous term since it suggests that reality may be 
multiple or take many forms. The phrase is close to that of “real time.” … In this 
case, the normal or conventional sense of “time” had to be preserved by the 
modifier “real.” But again the use of the modifier only draws attention to non-
“reality” of clock time, its nonexclusivity, is insubstantiality, its lack of 
foundation. The terms “virtual reality” and “real time” attest to the force of a 
second media age in constituting a simulational culture… The culture is 
increasingly simulational in the sense that the media often changes the things that 
it treats, transforming the identity of originals and referentialities… “[R]eality” 
becomes multiple. (37)  
Changing patterns of action, the mediation of our “equipment for living,” makes the 
culture in which we function more and more simulational—not only are the definitions of 
simulation changing, the position that they take in contemporary culture are also 
changing. As our understanding of “real” time and existence transform, our 
interpretations of various arguments and activities change.  
 Studies of tourism and leisure attest to our increasingly simulational culture. John 
Urry studies the shifting roles of leisure and tourist practices within contemporary 
culture. Since the nineteenth century, he argues, forms of culture and tourist practice have 
interacted in different ways. Nineteenth century tourist practices “culture largely moved 
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in different direction. So on the one hand there was the development of seaside resorts, 
and on the other bourgeois culture with its concerts, museums, galleries, and so on” 
(“Cultural Change and Tourism 233-234). The structural differentiation between what 
people did for fun and what they did to live was stark; the “equipment for living,” in 
other words, defined each of these activities as separate and independent from one 
another.  
  Currently, however, those roles and definitions are intermingled. He presents 
three reasons for this increased interdependence. The first reason has to do with media; 
mediation of commerce and culture presents a visually inseparable presentation of these 
two things. Second, culture is everywhere: “the economy is now mainly to be viewed as 
involving the production of signs and/or of objects which have a high sign-value 
component” (234). Finally, international tourism has become “one of the most 
significant” interactions between people of different cultures that it poses a challenge to 
(and, some might say, a questioning of) Anderson’s “imagined communities” (234). 
Tourist practices, no longer consigned to something people do in their spare time, 
become ways to interpret the world, simulated patterns of action working to explain and 
define the ways in which people and cultures interact. The American Idol Gives Back 
episode is another kind of tourism; virtually and with a minimum of effort, Idol audiences 
get to be politicians and philanthropists, both at once. 
  Theorists like Mark Poster and John Urry refer to contemporary culture as “post-
modern.” In this project, though, I think a better term for contemporary culture would be, 
simply, “simulational culture.” The changing practices and equipments for living 
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associated with current interpretations of culture are simulational in nature. Urry, going 
on to explain some of the more recent conclusions reached about culture and cultural 
practices, writes:  
A … related cultural practice is the extraordinary emergence of what one can term 
instantaneous time… This includes the development of a so-called three minute 
culture because of the VCR and TV… [E]lectronic means of communication have 
given rise to … a collage effect in newspapers and the media so that 
newsworthiness rather than place govern [sic] inclusion; news broadcasts present 
a kind of collage of historically and geographically disconnected events. (238) 
The melting together of time, information, geography, media, and culture creates a place 
where interpretation of personal experience works in the same way that interpretation of 
historical events—or football games—or Internet research—or cooking shows—does.  
 If a culture is an environment in which certain patterns of interpretive, perceptive 
actions grow, then we may be able to define that culture by those actions. In this 
contemporary culture, our interpretive patterns of action are simulational: time, location, 
and individuality are compressed and expanded to create simulated experiences (and 
understandings) of ourselves and our own culture, as well as people and cultures far from 
us. But the distance is only perceived dimly. Underneath our assumptions that we can 
cook like Alton Brown (by watching Food Network); learn the real culture of Hungary 
(by traveling to Budapest and eating the food); or understand the authentic events of the 
Civil War (by attending or participating in a Civil War reenactment) lie simulational 
warrants (that re-enacting something will give us the authentic feeling of having-been-
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there; that re-performing an action performed by someone else at some other time for 
some other purpose will teach us how and why that person was). These simulational 
warrants are both performative and analytical—a collapsing of the difference between the 
actor and the acted-upon. The performativity and analytical nature of these warrants also 
demonstrates Benjamin’s theory of the copy displacing the original. Re-enacting an 
event, re-performing a process, is an individual experience; can individual experience be 
copied? Or is reenacting, by its very nature, a sort of performed hyperreal? 
Simulational argument, in a simulational culture, works with warrants that assume 
the validity of simulation. Interestingly, there is a rhetorical difference drawn between the 
“technical reproduction” of a real and the performance of a real. Benjamin discusses the 
performance of the actor for the audience, but the audience experience is that of the 
spectator. Baudrillard talks more about the interaction between the passivity of an 
audience-spectator and the activity of a producer-simulator. But in this project I want to 
explore the relationship between simulation and experience more rhetorically. 
Discussions of tourism often include an experiential aspect—what, then is the rhetorical 
import of simulating/touring the past? Our “equipment for living” in a simulational 
culture interprets experiences within that culture through a lens of simulation—so 
perhaps we are persuaded by claims that we can “know” history by “living” history—
regardless of the impossibility of time travel. When time is compressed through 






What I shall call Simulated History is also referred to as living history. Living 
history, a relatively new phenomenon, began in Sweden in the nineteenth century (J. 
Anderson Living History Sourcebook 19). A nostalgic combination of both memory and 
ceremony, living history was designed to demonstrate the activities and objects of the 
past while simultaneously lending it a more “real” feeling than older museums and 
exhibitions. Since the middle of the 20th century, an interest in the performance and re-
construction of the past has grown among both spectators and participants (Allred 2), and 
inherent to the practice of living history is the simulated production of experience.  
The argumentative environment constructed by Simulated History occurs in a 
world of images and activities. To prove a point simulationally, one must reenact, or re-
present, or re-live, or re-construct, or re-member events from the past. Each simulation 
must be a performed reconstruction of the histories being explored. In this section of the 
chapter, I do two things: first, I present examples of different Simulated Histories, 
examining the ways in which those simulations get invoked in argument; and second, I 
introduce the argument construction in Civil War reenactment, providing the reasons why 
I chose that particular instance of Simulated History to examine. 
Let’s begin by looking at several different examples of Simulated History. In the 
Introduction, I mention Civil War reenactment, 20th century war reenactments, plantation 
homes in Louisiana and Mississippi, colonial museums in Virginia, 18th century hotels in 
Maine, time-traveling reality TV shows, and Renaissance festivals. Some other examples 
include: Star Trek conventions,33 17th century trade fairs,34 historic agricultural festivals 
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and farms dedicated to living history,35 and prehistoric Scottish fashion shows.36 The 
interesting thing about these different events and organizations is the similarities between 
their goals and language. Because they seem so out-of-context, let’s examine the science 
fiction-centered conventions first. 
There are two reasons that I include Star Trek conventions on a list of Simulated 
Histories. The first reason is representational: conventions/meetings that revolve around 
the study and pleasure of science fiction and fantasy themes are heavily focused on the 
sartorial excesses of those worlds. At Lord of the Rings (LOTR) conventions, for 
instance, you will see a variety of people dressed as hobbits, Elves, or Black Riders—and 
as they wander from booth to booth, each item of costume or uniform will be examined 
minutely by fellow attendees. It is very important, you see, to achieve an authentic look; 
in order to pay homage to the fictional characters and worlds being represented, one must 
research the details. How stitching is done, where one places a sword, how long one’s 
hair is, how many teeth on has—each of these representational details is carefully 
researched. The fictions themselves may have been written about magical worlds in a 
different time or on distant planets, but the works themselves exist, as historical events; 
there are timelines to check, names to remember, dates to verify, fabrics to replicate. To 
simulate a history of hobbits, then, a true fan will research the details—and be able to 
distinguish the bad simulations from the good simulations. 
 The argument construction happening at LOTR conventions depends heavily on 
the represent-ability of historical details. Represent-ability, as we saw in the previous 
section, is the ability to demonstrate realistically, some idea about the world being 
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represented. The same represent-ability must happen in other kinds of Simulated History. 
At a Renaissance festival or a prehistoric Scottish fashion show, the participants will be 
focused intently on the correct-ness of different sartorial elements. The dresses and 
uniforms at a Louisiana plantation home are one of the reasons people want to get 
involved—women want to try the dresses on, men want to see what it feels like to wear 
an authentic Confederate uniform. In each of these Simulated Histories, represent-ability 
drives the participation as well as the evaluation of the events being simulated. 
 The second aspect of simulation, performativity, plays a more central role in some 
of the other examples of Simulated History. Two examples of Simulated History in which 
performance is emphasized are farms and hotels dedicated to living history. Each of these 
simulations depends heavily on the performativity of the past, and they demonstrate the 
importance of activity in simulational arguments. 
 So, say you are on your way to a historic Russian pioneer settlement in California 
to learn what Russian pioneers did on a day-to-day basis. Fort Ross State Historic Park, 
located north of San Francisco, holds a heritage day on the third Saturday of each month. 
At the park, visitors are taught to make bread in brick ovens, speak Russian, and wear 
period clothing. During the week, school children stay overnight, learning to chop wood 
and work in the blacksmith shop. Marina Nikiforov, a frequent visitor, talked to Paul 
McHugh (writer for San Francisco Chronicle) about the value of such a park: “The best 
way to learn to be Russian is not an intellectual way, with ideas… Experience is 
strongest. Here my son chops wood with a hatchet and runs freely down to the cove. I can 
say, this is what the story books speak about, this wholesome experience” (P 10). This 
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observation demonstrates the kinds of claims that get made in simulational arguments—
that the past can be learned through action, as opposed to ideas. 
 Or, for another example, you and your family decide to visit rural Iowa because 
you really want to “get your grip on history at Living History Farms.”37 At this particular 
Simulated History, you will get a free pair of gloves and be invited to participate in a 
variety of historically authentic activities—like how Native Americans grew crops, or 
different ways to plow a field with oxen, or you can even learn how contemporary 
farmers feed and clothe themselves in the 21st century. As you stroll through the fields, 
town streets, general store, or print shop, historical interpreters will explain the details of 
daily life as they walk you through the motions of each activity. Authenticity, getting to 
re-member the actions, and feel the experiences of historical people—all of these 
elements of Simulated History are working to construct a persuasive argument about the 
past, “how things were.” The simulational experience of hands-on activities are 
performative. Even the smells and sounds, suggests the websites, are historically 
authentic in a way that more traditional museums and books can never be. As you wander 
around an 18th century Iowa town, you are being convinced of certain historical details. 
While you chop wood with a Russian émigré, you are being convinced of certain 
historical details. With every motion of your arms and legs, with every scent that wafts 
by—you are simulationally immersed in the history that these various sites re-present. 
And, with our ever-increasing technological advances, there are more and more 
opportunities for technology to bring more of these simulations closer to everyday life for 
more people. Honestly, Jean Luc Picard’s holodeck may not be so far away.  
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 The arguments proposed by Simulated History involve represent-ability and 
performativity. I diagram the claims and arguments of Experienced History, Professional 
History, and Collective Memory earlier in the chapter—so I’ll do the same here for 
Simulated History. This is a complex argument structure—in order to connect the claim 
about individual experience with the grounds that people really acted in certain ways, 
Simulated History must work on several different levels. First, there must be an 
assumption (sometimes stated, sometimes unspoken) that contemporary people are 
similar to the individuals being represented. Second, the performativity of historical 
events must be made individual—each of the activities at living history events 
emphasizes the completion of tasks (simple or complicated) by one person at a time. And, 
finally, the connection between doing these activities now and doing them in the past 
must be established—simulation connects the 18th century pioneer (or the Middle Earth 
occupant or the 19th century soldier) with the 21st century tourist. Such an argument 
might look something like this: 
Claim: Because Civil War reenactment does  not re-present the lives of slaves, 
slavery must not have played a big part in the actual Civil War. 
Grounds 1: The reenactors are historically informed and well-versed on authentic 
details of everyday life in the 1860’s. 
Grounds 2: Reenactments are blindingly white events. 
Warrant: Simulational experiences (personal, hands-on activities, and realistic 
representations of the past) teach us about real history. 
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In this argument construct, the backing is our cultural context—the technological and 
cultural assumptions in which simulated performances work to persuade audiences of 
their authentic, representational capacities. Authentic reproduction of historical 
experience drives these constructions, and the simulation of these experiences manifests 
itself through the rhetorical construction of identification with various historical groups. 
Using the same argumentative themes available to the three historical rhetorics I discuss 
in the first chapter (materiality, perspective, and practitioners), the performance of 
Simulated History attempts to construct an historical argument that is different from 
(because it is more “real” than) the more traditional historical rhetorics. In this chapter I 
briefly outline the ways in which Simulated History constructs its argument materially, 
perspectivally, and performatively. I go into much greater detail about these constructions 
in chapters three and four: my rhetorical analysis of Civil War reenactment. 
 Materiality in Simulated History is, like Experienced History, based on the tactility 
and credibility of bodies. The difference, though, is that these Experiences get 
transformed—through time, space, and simulational culture. Performers of Simulated 
History collect, display, and explain objects related to the activities of the human body: 
the evidence offered in Simulated History. Participants in Simulated History offer their 
bodily experiences and testimonies as both grounds and warrant. The body supports 
claims to an authentic knowledge/understanding of historical reality. Reenactors prize 
authenticity, and they use their bodies to claim authenticity. In short, reenactors use their 
bodies to prove the very history they perform. They rely on contemporary acceptance of 
experiential (first person, testimonial) rhetoric—because first person testimony is 
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accepted as difficult, if not impossible, to question. Contemporary audiences equate 
experience with credibility, and reenactors rely on current associations of credibility with 
experience relying on the premise that experiences of the body are more “real” than 
experiences of the mind. Living historians also suggest that individual bodily memory 
(transformed and simulated) is a powerful support for the process of living history—
which leads us to the next category of argument construction: perspective. 
 The perspective taken by Simulated History is both ideological and pedagogical. 
Stuart Hall explains ideology as “those images, concepts and premises which provide the 
frameworks through which we represent, interpret, understand and ‘make sense’ of some 
aspect of social existence” (“Whites of their Eyes” 18). Ideology functions to make 
aspects of our world mean. Simulated History is ideological, then, because it limits the 
interpretation of history to something that can only be individual—it is myopic in scope. 
Simulated History is also pedagogical because it, like Professional History, emphasizes 
the objective value of academic and professional studies of the past. Teaching is an 
ideological act. Ideology, in the context of teaching history, is a contextual and discursive 
set of practices. Decisions made by teachers to highlight or ignore certain historical 
events demonstrate ideological assumptions. In Ideology: An Introduction Terry Eagleton 
writes: 
 You could not decide whether a statement was ideological or not by inspecting it  
in isolation from its discursive context, any more than you could decide in this 
way whether a piece of writing was a work of literary art. Ideology is less a matter 
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of the inherent linguistic properties of a pronouncement than a question of who is 
saying what to whom for what purposes.(9) 
The practice of teaching history becomes ideological only within context—specific 
teachers, talking to particular students, in certain national/regional environments. History 
teachers, in other words, practice ideology by constructing and maintaining specific 
cultural norms. For example, many Americans celebrate their national day of 
independence on July 4th; in France, the national day of independence falls on July 14th. 
These two events in history are similarly described in their respective countries as 
moments of revolution and change, but their importance as an historical event differs 
from country to country. History teaches us which of these events to emphasize, and 
those emphases demonstrate the discursive ideological and cultural assumptions of the 
nations in which we live. 
Teaching history involves more than the relation of facts and figures. In choosing 
to emphasize and share certain events, in attending to certain figures and actions, in 
selecting certain groups to study over other groups, the teacher figures powerfully in the 
construction and maintenance of collective memory. In a sense teaching history involves 
the construction of collective memory transformed—this memory is polished and 
simulated, re-presented for popular and individual consumption. “Living historians” 
become the bearers of this simulated collective memory, representing the construction 
and maintenance of collective theories about history and its relationship to the present. 
These teachers, as “living history” must not only share their knowledge of past events 
with their students, they must also provide some framework in which to situate the 
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information they impart. Further, living historians, or re-enactors, present themselves as 
the final, objective word. They propose that their reclamation of the past is not only 
demonstrating stories that are rarely told, but are, in fact, presenting history as it really 
occurred. In “Toward a New Political Narrative,” W. Lance Bennett and Murray 
Edelman discuss the rationalizing function of political rhetoric, specifically, but their 
discussion informs the shaping of pedagogy, especially as it relates to relating and 
communicating “social truths.” When individuals embrace the truth of certain historical 
readings, they rely upon “highly selective impressions of reality that seem objective when 
applied uncritically to ongoing events… [and i]nformation that doesn’t fit the symbolic 
mold can be ignored, denied, or rationalized out of serious consideration” (158). The 
difficult or unexpected moments in history are excused and/or erased by the shared 
knowledge of living historians’ performances.  
The function of history in the creation and maintenance of culture is to narrativize 
the past so as to reify the present. Narrativizing the past, according to John B. 
Thompsonin Ideology and Modern Culture, is a process of making the story of history a 
smooth one, leaving out details deemed irrelevant, omitting certain chapters, erasing the 
voices of those who do not add to the narrative coherence. Each of these actions works to 
turn history into a narrative—as Paul Veyne mentions in Writing History. Simulated 
History, though, neglects to monitor or mention these omissions. Not only are certain 
versions of the past performed and re-presented, they are performed and re-presented as 
the only version. In Chapter Three I explain this narrativization process in detail 
(suggesting that Civil War reenactment specifically is designed for such sanitized, white-
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washed tales), but here it would do us good to notice the ways in which teaching 
(Perspective) and narrative coherence (Silences) work together. These sources/resources 
of argument work to construct claims about the past that are used to justify racially and 
economically motivated political ends.  
Narrativization, therefore, is specifically ideological. J. Thompson defines 
ideology in Ideology and Modern Culture as the “interpretive transformation of doxa” 
(25), explaining that ideology, much like collective memory, takes opinions (or lay 
theories) about the causes and effects of historical events and makes them solid. In order 
to cement doxa, ideology gets performed, says Thompson, in different ways. The 
pedagogical function of Simulated History occurs in two manners: narrativization and the 
symbolization of unity. Narrativization, according to Thompson, contains “claims re-
embedded in stories which recount the past and treat the present as part of a timeless and 
cherished tradition” (61). Re-enactors perform their version of events in the face of 
archival history and embed their claims of connection with the past and search for truth 
within the narratives that get performed. They construct seemingly continuous historical 
relationships between themselves and the people they seek to embody. Their 
identification with historical individuals is part of the performative perspective they 
present to both the spectators and themselves.  
The second pedagogical task operating in Simulated History is the symbolization 
of unity, a task which “involves the construction of symbols of national unity, such as 
flags, national anthems, emblems and inscriptions of various kinds” (J. Thompson 64). 
Re-enactors employ a variety of symbols in order to present a unified conception of the 
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past: flags, historically authentic uniforms, historical artifacts like cannons and surgical 
implements, preparation of food, layout of historical scenery. Each of these details 
becomes an important layer in the stories being told, a talisman of connection and 
authenticity. Symbolization of unity and narrativization are related facets of ideology: “In 
practice the symbolization of unity may be interwoven with the process of 
narrativization, as symbols of unity may be an integral part of a narrative of origins which 
recounts a shared history and projects collective fate” (64). Their interdependence affects 
the successful re-enactment of the past, and so the “living historians” must perform both 
tasks in order to accomplish their re-version of history. 
Simulated History is becoming an industry of consumption and production. An 
industry marketing the past is thriving: manufacturers, hotels, movie makers, clothiers, 
gun-makers, and animal handlers, just to name a few, are contemporary occupations at 
which people work on and profit from the consumption of history (Weeks 23). Other 
people who make up the players in the living history industry include employees of living 
history museums, battle reenactors (Civil War, WW II, American Revolution, and French 
and Indian War included), and documentary filmmakers. My case study in this project is 
Civil War reenactment. Of the living history market, Civil War studies comprise a major 
element, and it is an area of historical obsession open to study (Allred 3; Horwitz 5). 
 The Civil War interests a great many people in the world. The number of books 
written about the Civil War top 60,000, and, according to Tony Horwitz, “a bibliography 
of works on Gettysburg alone [runs] to 277 pages” (5). In “Catharsis, Revision, and Re-
enactment,” Randal Allred describes the unique nature of the Civil War market, as well 
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as some of the folks who subscribe to it: “There are Civil War ‘buffs’ who love the 
subject with an obsession unlike that of other buffs of other events. There are wargamers, 
Civil War Round Tables in nearly every city, living history festivals, preservation 
societies, Southern cotillions, and associations” (1).  Civil War buffs are responsible for 
the incredible memory-driven enterprise of living history events, and, while there has 
been some study of the Civil War history market, “there has been little attention paid to 
the significant cultural phenomenon of Civil War re-enactors and their hobby. It is more 
than a hobby for it assumes the identity of a culture itself with its own unique traditions, 
language, and rituals” (Allred 1).38 The culture of Civil War and living history comprises 
a world in which participants and spectators join to watch certain versions of the past get 
replayed and to experience those pasts as authentically as possible. 
RE-PRESENTING THE PAST 
 Simulated History is a performance and a re-presentation of the past—through a 
particular lens with a particular end in mind. The argument constructions in each 
historical rhetoric demonstrate two things: the world in which they function and the 
methods they use to persuade effectively. In the first chapter, I examine the rhetorical 
structure of Experienced History, Professional History, and Collective Memory. In this 
chapter I add a new kind of historical investigation to that list: Simulated History. After a 
discussion of simulation and simulational culture, I explore the argument construction 
different historical rhetorics—interrogating the positioning of warrants as cultural litmus 
tests. Warrants, symptoms and signposts of cultural assumptions, are the rhetorical 
connective devices between the claims made by different historical interpretations and 
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the data they use to support those observations. Finally, I introduce the case study for this 
project, Civil War reenactment.  
 There are three reasons why I choose Civil War reenactment as my case study: it 
is a rich example of Simulated History; it is more common and more people participate in 
Civil War reenactment than in many of the other kinds of Simulated History; and, finally, 
Civil War reenactment is generalizable to more than itself.  
 Civil War reenactment is a rich text for analysis because it is so rhetorically multi-
layered. There are a variety of different personalities simulated in Civil War reenactment. 
Different military constructions, occupations, genders, ages—each reenactment event 
features not only soldiers but medical personnel, laundresses, tailors and cooks. A 
rhetorical analysis o f this Simulated History may focus on a variety of different 
representations and performances. There are also multiple objects at play—in support of 
the aforementioned social and practical roles. Another element to consider is the people 
who participate in Civil War reenactment: people who do Civil War Reenactment must 
spend their own money and time to do it (it’s highly time-consuming and expensive, and 
nobody gets paid to do it). Finally, (and these are really the most basic reasons to study 
it), Civil War reenactment simulates a highly contested piece of American history—and 
the holes in its historical interpretation are gaping. An addendum to the richness factor of 
Civil War reenactment is its wide-ranging appeal—there are Civil War reenactors in 
more than just this country. British, Irish, Scottish, and French reenactment troops 
regularly simulate different events—both here and abroad.  
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 The third reason to study Civil War reenactment is its generalizability. Because 
there are so many people interested in the Civil War, because they reenact at their own 
expense, because the events of the war itself are highly contested, because there are 
serious implications for the history of this war, and because the simulations are so multi-
layered—Civil War reenactment is a generalizable example of Simulate History. 
Eventually, I will analyze other examples of Simulated History. But the re-presentability 
and performativity of Civil War reenactment may be enlarged beyond the fields 
mentioned in this dissertation. As rhetorical scholars and argument theorists learn more 
about the particulars of this case study, we may study the argumentative facets and 
rhetorical aspects of more (and varied) examples of Simulated History. 
 The main thing to keep in mind as we move into the analysis of my case study is 
that there are structural similarities within each of the historical rhetorics. 
Argumentatively, the claims and conclusions get made using similar rhetorical 
equipment, although the final products (and the ways in which those results get used) 
may be different. The four dimensions (Materiality, Perspective, Practitioners, and 
Silences) I discuss in the first chapter also apply to argument constructions in Simulated 
History. In the following chapter, I explore these dimensions. I am looking for the 
particular persuasion in Civil War reenactment, but I am also looking for the universal 
rhetorical effectiveness of Simulated History.  
                                                
Notes 
28 Page 28, Chapter 1. 
29 Anderson, Jay. Time Machines: the World of Living History. Nashville, TN: The 
American Association for State and Local History, 1984. 
30 A simulacrum is a copy without an original. 
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31 Baudrillard does not claim to know that there is or is not a real, he just claims to 
examine the effects of a perceived real on the processes and applications of simulation. 
 32 Photocopying (and copies in general) is an integral aspect of simulational culture and 
cultural simulation—the drive to copy. In the Culture of the Copy, Hillel Schwartz’s discussion of 
“copy cultures” gets at the relationship between simulational culture and cultures that foster 
simulation. In his discussion of theater and acting, Schwartz writes, “For centuries, European 
performers had been struggling to inhabit a second body… At issue, of course, is how each 
society or reconceives, and represents, the naturally human” (17). Since the beginning of Western 
notions of drama and ritual in ancient Greece, the struggle for authentic human re-presentation 
has been a cultural constant. Simulation and representation, as Brummett explains, are not the 
same—they differ in their cultural manifestations, as well as their cultural definitions. However, 
theorists have begun to argue that there is a changing cultural understanding of the position and 
function of simulation within our contemporary cultures. For more on the interaction between 
simulation, technology, and culture, please see Walter Benjamin (“The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction”).  
33 For more information about various science fiction fairs and festivals, please see the 
website of Creation Entertainment: http://www.creationent.com/. This website displays a calendar 
of events surrounding conventions featuring Star Trek, Xena: Warrior Princess, Battlestar 
Galactica, Stargate, etc. 
34 For more information about these festivals, please see the official George Rogers Clark 
Heritage Association website: http://www.grcha.org/index.html. On that site are links to several 
of their scheduled events, as well as ways to get involved, places to procure supplies, and 
members to contact with questions. 
35 For more information about agriculturally related simulations, please see the official 
website of Living History Farms: http://www.lhf.org/. Located in Urbandale Iowa, this 
organization teaches various groups about the historical mechanics and processes of agricultural 
life on the prairie. 
36 Coming at the end of May, 2007, the prehistoric fashion show is presented by the 
living history division of Historic-UK. The schedule of upcoming events may be viewed at 
http://www.historic-uk.com/HistoryUK/LivingHistory.htm. 
37 Quote taken from the “Take A Tour” section of the Living History Farms website: 
http://www.lhf.org/. 
38 Estimates of Civil War reenactors range from around 30,000 in America (Allred) to 
nearly a million today (McPherson). I attended a national event in Franklin, TN, two years ago 
and the estimates there, according to the organizers, were the following: 8,000 re-enactors and 
100,000 spectators. Spectators were charged $17 for a one day admission (personal interview, 








Three: Simulating the Civil War 
 
“Many living historians prefer the past to the present. They often say that they were born 
in the wrong century. Since people cannot control where or when they were born, time 
travel gives them the opportunity to practice a kind of reverse re-incarnation. Living 
history is a means of being born again in a more congenial time and place.” (Anderson 
186) 
 
Simulated History is a construction and performance of history—as if, by re-
doing the past, we know it differently. In the first chapter, I discussed three dimensions 
shared by different Historical Rhetorics: Materiality, Perspective, and Practitioners. In the 
second chapter, I explained the process of simulation and the ways in which 
contemporary culture privileges simulation. Because we live in a simulational culture, I 
suggested, we are more persuaded by simulational rhetoric. In this chapter, I analyze a 
case of Simulated History. Using the previously established themes and the discussion of 
simulation, I explain the ways in which a Simulated History works. 
The data analyzed in this dissertation was gathered over the course of three years 
(2004 to 2007). I attended many different Civil War reenactments, in Texas and in three 
other states (Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee), and part of the data, then, is taken from my 
observations of various reenactments. Over the course of these travels, I also interviewed 
different reenactors—asking them about their reasons for joining, their methods of 
research, and the different types of historical reenactment in which they had participated. 
Most of the people interviewed are members of a Texas reenacting group called the 9th 
Texas Infantry. The 9th Texas is based in Dallas/Fort Worth—I also used some 
information from their website.39 There are also interviews with some reenactors in the 
other states who are not affiliated with the 9th. Interestingly enough, most of the people I 
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talked to at the different reenactments (even in different states) were familiar with the 9th 
Texas. They are famous (within the Civil War reenacting world) for their authenticity and 
dedication, and I was lucky to have happened upon them in 2004.  
Although there are many instances of Simulated History available to scholars of 
rhetoric and history, the specific case that I examine is Civil War reenactment. In the 
following four sections, I discuss the ways in which reenactors construct a Material 
environment, the particular pedagogical Perspective they assume when they argue 
history, the performative parameters of reenactors as Practitioners of Simulated History, 
and the Silences lurking within and around the claims-making processes in Simulated 
History. I conclude this chapter with a brief rehearsal of problems posed by such a 
Simulated History, as well as a glance at (prediction of?) the answer to my original 
hypothesis: In a simulational culture, Simulated History is as rhetorically powerful 
(perhaps more so) as the three main historical rhetorics described. Before we begin to 
decide whether this claim has any merit, though, let’s look at a specific case of Simulated 
History. 
MATERIALITY: MEANINGFUL BODIES/BODIES OF MEANING 
“We dissect this stuff down to the thread count.” 
The process of simulating history begins with the construction of an environment. 
In order to simulate the experience of a Civil War engagement, reenactors surround 
themselves with a variety of objects: uniforms, artillery, horses, medical equipment, 
canteens, blankets. Each of the objects used in a reenactment plays a fundamental role in 
the construction of credibility—each object serves to remind the reenactors of an 
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authentic moment they strive to re-create. In this section, I examine the materiality of 
Civil War reenactment.  
 The construction of an environment is a rhetorical endeavor—to demonstrate that 
the environment is authentic, that the objects are truly defined, that the bodies 
experiencing are physically (and, sometimes, psychically) linked to the historical figures 
they portray, reenactors must rhetorically construct believability. Simulation, as we saw 
in Chapter Two, depends on performance and technology. These reenactors are 
essentially creating and performing in a really good holodeck.40 That they have some 
rhetorical purchase on the past is the goal of their environmental construction. The 
environments constructed by Simulated History must be realistic—as we see in the 
various definitions of simulation, the process of re-presenting a real is the basic element 
of effective simulations. In an educational environment, a cultural ontology, a political 
interpretation—regardless of the purposes to which a simulation is being put, the realness 
of the representation is paramount. Generally, the re-presentability of simulations 
depends upon the objects, definitions, and material being re-presented. 
 Civil War reenactment, as a particular instance of Simulated History, 
demonstrates this drive to re-present a convincing real. Over the course of my interviews 
with reenactors and my observations of various reenactment events, I recognized three 
different methods of rhetorically constructing credibility through the use of material. 
First, reenactors use the materials at hand (uniforms, kitchen utensils, tents, and even 
food) to claim authenticity—their claims to authenticity are part of the drive they have to 
reenact the past. Second, reenactors, through these claims to authenticity, perform a 
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physical (and sometimes psychical) identification with historical figures. Finally, 
reenactors, in the struggle to define the bodies and objects they re-created, materially 
engage the process of naming. As we saw in the first chapter, the story of history is not, 
in fact, always told by the victors—rather, believable history is told by the most credible 
rhetoric. In some cases, the credibility of that rhetoric is constructed by the people who 
won the war—sometimes, though, as in the case of many Civil War reenactors, the most 
persuasive, most seductive rhetoric stems from the Lost Cause.  
Part of the reason I think that Lost Cause is so seductive stems from the beauty of 
the simulation: to re-enact steadfast nobility and individual heroism, even in the face of 
inevitable, crushing defeat, is a seductive appeal. In The Transparency of Evil, 
Baudrillard examines the persuasive force of seduction, identifying the appeal of 
seduction in an excess of otherness—rather than a carefully moderated difference, he 
suggests, seduction occurs when elements (or interpretations or perspectives) are so 
different, so other, that they eliminate any possibility of shared understanding. Seduction, 
a figure of distraction and illusion, re-presents stories of the past as more than what they 
could have been: 
Seduction is the far more radical figure of disjunction, distraction, illusion and 
diversion, a figure that alters essence and meaning, alters identity and the subject. 
And, contrary to common belief, entropy is on the side not of universal 
disjunction but of conjunction and fusion, of love and understanding—on the side 
of the proper use of differences. Seduction—exoticism—is an excess of the other, 
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of otherness, the vertiginous appeal of what is ‘more different that different’: this 
is what is irreducible—and this is the true source of energy. (141) 
The Lost Cause, a Seductive version of the past, gets simulated in Civil War reenactment 
because a Simulated History is always an altered version of history, a story of the past 
that is inherently excessive—excess time (150 years later), excess experience (the 
reenactors are rarely only soldiers), excess age and weight (reenactors are older and 
bigger than their historical counterparts), excess resources (reenactors spend their own 
time and money to attend events). The re-production and re-presentation that happens in a 
simulation outshines the real; instead of “things as they were,” Simulated History 
presents of a version of “things as they should have been”—without ever having to draw 
attention to the Seduction occurring, the “more different than different” story of the past 
being re-presented. 
 I divide this section into three sub-sections exploring reenactors’ rhetorical 
construction of materiality. The first section discusses authenticity. As discussed in the 
first two chapters, the authentic-ness of historical claims (for each method) is very 
important to credibility. The sources/resources of Simulated History’s argument 
construction (the grounds) rely on the technical excellence (authenticity of re-
presentation) of the simulation. Such a notion of authenticity is particularly relevant to 
Civil War reenactment—both because they claim authenticity (statements about the 
authentic recur frequently in discussions of reenactment) and because the notion of an 
“authentic” experience is part of the draw to reenact. In the following section, I explore 
the statements and actions of reenactors for an understanding of authenticity. 
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Materiality 1: Claims to Authenticity 
“The reason I joined the 9th is because I wanted to push them to a higher level of 
authenticity… to be living historians, rather than Civil War reenactors.”41 One of the 
major reasons reenactors simulate history is what the reenactor mentions above: a drive 
to construct more and more authentic experiences. The rhetorical process of Civil War 
reenactment relies upon this notion of authenticity. Much like the evidence provided in 
discussions of Experienced History, Simulated History is intimately related to the 
believability of personal, individual experience. The differences between Simulated 
History and Experienced History can be seen in the word reenactment: the process of 
simulating history is a process of re-membering, re-enacting, re-constructing past 
experiences. Therefore, as much as the claims of reenactors depend upon notions of 
experience, the experience demonstrated must be authentic—in order to achieve the 
rhetorical value of an experiential testimony.  
The first element of materiality (as it relates to Civil War reenactment) is this 
notion of authenticity. Authenticity, theoretically and practically, is rich with 
contradiction; authenticity, a concept that entails both sensation and analysis, only occurs 
when an idea or action contains both commonsense and community. Simulated History 
depends upon these contradicting notions: authentic, simulated experience is an 
oxymoron. And yet, the argument construction in Simulated History appeals to the 
sensational, tactile, sensual aspect of authenticity—the re-presentation and performativity 
of each simulation must feel authentic. Moreover, Simulated History appeal to the 
analytical aspect of authenticity—defining objects, presenting opinions, and making 
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claims about the past are all analytical tasks that must get performed in the construction 
of Simulated History’s environments. Rhetorically speaking, Simulated History in 
general (and Civil War reenactment in particular) is the most artistic of Aristotle’s artistic 
proofs42—everything in them is entirely created. In a discussion of Hannah Arendt’s 
concept of common sense, Valerie Burks explains the ways in which human beings learn 
from and function within the world. It is a sense of community that drives humans—the 
authentic is inter-subjectively derived. To be authentic is to perform some kind of 
common sense; to be commonsensical is to be part of a community. 
What Arendt more correctly approaches in her description of common sense is not 
a sixth sense of individual being in the world but rather a seventh sense of living 
together, not for self but for plurality. This is what she calls common sense: “the 
reality of what I perceive is guaranteed by its worldly context, which includes 
others who perceive as I do.” The context of reality is located and sustained not 
merely by the individual’s tangible sensing … but by the confluence of plural 
sensing, the agreement not of the many senses but of the many sensers [sic]: “the 
only character of the world by which to gauge its reality is its being common to us 
all.” (P 7) 
Commonality of experience makes the experience authentic—to share an interpretation of 
experience with other common sensers [sic] allows for a more documentable meaning. In 
her discussion of common sense, Burks demonstrates the power of intersubjectivity in 
determining the “reality” of an experience.  
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Simulated History, as well, depends upon this notion of authentic 
intersubjectivity. However, the intersubjectivity of Simulated History is different than the 
intersubjective agreement happening in a place like Collective Memory because it is a 
transformed, individual, and tangible perception of the past; these intersubjective 
agreements are artistic proofs, created and explained solely through the technology of 
simulation. Material experience, according to intersubjective (or process) rhetoric 
manifests itself in claims to authenticity, in physical identification with historical figures, 
and sharing of stories, in the definitions of objects, and in the process of definition. Each 
of these moves depends upon shared meaning. A community based around the notion that 
Simulated Experience—interpreted intersubjectively—demonstrates a believable, 
authentic reality. 
 The definition and understanding of reality according to Simulated History relies 
on shared meanings and intersubjective (or process). According to Barry Brummett’s 
“Some Implications of ‘Process’ or ‘Intersubjectivity’: Postmodern Rhetoric,” 
intersubjective rhetoric is a reply to more objectivist, mechanical rhetorics of reality. The 
notion of intersubjective rhetoric, while it does not reject the idea of an objective reality, 
dismisses the idea that observations of the world will provide an explanation of that 
reality. Instead, discussions of truth are just that: discussions. 
Reality in process is, instead shared meanings. Therefore, truth, for the individual, 
is the extent to which the meanings of experience (that is to say, reality) of that 
individual are shared by significant others. Truth is agreement. If nobody else 
shares the meaning I give to sensory data, then I will usually conclude that those 
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meanings are not true, and I will try to grasp the meanings others give to that 
experience. (34) 
The communication and sharing of meaning is the material of intersubjective reality—
and Simulated History. The quest for authentic simulated experience demonstrates the 
argumentative construction that happens in such an intersubjectively dependent 
environment. To Simulate History, one must construct and share meanings with 
significant others. Truth in Simulated History is agreement and authenticity. 
 Interestingly, agreement on authenticity is something that comes up frequently in 
discussions of Simulated History. In her book War Games, Jenny Thompson describes 
her own feelings of authenticity: 
I imagine that the feeling of experiencing a magic moment is akin to similar 
feelings described in other contexts: being in the zone, achieving flow, or getting 
a rush or high when engaged intently in an activity. But those sensations are 
usually experienced when one is alone. What is unusual about a reenactor’s magic 
moment—and what definitely intensifies it—is that it is usually shared with 
others, and many times those others are strangers, which surely adds to the drama 
of the moment. (168-169) 
The sociality of reenactment, the crowds surrounding the reenactors, are part and parcel 
of performed authenticity. The social nature of these events, as well as intersubjective 
agreement on the “magic moment” drives reenactors to attend. One reenactor mentions 
this when we are sitting in a bar—away from the event—surrounded by men dressed as 
1861 federal troops. They are dressed in period clothing, but they are not in character at 
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the moment. So we talk about a variety of contemporary issues. In a conversation lull, he 
says, 
It’s nice to spend time talking about the present, uh—because most of the time, 
we don’t really talk about the world. We talk about our families or research, or we 
debate the details of certain battles, or whatever. I’ve never even seen some of 
these guys in civilian clothes. I don’t know what a lot of them do for a living—but 
I know how they feel about the Alamo and Appomattox.43 
He smiles when he says this, but he goes on to tell me that the group to which he belongs 
is a big reason he stays. One of the main reasons reenactors attend events is to spend time 
with their fellow group members. Simulated History brings different people together—
the seductive nature of “things as they should have been,” turns into “how things could 
be.” Sociality and intersubjective connection makes Simulated History a convincing way 
to talk about the past because the historical claims being made get verified again and 
again by the group. 
Because there is something about the shared nature of reenactment—definitions, 
interactions, objects, sleeping outside together, group hobby—the very notions of 
authenticity, identification, and naming are always done outside, with others. They are 
performances—which have to be socially shared, or they won’t make any sense. 
Discussing a Russian-German reenactment in War Games, one man says, “We had 
become actors in a historical play,” Luke said describing a reenacting experience that he 
judged to be a success, “that we were all benefiting from. We were all enjoying the play, 
we were acting in it, but we were also watching it. So it was very intriguing. That’s really 
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when the hobby can be at its best” (168). The best, in this instance, is an authentic feeling 
of social connection—a performance of shared meaning that can only be constructed 
through social interaction and group materiality. Other instances of Simulated History 
demonstrate this social interactivity—contemporary computer games involve the creation 
of simulated worlds, in which characters come to know one another through the 
simulation. In games like World of Warcraft and Second Life, different players learn 
each others’ characteristics and personality foibles as they learn the rules of the world, 
creating an environment in which the intersubjective and simulational exploration of both 
individuals and communities is simultaneous. Such a simultaneous exploration of history 
and individuals occurs in Civil War reenactment because we need the social to encourage 
a willing suspension of disbelief. 
Claims to authenticity stem from the “feeling” both Thompson and my 
confederates mention (seeing the elephant). The sensuality and tangibility of Simulated 
History lend to the notion that reenactors are telling a true story. Simulation needs this 
intersubjective agreement, these cultural warrants, because the whole premise is a bit 
shaky. If they have actually slept on the field of Shiloh—and they can corroborate their 
stories with the stories of other reenactors—then there is an authenticity to these 
experiences that does not happen in other historical rhetorics. In a Simulated History, part 
of the materiality depends upon the authenticity of sensation—the simulated experience 





Materiality 2: Physical Identification 
The materiality of Simulated History relies very much on the social aspect of 
reenactment. Intersubjectivity is, of course, a very social construction. Physical 
identification with historical figures and body/object definition are also very social. 
Experiential tourists like reenactors spend great amounts of time and energy trying to feel 
the events they reenact. Materiality is a physical thing—to prevent a child from touching 
a hot stovetop, one must convey the heat of the surface. When I want to convince 
someone that the scarf I’m wearing is particularly scratchy, I place the fabric in her 
hands. These tactile sensations depend upon the persuasion of feeling—in order to agree 
on a feeling (that the sand is hot, that the waves are cold, that the milk is sour, that the 
baby’s skin is soft, that the rollercoaster ride is fast), we must share the perceptual 
sensation of that feeling. Tactility and feeling work together, then, to provide us with a 
mutual, share-able feeling—a sensation of identification. This emphasis on sensation and 
tactility—as we see in the previous section—manifests itself in a rhetoric of authenticity. 
But authenticity is not the only element of this kind of rhetoric; there is also a drive to 
identify, physically and psychically with the people reenactors portray.  
As Kenneth Burke discusses at length in A Rhetoric of Motives, one of the main 
reasons people talk at all is to feel some connection, some shared substance, with their 
interlocutors. Because we are substantially and materially divided, then, we seek 
rhetorical identification. 
Identification is affirmed with earnestness precisely because there is division… If 
men were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician 
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to proclaim their unity. If men were wholly and truly of one substance, absolute 
communication would be in man’s very essence. It would not be an ideal, as it 
now is, partly embodied in material conditions and partly frustrated by these same 
conditions… (22) 
This excerpt explains the rhetorical function of identification: to unify the divided. A 
particularly appropriate element of this definition is Burke’s mention of the material; 
materiality works simultaneously to divide and unify. The partial embodiment of 
identification—the materiality of consubstantiality—exists. But, at the same time that 
embodiment works for identification, it also subtracts from the possibility.  
 In Simulated History, the possibilities (and difficulties) of material identification are 
specifically demonstrated by bodies.  One of the ladies I met at a recent reenactment in 
Athens, AL, spent some time explaining the ways in which one’s body (carriage, posture, 
self-image) is altered by the period uniforms required at reenactments. She mentioned, 
smiling, how excited her daughter was at the civility and courtliness shown her by men at 
reenactment dances. The men escort ladies to the dance floor, hold them carefully while 
dancing, and then walk them back to their seats. Doors are held, compliments given, cups 
of punch delivered—all with an historical feel of romance and reality. Her daughter, she 
said, contrasted those actions with contemporary behavior at, say, a club. Her mother’s 
reaction to and explanation of these differences focuses on embodiment: “You act 
differently when you’re wearing those dresses. You act as if you deserve respect and 
honor, not just showing your naked body to anyone who’ll look. And the treatment you 
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get will reflect that.”44 The clothes make her hold herself differently, and, apparently, 
they shape the mores and responses of a more romantic time.  
The temporal divide between reenactors and the people they seek to represent, 
then, can be bridged materially. By putting on the dresses, moving in the same materials, 
feeling the roughness of wool and the heat of campfires, Simulated History presents us 
with a rhetorical identification—a myth collapsing the people represented and the people 
representing. Burke, discussing the mechanics of rhetorical identification, writes about 
the “rhetorical situation”: “wherein division may be idealistically buried beneath a 
terminology of love, or ironically revealed in combination with varying grades of 
compensatory deference, or where the continuity is snapped…” (Rhetoric of Motives 22). 
Simulated History’s “compensatory deference” focuses on the materiality of 
identification—the ways in which contemporary simulational experiences can stand in 
for, and thus teach about, historical interpretation. 
Civil War reenactment, while not an exercise in simultaneous identification, is 
nonetheless an attempt to connect rhetorically with the events being portrayed. Through 
actions, location, authenticity, and a focus on corporeality, reenactors construct a 
rhetorical identification with the people they seek to embody. Reenactors talk about their 
physical experiences as unifying and romantic—both reminders of Burke’s “terminology 
of love.” In the following excerpt, one reenactor tells me about the reasons he enjoys 
Civil War reenactment: 
The enlisted men in the, well back then, it was classist—you were somebody or 
you were crap. Most of the men in the enlisted, no matter who you were before, 
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they turned into crap, but to themselves they weren’t… like when we look at 
bikers, we think you know they’re rapists, they’re drug users, drug sellers. But in 
their world, they would take their shirt off their back and give it to their party …45 
His enjoyment of reenactment is driven by his physical understanding of the historical 
soldier’s suffering—while, at the same time, he also recognizes the differences between 
his own group and the men in the war. As I mention earlier in the Materiality section, the 
social connections between those men, he tells me, are similar to the social connections 
he feels with the men in his battalion.  
 In the process of constructing Materiality, actions are a major element of 
rhetorical identification. Whether it is through the use of objects, the display of utensils, 
the firing of artillery, or the wearing of time-appropriate uniforms, reenactment revolves 
around physical action. One of the elements they like to discuss, concerning their 
activities as reenactors (and their feelings of identification with the men they seek to re-
present) is mistakes. The humanity of individual soldiers is a favorite topic, and 
reenactors are quick to identify their own bad ideas with historical faux pas. In the 
following excerpt, one reenactor tells me about a mistake that was made—that left him 
angry and burnt. 
Reenactor: “I can think of some stupid, stupid stuff that’s happened that I don’t 
want to every happen again.” 
Interviewer: “Well, what’s that?” 
Reenactor: “I—the company that we were in is I, and I being the first corporal 
was on the end. Company K was to the left, no to the right of us…they did an 
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oblique fire like this—and shot me in the back of the head and knocked me down 
from two feet away… I took out two people with me and singed all the hair off 
the back of my head. That wasn’t fun. I remember that because I was ready to 
beat some ass… 
And the kid that fired the gun he goes, “well I didn’t see anybody at the end of my 
gun.” I’m not exactly a skinny little boy standing at the end of the gun. Um, that 
was memorable.”46 
He discusses several elements of reenactment actions: troop formation, marching drills, 
artillery practice, and physical appearance. Each of these elements adds to his dismay—
and discomfort—when one of the newer members, unfamiliar with the function and form 
of a drill, accidentally shoots him. The physicality of this exchange is the focal point. 
Another reenactor tells me that the closeness of his experiences to historically 
authentic knowledge and experience is one of the reasons he participates:  
And it rained and rained and rained and rained. And all I had was my uniform, my 
weapon, and a blanket. No tent no shelter at all. Because it was a hobby, you put 
into it… you got out of it what you put into it. Well, you had one blanket if you 
were lucky, so that’s what I took. Well, I was soaking wet, kept the fire going, 
and I’m standing there all night long, no sleep. Trying to dry out my blanket. A 
couple of weeks later I was reading a book about the 2nd TX, and there it was right 
there—a man writing how he stood all night long, holding up his blanket trying to 
dry it out. And I just went, “I just did that!”47   
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He feels a physical camaraderie with historical characters; his knowledge and research of 
the past serve mainly to establish a simulational link between his own experiences and 
the experiences of people in the past. And, qualifying this experience, as if to justify the 
value of such a simulation, he mentions, “So, but as far as a bullet whizzing by my head, 
no I’ve never experienced that. But, I’ve experienced being rained on a lot and I’ve 
learned the secret is you never let the fire go out.” This statement, this experiential 
knowledge, is based on his simulated experiences reenacting.  
 The relationship between their own research—in order to establish and construct 
the experiences they then seek to simulate—and the actions they perform demonstrates a 
tension in the process of Simulated History; this tension is mentioned often by the 
reenactors. Such a tension (between a Simulated History and the Professional History 
reenactors use to research their roles) points to the rhetorical function of claims to 
authenticity and physical identification—these claims work to bolster the credibility of 
the reenactors. Their authentic physical and psychical relationships to these historical 
figures is unique: Experienced History involves the sharing of individual body stories 
(not the creation of tangible relationships); Professional History does not work to create 
rhetorical identification—in fact, it works to create distance; and Collective Memory, in 
the process of creating group identity, spends more time on the explanation of the group 
experience. Simulated History reveres the myopia of the individual—in the face of larger 
political and social occurrences. It is a particular way of reading the past, but reenactors 
do not allude to the problems that stem from making claims about the past from one 
man’s point of view.  
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 The myopic focus of reenactors on the individual in history—the identification 
with one specific, individual through physical and sensual Simulated experience—is the 
rhetorical process by which reenactors convey credibility. In the fourth category, 
Silences, I come back to these performative and rhetorical holes. For now, keep in mind 
the importance of this individual focus. Reenactors (and other Experiential Tourists) 
construct and maintain the value of individual historical readings. Their knowledge is a 
rhetorical combination and synthesis of other kinds of historical rhetoric—but with a 
twist. Based as it is in the rhetorical value of individuals who Experience History, the 
emphasis on careful research like Professional History, and the Collective Memory of 
reenactment itself, Simulated History is a chimaera—experience and group identity 
simulated, research performed.  
Materiality 3: Definitions of Objects and the Body 
The economic juggernaut of tourism revolves around the production of simulated 
experience, and that simulated experience depends upon the consumption and use of 
objects. The greater the consumption, the more a simulation convinces—essentially, I 
suggest, if we believe that buying things will make us richer or happier or smarter or 
thinner, then why wouldn’t we believe that consumption can tell us something about the 
past? The final section of my Materiality discussion, then, focuses on the objects in 
Simulated History, a rhetoric of consumption. The material at play in these conversations 




 In System of Objects Baudrillard writes about the rhetorical power of objects to 
create a world. In such a contemporary rhetoric of objects, the practice of consumption is 
only allowed by material relationship between objects and subjects. He writes, 
Consumption is not a material practice, nor is it a phenomenology of “affluence.” 
It is not defined by the nourishment we take in, nor by the clothes we clothe 
ourselves with, not by the oral and visual matter of the images and messages we 
receive. It is defined, rather, by the organization of all these things into a 
signifying fabric: consumption is the virtual totality of all objects and messages 
ready-constituted as a more or less coherent discourse. If it has any meaning at all, 
consumption means an activity consisting of the systematic manipulation of signs. 
(218) 
The transformation of objects from use-directed into signs, for Baudrillard, demonstrates 
the transformation of human culture into a culture of consumption. Essentially, the world 
in which humans function, he argues, is no longer controlled by the subjects—but by the 
objects designed for their comfort and ease. The technological shift of a system of objects 
from usable to signifying makes the process of consumption central to human life.  
Simulated History manifests this relationship clearly. In the process of defining 
objects and naming evidence, reenactors rely upon the sign-function of these objects. 
Further, the world in which the reenactors function, a recreated version of the past, is 
populated by certain historical actors, as well as specific historical objects—an 
environment divorced from history by time and space. But the Simulated History in 
which reenactors function is realistic, up to a point—authentic in its dedication to the 
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rhetoric of consumption. In this final sub-section of Materiality, I explore the relationship 
between subject and object in Simulated History.  
Objects in Simulated History are used for two reasons: first, to reinforce, through 
performance, the credibility of the reenactors; and second, to function as a lenticular 
logic. The performance of credibility relies heavily on the use and explanation of objects. 
As they name certain objects and display particular aspects of the past, reenactors 
rhetorically perform the part of historians. They use the naming of objects and the 
performance of past practices (with objects) to define the parameters of the past they 
claim to know.  
Lenticular logic relies heavily on the use and explanation of objects, as well. 
Meaning, then, in the culture of Civil War reenactment, gets communicated innately via a 
particular kind of logic: a monocular or lenticular logic. I borrow the phrase “lenticular 
logic” from Tara McPherson’s Reconstructing Dixie. She uses “lenticular” to describe the 
alternating ideological images of race and gender in pop cultural and historical appraisals 
of the South. According to McPherson,  
a lenticular lens… allows the viewer to see only one of … two views at a time. 
Rotating the picture slightly brings the second image into focus, displacing the 
first… [T]he structural logic of the [lenticular perspective] makes joining the two 
images within one view difficult if not impossible, even as it conjoins them at a 
structural level. (26) 
The most familiar example of this kind of illusion occurs in those 3-D postcards: “The 
coating on each card is actually a lenticular lens, a device that makes viewing both 
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images together nearly impossible” (26). Only by turning the cards back and forth can 
one see the images, and they are always separate—or sort of melting into each other. 
They cannot exist separately on the same page at the same time. 
The images revealed in a lenticular logic exist simultaneously, but they do not 
stand together. Imagining the culture of Civil War reenactment as a kind of lenticular 
logic allows for the understanding that historical perceptions as performed by 
reenactment and the identities constructed through reenactment will only reveal certain, 
one-sided readings of past events. And, as a culture, this kind of logic will be the kind of 
logic that determines who is and is not authentic, who is and is not a “farb.”  
Farb is a word with a shady etymology. Depending upon the person asked, “farb” 
might mean several things. Jenny Thompson suggests that farb is a contraction of the 
phrase “far be it from me,”—a prelude to correcting another reenactor’s uniform or 
speech or paraphernalia. One of my interviewees, however, told me that farb originally 
meant: Fairly Authentic, Representing the British—which, as far as I can tell, is some 
derogatory term designed to insult both American revolution reenactors and British 
people. Either way, being a farb is not something reenactors interested in authenticity 
want to do because farb is a word used by reenactors to describe individuals who, for a 
variety of reasons, are not authentic enough in their simulations—farbs drink Coors light 
and park their trucks on the field, or they wear 1863 uniforms to an event simulating a 
battle in 1862, or they wear general bars because they want to (not because they’ve been 
promoted through the ranks of the troops). For these men, historical accuracy is the 
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foundation of re-enacting. They are disdainful of farbs who fail to do their research, 
especially when it involves misplaced authority or rank: 
Reenactors look down their nose at people who show up at events wearing stripes, 
or what they call bars, which are officer bars if you don’t have any men to 
command. That’s a no-no. you don’t come to an event unless you have enough 
men under you to make yourself that rank. It’s a very time-consuming process.48 
The colonel (and other reenactors) gets angry when they see people stepping out of line, 
or abusing the historical scene. Paying attention to the rank and file of the drills, adhering 
to military rules of conduct and safety—these are all fundamental to the practice of Civil 
War re-enactment.  
Lenticular logic is the logic of Simulated History. The obsession with detail, the 
myopic focus on individuals and rank, the particularities of authenticity—each of these 
concentrations limit the ability of the reenactors to see anything but the minutiae. They 
literally (and purposefully) miss the forest for the trees. Lenticular logic describes the 
inability to see simultaneously all the sides of a many-sided event (or image). The 
American Civil War, to say the very least, is a many-sided event—other moments re-
presented and performed by Simulated History are as complex. But Simulated History 
does not allow for complexity. Authenticity and identification are the goal of these 
practices; there is no time for debating the political and social when one is entirely 
focused on the fabric of one’s tent or the correctness of one’s firing stance. Objects begin 
the framework of this lenticular logic—they set the stage, literally, by creating the look 
and feel of the past being reenacted. We will also see, however, how lenticular logic 
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shapes the Perspective of Civil War reenactment, lends rhetorical power to the 
Experiential Tourism performed by reenactors, and bolsters the performed Silences in 
Simulated History. 
 In a discussion of Materiality, though, lenticular logic begins with objects. Each 
chosen object, every item that gets highlighted and explained, becomes a backdrop to the 
Simulated Civil War. Standing in a medical tent, talking to a simulated doctor, one begins 
to understand the power of objects in lenticular logic. As one reenactor puts it: “This kind 
of history (Civil War reenactment) is more authentic, yes, because it’s living action. 
Movies try to do it, but they’re Hollywood… if you can pick up stuff, touch it, then it’s 
better, more real, than some of the museums where you don’t get to touch anything.”49 
The emphasis on touch, for this reenactor, is the reason he does Simulated History. He 
teaches history to seventh graders as a profession; he reenacts medical personnel at 
reenactments.  
The emphasis in Simulated History is placed upon things and people that can be 
seen. Feeling authentic and looking authentic are two different things, and the reenactors 
often talk about this tension. I asked one of the reenactors—a Federal reenactor—why he 
has difficulty recruiting realistic-looking troops:  
It’s expensive and takes a lot of time. Historically, most of the soldiers were poor 
immigrants. The other thing is that most of the men were 17-22 years old. We’re 
nearly all middle-aged men, and some of us are getting pretty elderly. I know one 
guy that’s older than me and he’s been doing it since the 1960’s. So, uh the hobby 
is not one that the 17-22 year olds are interested in—mainly because they’re still 
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getting out of high school or make a living. We are constantly inundated with kids 
who have no idea what it’s like. Well, you can’t be a reenactor unless you’re 18—
without a parent joining and wearing a uniform. No legal liability.50 
The tension between feeling like historical soldiers and looking like them is a universally 
acknowledged difficulty of reenacting. But, despite this tension, reenactors will often talk 
about the people they represent as if they could somehow feel as they did. 
 I asked them about this tension, if they felt a connection with the men they were 
simulating. One response seems, at first, to deny this connection. 
Not in the least! I have no idea what he thought! I mean, if we’re all supposed to 
adopt personas, when we do first person type stuff… where you’re supposed to … 
you don’t talk about anything that happened outside of other than what’s 
immediately going on. You don’t talk in modern terms or anything else.51  
These first few sentences seem to deny any historical interpretation of the war. But the 
reenactor goes on to tell me how he rhetorically adapts the situations being re-presented 
and performed—in order to make them more believable. 
And so whenever we lapse into one of those things, I immediately become 
professor, y’know, I think Austin College may have actually existed during the 
Civil War, so I just go ahead and say I’m a professor from there, I’m an English 
professor. I’m an English teacher. So I still even in the extra little things that I’ve 
chosen to do to make it more first person for me, y’know I just, I have no idea 
what it’s like to be a pig farmer. Y’know and some people have adopted that 
persona, but I can’t. It’s just not within me. Why would a pig farmer have 
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glasses? Why would a pig farmer y’know be able to quote Shakespeare? Why 
would a pig farmer be able to joke about the –they were making fun of me when 
they were talking about all the rhetoric stuff—why would a pig farmer be able to 
say that kind of thing? Well, he wouldn’t. So y’know that’s why I adopt that?  
In this response, he begins to reject a connection with the soldiers of the day. However, 
as he speaks, he begins to explain how he can make such an unlikely link more likely. To 
connect with the past, he uses contemporary images of himself, modern objects in the 
scheme of his life. The material of his life (glasses, job, Shakespeare, rhetoric), as 
different as it may be from the material of a pig farmer’s life, might still be similar to the 
material of a professor’s life. In order to establish a simulated connection, he uses objects 
and material—even as he denies a connection between himself and the soldiers he 
simulates. 
PERSPECTIVE: PEDAGOGY AND NARRATIVIZATION 
“They were a lot tougher than we are. I am honoring the deeds of the men who went 
before me.” 
 As we learned in the first chapter, perspective is ideological, and, as we learned 
earlier in this chapter, the logic driving Simulated History is lenticular. We have seen 
how Materiality, defined and explained, works in a lenticular manner. In a Simulated 
History, Materiality is the construction of an environment. The backdrop, the scenery, the 
substance of a reenactment are all material arguments. Perspective, on the other hand, is 
the construction of a lenticular ideology. Each of our three themes works together in a 
lenticular logic: Materiality provides a substantive background for the ideological 
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conclusions of Perspective, and Perspective begins the rhetorical work of Experiential 
Tourism’s identity construction. Now that I have explored the Material of a Simulated 
History, I examine the lenticular ideology of Simulated History. 
The Perspective taken by Simulated History is pedagogical. The individuals 
involved in simulating the past do so, they say, because they want to teach/learn more 
about it. And, because certain decisions about what to re-present and when to re-present 
it, only certain bits of the past get told. As we already saw in the discussion of strategic 
silences and Materiality, the historical interpretations performed by Simulated History are 
limited—deliberately so. In this section, I explore that pedagogy. Arguing that pedagogy 
is inherently ideological, I construct my argument in the following way: first, I explain 
the links between pedagogy and ideology; second, I suggest two ways in which Civil War 
reenactors perform ideology (narrativization of the past and symbolization of unity); and 
third, I provide textual examples of the lenticular logic pervading Simulated History 
events. Each event, each demonstration, is carefully chosen. Civil War reenactment is an 
ideological performance of a certain version of the past, a Lost Cause version in which 
the soldiers are noble individuals and the slaves are silent ghosts.  
Similar to the other rhetorics of history, Simulated History must select certain 
events to highlight. However, in a performed rhetoric, these holes are both more obvious 
and more difficult to argue. I highlight and develop the ways in which these events get 
chosen in the following sub-sections—explaining the sources/resources of these choices, 
as well as the uses to which these arguments get put. How does one argue with ghosts? If 
there are no slaves mentioned in a history book or a testimonial or a memorial, then there 
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are methods of protest—certain channels of debate are allowed (if not necessarily 
encouraged). In a Simulated History, the channels of dissent are noticeably absent.52  
Perspective 1: Teaching Ideology 
 In this section I discuss the pedagogical and ideological parameters of Civil War 
reenactment. Because there are so many possible definitions of ideology, I borrow my 
concept of ideology from John B. Thompson:  
In studying ideology we are not concerned simply with categorizing and 
analyzing a system of thought or belief, nor with analyzing a symbolic form or 
system taken in and for itself. Rather, we are concerned with some of what could 
be called the social uses of symbolic forms. We are concerned with whether, to 
what extent and how (if at all) symbolic forms serve to establish and sustain 
relations of domination in the social contexts within which they are produced, 
transmitted and received. (Ideology and Modern Culture 8) 
Thompson’s reformulation of ideology allows for some maneuverability—within the 
rhetoric of Simulated History, there are many possible symbolic forms used, and each 
form may not be inherently ideological. That being said, the manipulation of these forms 
and the Perspective they shape, provides a lens into the ideological structures performed. 
Where the Materiality of Civil War reenactment gave us a critical view of their 
environment, Perspective provides us a method of reading their ideological constructs. 
The manner of ideological structure is, as I mention earlier, pedagogical. 
As we learned in Chapter Two, the practice of teaching is inherently 
ideological—the process of selecting and highlighting certain events and people in the 
 
182 
past presents a particular ideological read to historical interpretation. The example I 
provided discussed different national independence days (America’s July 4th and France’s 
July 14th). Each of these days is celebrated—for very similar reasons—in the different 
countries; because the specific days are particular to each nation, they are emphasized. 
Bastille Day, for that very reason, is not such a big holiday in Huntsville, AL. Thus, the 
celebration of Independence Day in Alabama, and the celebration of Bastille Day in 
Alsace, carry with them the ideological weight and significance of those historical 
highlights. These ideological constructs occur within (and are maintained by) the 
teaching of important days, events, and people. In Simulated History, the same sorts of 
ideological decisions get made—certain events are stressed, while others never get 
mentioned. Just as the material identification and object definitions accentuates particular 
interpretations of the past, so do the pedagogical choices of reenactors. 
Further, living historians, or re-enactors, present themselves as the final, objective 
word. They propose that their reclamation of the past is not only demonstrating stories 
that are rarely told, but are, in fact, presenting history as it really occurred. In the 
following excerpt, a reenactor discusses the beginnings of the Civil War. 
Y’know that, that’s wonderful. I love that little piece of history because what does 
it show? It shows that that it wasn’t necessarily… yes, while it, while slavery did 
become a major issue… that there were other issues involved here. That there 
were state rivalries. We’re not so much caught up anymore, into the idea of state 
rivalries. Y’know, North Carolina doesn’t look at South Carolina and go “Pthtt, 
idiots.” Y’know that sort of thing. Nobody does that sort of stuff anymore. But 
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back then they did. And so, y’know, to call somebody an Ohio Yankee or a 
Pennsylvania Yankee—that’s a major insult for them back then. Not so much 
now. Who cares? Y’know? So you’re from PA? So you’re from Michigan? 
Whatever, that’s, it’s a, it’s a major issue to them.53 
Reenactors make almost continuous reference to the role and relevance of slavery to the 
beginning of the war. Their explanations are almost always dependent54 upon a Lost 
Cause mythology.55 The reference to slavery above demonstrates the ways in which 
certain claims about the past get used—slavery, in the rhetoric of Simulated History, 
plays a small role in the war. Instead, the war is driven by states’ rights, rivalries created, 
developed, and performed in the simulation of the Lost Cause. By narrativizing the Civil 
War, reenactors present a version of history in which the Confederates were noble, 
dutiful fighters and slavery was a side issue, unworthy of re-presentation. 
Perspective 2: Narrating the Lost Cause 
 The Lost Cause is a seductive (in Baudrillard’s sense), Southern56 story, and 
according to Gary W. Gallagher and Alan T. Nolan in The Myth of the Lost Cause and 
Civil War History: “[I]t is fair to say that there are two independent versions of the war. 
On one hand there is the history of the war, the account of what in fact happened. On the 
other hand is what Gaines Foster calls the “Southern interpretation” of the event” (12). 
The “Southern interpretation” has become the popularly accepted version of events, due 
to a long-standing and effective rhetorical war begun by Southern apologists immediately 
after Appomattox. Such an effective rhetorical war puts together several 
sources/resources and uses. The sources of much Lost Cause rhetoric stems from both 
 
184 
personal testimony (in the form of old Confederate letters and diaries) and public 
campaigns (begun and doggedly pursued by Southern apologists since before the end of 
the war). That this rhetorical war was so effective is not the least of historians’ concerns. 
The uses to which these claims get put, however, is a major concern for historians and 
rhetoricians alike. Other historical concerns focus on the counterfactual nature of the Lost 
Cause. In the following excerpt, some conclusions of the “Southern interpretation” are 
outlined: 
Among other points [in the myth], these ex-Confederates denied the importance 
of slavery in triggering secession, blamed sectional tensions on abolitionists, 
celebrated antebellum Southern slaveholding society, portrayed Confederates as 
united in waging their war for independence, extolled the gallantry of the 
Confederate soldiers, and attributed Northern victory to sheer weight of numbers 
and resources. (4)  
As do all different versions of the past, each of these Lost Cause details imparts a certain 
perspective on past events that, some would argue, portrays those events in a false (and 
politically manipulative manner). Moreover, those claims do something in a 
contemporary world—where people believe that slavery was not a driving economic 
force in the antebellum South, so might they believe that there is no structural racism 
within American society. Where people believe that the Northern victory was inevitable 
(instead of resulting from bad Confederate military choices and effective Federal 
maneuvers), there might they also believe in the inherent nobility of the losing side. 
Within certain scholarly circles, these depictions are true. And, as can be seen in the 
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interviews, that depiction is true to most reenactors—at times, the Lost Cause is the 
reason these men re-enact.  
 Tony Horwitz’s Confederates in the Attic describes the omnipresence of the Civil 
War in the Southern mind. Explanations and definitions of the mind of the South are as 
varied as the explanations of the Lost Cause. In God and General Longstreet, Thomas 
Connelly and Barbara Bellows conflate the Lost Cause with the Southern Mind, arguing 
that the Lost Cause manifests itself in two layers: first, the literary “outpouring from that 
angry cadre of former-Rebel political and military luminaries” (1); and second, the 
timeless, romantic, chivalric image of the Rebels and their leaders. In the second case, 
they write, the origins of the phrase Lost Cause are easier to understand: “Southern 
romanticism of the early nineteenth century had thrived upon Sir Walter Scott’s accounts 
of the lost cause of Scotland in a quest for independence. An antebellum South embroiled 
in a power struggle with the ‘churlish Saxons’ of Yankeedom could identify with a heroic 
Ivanhoe”.57 The literary flavor of the Lost Cause is powerful. The (imagined) romance 
and poetry of war go hand in hand with vanquished nobility. They also compliment the 
hopes for a return of those “lost” values. The Lost Cause is a source for contemporary 
claims of nobility and courage. Without Lost Cause warrants and grounds, the claims 
made by contemporary reenactors about the romance and manliness of the war would 
make no sense. 
 The reenactors discuss the allure of Lost Cause-flavored history. It is one of the 
reasons that some of them are intrigued by Civil War reenactment. When asked why he 
thought the original soldiers fought, one reenactor said this: 
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… some of it’s manhood. I mean if you look at the 19th century ideas of manhood. 
Uh, y’know if you didn’t go to war, there was something wrong with you. 
Y’know if you didn’t, if you weren’t glorious, if you didn’t value the struggle and 
everything else, there was something off about you. And y’know, questioning 
someone’s manhood is something really, really huge. I mean that is a very large 
issue. Um, Wyatt Brown… did Honor and Violence in the Old South. And he 
wrote an entire book—and in fact there’s a distillation because the book is huge. 
But uh a whole thing about how, y’know the idea of if you impugn someone’s 
manhood, that is a very, very large issue. And I’m sure that’s how they got a lot of 
those guys in here. 
Y’know I’m not gonna go fight for him, why do I give a damn? I got a 
farm to take care of. Y’know I’ve got these considerations, I have a mercantile to 
take care of, y’know I’m just an eye doctor or whatever. Horse doctor. But some 
guy comes in and says, “Well, if you’re not, if you’re not willing to fight for your 
state, what kind of man are you?” Well, the next thing you know, they’re like, 
well, here I am. And so that’s what they’re doing.58 
The process of recruiting men based on their historical concepts of manhood is an old 
idea, he says—citing a book about honor and violence, he explains that the possible 
reasons to join might have had to do with 18th century perceptions of masculinity. 
Interestingly, the concept of manhood also emerges when the reenactors are discussing 
why they themselves participate in Civil War reenactment. These claims about “true” 
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manliness and authentic values are put to use to recruit new reenactors while 
simultaneously reassuring participating reenactors. 
 Even Civil War monuments attest to the slippage between history, memory, and 
the Lost Cause. Because of the messy nature of civil war memory and the fact that the 
enemy still exists within the borders of the newly rejoined nation-state,59 monuments to 
the American Civil War demonstrate the increasing rhetorical strength of the Lost Cause 
in collective memory. After the war, monuments dedicated to the fallen were erected 
throughout eastern parts of the country. Ambiguity became the theme of Civil War 
memorials. Using formal characteristics of monuments and memorials to create an 
apologetic and ambiguous language, proposes Kirk Savage in “The Politics of Memory,” 
national and regional decision makers elided the line between rebellion for a good cause 
and rebellion for any cause at all. Discussing the inherent racial politics of these 
monuments, he writes: 
While some Northerners were still offended by the Southern commemoration of 
its former rebels, they could no longer pinpoint why. The Southern monuments 
did not defend slavery or question the blessings of abolition; instead they 
represented their struggle in a language and form that mimicked the North’s own. 
Northerners looking at Southern monuments could just as easily see reconciliation 
as treason, and many did. As time wore on, more and more Americans perceived 
this kind of monument building as part of a healthy process of sectional 
reconciliation—a process that everyone knew but no one said was for and 
between whites. (132) 
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The use of language (in inscriptions) that copied other forms of commemoration, the 
incorporation of Lost Cause mythology—both of these rhetorical elements are 
demonstrated in the placement, timing, and construction of Civil War memorials. 
Simulated History is another place for these rhetorical elements of the Lost Cause to get 
performed and reiterated. Myths of individuality and heroism, white nobility and 
soldierly fortitude are constant themes of Civil War reenactment.  
 In Ghosts of the Confederacy Gaines Foster examines a collection of memoirs, 
personal papers, monuments and veteran reunions in order to flesh out perceptions of 
honor and defeat among white southerners. Rather than address the fictional outgrowth of 
Civil War stories, Foster interrogates the way in which the Lost Cause grew, faded, and 
returned in the letters and activities of southerners after the war. He discusses the fact that 
symbols of the Confederacy, years after the fact, often stood for no real coherent ideology 
or tradition: “they only symbolized defiance” (198). Items like the Confederate flag 
(which is only one version of the many different flags used by different troops) become 
contemporary symbols of an entity that never existed: the united, federalized 
Confederacy. Memory of the Civil War and the history of that war, he argues, lost their 
specificity and power over the course of the twentieth century because of the ways in 
which private memories conflicted with the official historical records:  
The New South of the twentieth century remained a land haunted by the ghosts of 
the Confederacy. The ghosts had helped make it a conservative, deferential 
society; they had contributed to an unquestioning patriotism and respect for the 
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military … [T]hey were phantoms called forth from time to time by various 
people for differing purposes. (198) 
These memories are still being called forth, both in vernacular and official memory. 
However, recognizing that the Lost Cause is problematic and worthy of study is one 
thing; the performance and reifying Lost Cause mythology in Civil War reenactment, 
through a careful selection of historical events and locations, is quite another.  
Perspective 3: Selection of Events 
In the process of studying history, teachers make choices. As I mention earlier, 
teachers in North America get very excited about July 4th, while French history teachers 
are more interested in July 14th. Because of the historical significance attached to each of 
these dates, the ideological weight they carry shifts from continent to continent. All 
historians must make choices—unless one is H.G. Wells, one does not consider 
explaining the entire history of human kind in a book or two. That being said, different 
historical rhetorics acknowledge the necessary limitations of studying the past. So, 
Professional History, in its specialization and objectivity, grants its practitioners certain 
specialties—historians spend their lives studying the minute details of specific events and 
occurrences. There are still careful selections within those studies, but Professional 
History demands an explanation of those selections, if they even acknowledge that such a 
selection has taken place. Paul Veyne, in Writing History, describes a Professional 
Historian’s approach to studying the past: “Facts do not exist in isolation, but have 
objective connections; the choice of a subject in history is free but, within the chosen 
 
190 
subject, the facts and their connections are what they are and nothing can change that; 
historical truth is neither relative nor inaccessible” (32).  
 The practitioners of Collective Memory and Experienced History are sometimes 
more likely to own up to event selection. By recognizing the limitations of their own 
Perspective, practitioners of Experienced History and Collective Memory may derive 
more rhetorical power from those limits and boundaries. In fact, as I discuss in the first 
chapter, these historical rhetorics derive much of their credibility from the narrow 
boundaries of their Perspective—because their understanding of the past hinges on 
specific events, experienced individually or collectively, these Collective Memory and 
Experienced History must acknowledge and rely on the particularities of their histories.  
Simulated History, with its pedagogical Perspective, uses the language of 
Professional History while performing/demonstrating the limitations of individual 
Experience and Collective rhetorical negotiation. In a combination of Materiality and 
Perspective, Civil War reenactors create a world in which only the aspects they decide to 
highlight are seen. The lenticular logic of this selection is designed to emphasize the 
heroism of individual soldiers, the “roughness” of frontier life, the authenticity of 
simulated experience. Using objects, Simulated History builds the backdrop—very 
specifically. There are no slave drovers at reenactments, no nooses, no whips, no chains. 
In order to tell the very selectively chosen version of history, the backdrop is clearly very 
limited. However, the same holds true for Perspective—the teaching of specific historical 
stories is ideologically driven. And the Simulated History performed uses that specificity, 
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that particularity, very deliberately. Without such a lenticular logic, there could be no 
white-washing of history.  
 Civil War reenactment, as a pedagogy, is a myopic practice. Focusing on the 
individuality of the hobby, reenactors learn about the particular experiences of each 
soldier. There is no discussion of the larger issues at stake (except to dismiss or downplay 
their importance); all the attention is spent on individual actions in particular moments. 
For example, one of the major activities at certain reenactment events is shared classes on 
historical military practices and methods of cooking authentically over campfires, taught 
by senior members of each group. In an interview with one of the older members of the 
group, I asked about these classes. The member replied: 
Yeah. Like I try to kill two birds with one stone. So when we drill and you take a 
15-minute break in the shade. It’s a term I call shaking and baking, it means 
standing there in the hot sun, no shade, standing there at attention not doing a 
damn thing. You’re shaking and baking. So what we do is, we go in the shade. 
And while you’re at break, tell the guys something. Tell em how to cure meat. 
Um, how to clean a rifle. I mean we do all this all the time, but instead of shakin' 
and bakin', that’s when we hold a little miniature class… that’s what we used to 
do with Company I and when I was with Company G.60 
The classes occur at every reenactment, although some of the larger, national 
reenactments are less focused on teaching the members; national reenactments are more 
directed toward the spectators in attendance. However, at the smaller musters, reenactors 
spend the whole weekend drilling, learning how to cook over an open fire, going over 
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details of the uniforms and military details. Much of the learning occurs, as can be seen 
above, in soliloquy form—older members teach newer members small elements of the 
Simulated History while they are occupied with other tasks.  
 The group learning that happens at these events demonstrates the selectivity of the 
history told. Only members who have been sufficiently indoctrinated—working within 
the same group for a certain amount of time—are allowed to teach other members. 
Simulated History is, at times, more selective than other methods of making claims about 
the past because, logistically, it has to be. There are only so many re-presentations of the 
past that modern human beings can do. Veterans of Simulated History teach the classes 
that are held. Further, the reading lists suggested, the sutlers recommended, the 
reenactments attended, are all selected by the higher-ups. So, as I asked different men 
which history books I should read, which movies I should watch, which events I should 
attend—the answers were all the same. There is a limited number of sources from which 
these men get their facts and figures; so the historical events they reenact and remember 
are all particularly shaped by specific members within each regiment. 
 There is a particular incident that demonstrates the dogmatism of this Simulated 
History. In an article titled “Lost Cause: The Confederacy’s New Face,” Jason Zengerle 
discusses a power struggle within the SCV (Sons of Confederate Veterans). The SCV is, 
some argue, a radical fringe group within Civil War reenactment; their politics is driven 
by divisive issues of race and ideology, and they focus their attacks on things like 
national and state debates about the Confederate flag. Many of the men I spoke to 
expressed disagreement with the SCV—out loud. But the SCV were present at every 
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reenactment I attended: recruiting and reenacting. In his article, Zengerle describes the 
actions of a man named Walt Hilderman. Hilderman, attempting to save the SCV from a 
radical drift to the right, ran for commander-in-chief—on the platform that the SCV 
should commemorate the past, not work to reinforce racial stereotypes or keep 
Confederate flags flying over the Georgia Capitol: “Now, according to Hilderman, local 
SCV camp meetings are more likely to feature anti-government diatribes and odes to the 
unique ‘Anglo-Celtic’ nature of the South than plans to commemorate Robert E. Lee” 
(14). Setting aside, for now, whether or not the SCV’s actual purpose is politics or 
commemoration (and whether or not those two things are different), the point of the 
article is that Hilderman loses. Within the machinery of the SCV, the old guard decides 
doctrine and structure—as the SCV’s version of the past gets more and more obviously 
radical (stemming, some argue, from recent state and national battles over the 
Confederate flag), the likelihood that these groups will tell more historically accurate 
stories of the past is shrinking.  
 The Lost Cause rests on Simulated History, and within the ranks of Civil War 
reenactment, few believe (and argue) any other version of the past. Further, this story 
makes obvious the difficulties one might face in seeking to promote different versions of 
the past within reenacting. One of the realities of Simulated History is that the pedagogy 
being shared is decided by someone, at some point, with specific ends in mind. There is 
no space for dialectic in a lenticular logic. 
 The SCV example is an exaggerated one, but I include it in order to demonstrate 
two things: first, that the history getting told is monolithic; and second, that Simulated 
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History, peopled by Experiential Tourists, constructed around a Simulated Material, and 
Perspectivally Pedagogical, is politically motivated—and rhetorically effective. Most 
reenactors wear their politics less obviously than the SCV61—the pedagogical bent of 
reenactment is a disguise for more radical views on history, or race, or politics. But the 
enclavish nature of reenactment reproduces these radical opinions—on a smaller scale, in 
every facet of the hobby. Often, in the course of the interviews, the incidental nature of 
their historical “discoveries” would appear.  
It’s not even that I know something and I … that other people don’t know… if I 
know something, I want other people to know. So I mean, I want, I mean, it’s 
almost kind of like clearing the record. Um, it’s kind of nice, it’s kind of nice to 
know that “Dixie” was written by a guy from Ohio. Um, that songs like “Dandy 
Jim of Caroline” which unfortunately there are a whole bunch of reenactors that 
like to sing it because it’s got the “N-word” in it. Um, that “Dandy Jim of 
Caroline” was written by some guy from the North, by a wandering minstrel from 
the North. I mean, it’s great that most of the minstrel shows were people from the 
Midwest.62  
In this excerpt is the implied conclusion that the historical racism isn’t exclusive to the 
South. Even as the reenactor tells me that he knows no more or less than the average 
spectator, he is demonstrating that his teaching is an attempt “to clear the record.” This 
clearing of the record is another element of Perspective. As they teach, the reenactors are 
just “telling us how it is.”  
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 The persuasiveness of this Perspective brings me to the final section of the 
chapter: Practitioners. The interaction between the persuader and the persuaded is the 
most interesting aspect of Simulated History—and the reason I began this study. The 
reenactors are teaching each other, and the lessons are being taught to a willing 
audience—the reenactors. There is not such a clear demonstration of spectator 
persuasion. Here, then, is the link between Perspective and Practitioners: who is the 
audience? Who is the persuaded? In this study I find the only people being really 
persuaded are the reenactors because their pedagogical design seems particularly directed 
towards intimate, personal connections. Despite what one might think about the rhetorical 
motivations of large numbers of men running around on the field of Shiloh, the majority 
of the persuading happens in the camps, between the men. In the next (and final) section 
of the chapter, I explore the rhetorical connections and relationships between the 
practitioners of Simulated History: Experiential Tourists. 
PRACTITIONERS: EXPERIENTIAL TOURISTS 
“They’re like walking historians. Talk to them.” 
So far, we’ve looked at the materials out of which Civil War reenactors fashion 
their arguments, as well as the standpoint from which they deliver their judgments about 
the past. The world in which Civil War reenacting occurs is filled with objects defined 
and opinions presented—in this section, I examine the people who reenact. The question 
in this section isn’t “Who are these people?” it’s “Who do these people claim to be?” 
Really, at the heart of an historical rhetoric, the people making claims are a construction, 
as well. Just as the environment (Materiality) of each rhetoric depends upon the 
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construction of sensibility, as the viewpoint (Perspective) of each rhetoric depends upon 
the construction of truth—so the voices (Practitioners) of each rhetoric depend upon the 
construction of personality. The persona of Simulated History is a simulated identity 
formation, a performed construction of the personality behind the histories being told  
 The personality of each historical rhetoric is, arguably, the part most likely to 
convince, as well as the most difficult element for Practitioners to convey. After all, an 
audience may be intrigued by an environment and an outlook, but if they do not believe 
(in) the person talking, then the historical rhetoric will not be effective. This section of 
the chapter is about the people who tell a simulated story of the past. To examine and 
explain the Practitioners of Simulated History, then, I discuss the two-fold construction of 
simulated identity. First, I explore the performance of experience. Performance is the 
clearly simulational part—reenactors (and other Experiential Tourists) are clearly doing 
something. They are performing the actions of their historical counterparts, and that 
performance itself is a rhetorical construction. Secondly, though, is the more expositional 
aspect of Experiential Tourism. Such an exposition depends, superficially, on elements of 
the more traditional historical rhetorics. In the exposition of Experiential Tourism, there 
are bits of both Experienced History and Collective Memory. The deeper part of such an 
exposition is, ironically, the part that depends more on simulation—as we will see at the 
end of the chapter.  
Before I begin the analysis, I briefly explain the audience/spectator dichotomy of 
this study. Up to this point, the interview excerpts have been focused on outside stimuli—
the reenactors have told us how they research events and uniforms, where they look to 
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define certain objects and scenes, how they make their uniforms and stories. From now 
on, we will look at the ways in which reenactors describe themselves and each other.63 It 
is important, also, to recognize the audience at this point. When I began this project, I 
assumed the audience was the spectators; now, I don’t really think that’s the case. The 
actual audience is the reenactors themselves—for this project I talked to them, and I 
found them to be the most convinced by their own rhetoric. In future projects, I will talk 
to the attending spectators in order to divine whether they are, in fact, persuaded by the 
performance of Simulated History. However, beginning with the purveyors of Simulation 
is justified—after we figure out kinds of arguments reenactors are most persuaded by, we 
can begin to explore whether Simulated History’s performance and re-presentation of the 
past is persuasive to spectators. In this section, then, I explore three aspects of 
Experiential Tourism: performance, embodiment, and the “subject” of history. 
Practitioners 1: Experiencing Performance 
In the first chapter of the dissertation, I explored the rhetoric of Experienced 
History. In such a rhetoric, the arguments constructed depend upon the immediacy and 
tangibility of experience. First person witnesses, it is believed, know something 
differently than history teachers or second-generation survivors. Because of their 
personal, individual experience with the past, first-person witnesses tell stories of the past 
that are viscerally believable. In a way, Simulated History depends upon this kind of 
tangibility, as well. However, a Simulated History takes a turn towards performance—




 The departure of Simulated History from Experienced History is in this present-
tense feeling. History made present is the drive of Simulated History, while Experienced 
History practitioners rely on the past-ness of events for their credibility. What I mean 
simply, this division dresses up that a Simulated History isn’t history, at all—it’s the 
present to look like the past, an ahistorical performance of historical events. While the 
practitioners of Experienced History may, at times, do a little Simulated History (veterans 
at parades, first-person witnesses appearing in plays and movies about the events they 
witnessed, survivors at the unveiling of monuments and exhibits), there is no 
physical/temporal way that a Simulated History practitioner can actually participate in the 
pasts they’re re-creating. 
 If time-specific experiential participation is impossible, then Experiential Tourists 
must shop for persuasive arguments about the past in simulation: a performance of 
history. The performative nature of Simulated History allows practitioners to claim a kind 
of experiential credibility. So, along the lines of Experienced History, when confronted 
with a question about the history being performed, a reenactor can reply, “Well, I’ve slept 
on the field of Shiloh, so I know something about the material conditions experienced by 
the soldiers who slept there.” The implied opposition to this argument is coming, I 
imagine, from the carefully educated practitioner of Professional History. Instead of 
specialization, the reenactor has simulated experience—a kind of performative buffer 
against the historical claims put forth by Professional Historians. 
Clearly, the body is central to argument construction in Simulated History. At the 
beginning of this chapter, I discuss the Materiality of Civil War reenactment—the ways 
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in which reenactor’s bodies become evidence for the claims they propose. Like the 
objects defined (artillery, uniforms, medical equipment), the bodies of reenactors are 
inscribed with and used to support different claims about the past. In this section of the 
chapter, I return to a discussion of the body, but this time, we will examine the body in 
action. Where Materiality depends upon the body as object, the focus of Practitioners is 
on the notion of embodiment. 
Practitioners 2: Embodying the Past 
Concepts of embodiment in contemporary theories of performance and 
performativity diverge when it comes to explaining the results of embodied action. 
Performance theorists provide various ways to understand repetitive acts (rituals, rites, 
everyday activities). How these acts (everyday or spectacle) work to construct or 
reinforce social notions is a point of contention. However, the main thrust of embodiment 
in culture stems from early 20th century practice theory and suggests that bodily practice 
is not only a demonstration of normativity, but that it is a building point of social norms. 
Embodiment is different from the functioning of the body. In the first chapter, I 
examine the rhetoric of the body itself—the materiality of Experienced History, I suggest, 
is dependent upon the material of bodies. In Simulated History, however, the focus shifts 
to embodiment—the practice of the body in constructing/simulating experience. The 
social rituals examined by theorists like Geertz and Bourdieu emphasize the positioning 
and tangibility of embodiment. In these rituals, embodiment is both the method and the 
substance of the social rules and structures being shared. In “ALL MADE UP,” a review 
of recent performance theory, Rosalind Morris explores the similarities and differences 
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between performance and practice. One of the original links, she finds, is embodiment. 
Embodiment works to connect ideological practices with material ones. 
Perhaps what made practice theory most attractive to constructionist 
anthropologies of gender was its promise to overcome the Manichean oppositions 
between the given (which is not here reducible to the natural) and the constructed, 
with a more dialectical sense of how what is socially constructed comes to have 
the force of the given in individual lives. In Bourdieu’s work… that dialectic was 
located in the habitus (a term he appropriated from Mauss) and was imagined as a 
set of ‘structuring structures’ that produced and were produced by specifically 
embodied subjects. Embodiment became the key term in such discussions, 
providing a way to address the productivity of collective representations in 
material rather then mentalist terms (571). 
The physical, embodied argument of ideology is an important part of Simulated History. 
As the Practitioners define objects and employ a pedagogical perspective, embodiment 
grounds the arguments Simulated History makes about the past. At the same time, the 
Embodiment sets up the very arguments that the Practitioners seek to make. The actions 
of their bodies, the performativity of their claims forms the foundation for all the rest of 
their arguments. In a simulated embodiment of history, these Practitioners attempt to 
make real what once was only metaphorical (or historical or imagined).  
 The most difficult aspect of diagramming these particular arguments is that they 
are rarely, if ever, said out loud. Simulated History is filled with implied claims; similar 
to unspoken warrants (but designed for specific uses), implied claims are drawn when the 
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arguer wants to persuade covertly. To argue that one knows more about the past because 
one pretends it very well sounds ridiculous—at first. However, the grounding of these 
arguments in the body, the myopic focus on minutiae, the embodied simulation of 
historical events all imply certain first assumptions: 
1) That the person doing the explaining or re-presentation or performance is not 
lying. 
2) That the person feeling the authentic material of a uniform, or getting rained 
on, or eating moldy potatoes, or walking twenty miles in ill-fitted boots, is 
really feeling the sensations of those details. 
3) That those real sensations are similar to the real sensations felt by the 
historical individuals being re—presented. 
4) That the culture sanctions these interpretations and experiential translations. 
Each of these first assumptions lays the ground for arguments stemming from simulated 
experience—if these simulated experiences are, in fact, true to the historical 
interpretation, then there is a powerful rhetoric to performing and re-presenting them. 
One of the reenactors, when I asked him about his desire to suffer like they did, 
said: 
We know that we can never know what they [the soldiers] really felt. But  we can 
get closer to them by eating the stuff they ate, by wearing the same scratchy 
clothes, carrying the same stuff they carry. I want to know that I am doing them 
honor, that I am doing them a service. … All these farbs running around…that’s 
not the way it was. It wasn’t a joke.64 
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He wouldn’t tell me that he knows more than some smarmy academic or a survivor—
what he will tell me, though, is that his discomfort is an homage to the people he seeks to 
emulated.  
These actions, this willingness to suffer, are performed, on the surface, as an act 
of commiseration and honor. But then, in places like the online discussion boards or the 
teaching sessions at musters, different members of the battalion persuade other members 
on the basis that they’ve done this before. These men are not demented. They are not 
crazy. But they are persuasive. In the following conversation taken from a discussion 
board, different reenactors talk about the ways to “de-farb” a certain kind of gun: 
All,  
As Mike has stated, defarbing an Enfield is a real task! There are a lot of options 
out there and some research and study is best. 
A good deal of the work can be done by an enterprising (and skilled) 
fellow at home- removing bluing, re-bluing with cold bluing, removing poly coat 
from the wood, even reshaping the screw estuchions [sic]. Still, getting the 
lockplate redone- double line of etching, stamps, etc- takes tools we don't have. 
Same goes for profiling the stock (a good deal of sanding and shaping goes into 
this), getting the maker's marks and inspectors stamps in the butt, etc. 
There are a few spots out there that do very good work. My top choice, by 
far, is James River Armory. These guys are something of a new-comer, as they've 
only been doing work for the past couple years. I've owned one of their two-band 
rifles and it was killer. Second choice would be Lodgewood Manufacturing. 
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My two cents on this topic...65 
In another message, a senior member lists the various items needed to maintain a clean, 
safe rifle: 
 For good cleaning in the field, the following items should be obtained: 
1.) Cotton cleaning patches 
2.) Worm  
3.) Cleaning jag 
3.) Barrel scraper 
4.) Nipple pick 
5.) Nipple wrench/screw driver combo tool 
6.) 1"x1" scrap of leather for covering nipple 
7.) Gun grease (NOT BORE BUTTER. I use RIG brand with a little bee's wax 
added t o increase the melting point.) 
These items are all you need in the field to properly maintain your 
weapon.  
For a thorough cleaning at home, the previous items will be needed, along 
with the following: 
1.) Lots more cleaning patches 
2.) Hot soapy water 
3.) Black powder solvent 
4.) Pipe cleaners 
5.) Gun oil in a spay can 
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6.) Green Scotch Bright pads (if your gun has an armory bright finish) 
If it is so desired, classes on how to properly clean and maintain you 
weapon in the field and at home can be held at the Muster in September. Just let 
us know if this would be a good idea.66 
Each of these messages explains details about performance—to keep the guns looking 
clean and authentic—these men provide detailed explanation, based on experience, about 
how to authenticate and realize historical details. And they never say, “Well, I know this 
because I simulated these events.” But that is why they are believed—and why their 
advice is sought. 
In this sub-section, I explore the ways in which performativity and exposition 
position the Practitioners of Simulated History to make claims about the past. We must 
think of these simulated performances in two ways: product and process. First, they are a 
product of reification and reiteration—certain things get played out again and again: 
masculinity, the Southern "culture of honor," the Lost Cause, the invisible slaves (and 
socio-economic divisions). And second, they are a process of repetition with a difference: 
each performance is always something newly simulated. Each reenactment is not just a 
reinforcement of the old but a creation of the new simulation. These two elements work 
together, you see—because part of the performance, the claim to be doing something that 
was always already true, is the process and product of some new simulacra. To construct 
new simulacra (and simultaneously reiterate normativity), reenactors make the war 
personal (a myopic understanding of the war as it relates to individual subjects), thereby 
closing off any possibility for argument. They empower themselves, through the process 
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and product of embodiment to make simulational claims in a simulational culture. 
Practitioners 3: Subjects in History 
To explain the past through embodiment, reenactors must construct and perform 
as subjects in history. The first element of this construction is the personalization of the 
war. In an article for the Christian Science Monitor, Scott Baldauf travels to a re-
enactment in Stillwater, OK. Stillwater hosts the gathering of a large group of re-
enactors. When Baldauf asks the men why they participate in the re-enactment, a man 
named Preston Ware replies, “There are times when you’re chargin’ up a hill with all 
these soldiers around you and you lose a sense of time. Boom, you’re in 1861” (11). 
Baldauf describes the unique culture of the Civil War re-enactors “as a culture all its 
own,” emphasizing the dedication with which the re-enactors pursue their practice of 
living history. Jim Kushlan, in an article for the Civil War Times, touches on the 
dedication of re-enactors, as well. He contrasts the excitement and dedication that re-
enactors feel for these pursuits with the economic ties people feel to their jobs:  
Relatively few people who love Civil War history get to immerse themselves in it 
for pay. And yet, for the most part, the people who bring Civil War history to the 
public through reenactments and living history, museums, round tables, and 
historical societies are volunteers. They are doing something they love, something 
they believe matters. (4) 
Reenactors make these distant past events personal and immediate. In their search for a 
connection with the Other—a connection with the past—these men (and some women) 
make the stories of that past their own. Often, along with actual attendance at and 
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participation in reenactments, reenactors do genealogical searches to find members of 
families who fought on either side of the war. The people involved tell of feeling 
connected to something larger, something more meaningful—a sense of historical 
continuity. There is a tension here, as well, between memory and history. Further, many 
of the re-enactors identify with the soldiers they seek to portray and lament feelings of 
distance or impotence: “As Southerners, we get very emotional about this battle 
[Gettysburg],’ says Ware, adding that after the battle he sobbed. ‘I felt like it was my 
fault. I didn’t make it to the enemy lines’” (Baldauf 11).  
 To make the war personal, the reenactors speak of two ideologically motivated 
reasons for personal involvement in reenactment: appeals to manhood and desire for 
connection with an Other. Both of these ideological lines are directly related to Lost 
Cause mythology—and both of these lines of thought lead directly to the Lost Cause-
related Silences about race, class, and gender. One of the uses to which reenactors put 
their arguments is located in cultural perceptions of masculinity. The men speak, 
frequently, of romantic ideals of manhood and heroism. These responses recall Lost 
Cause imagery of the noble Confederate soldier, as well as the longing for an idealized 
antebellum South, in which white men were men and everyone else knew their place. 
Several of the interviewees talk about notions of manhood in relation to the practice of 
war. When asked what the draw to this sort of hobby was, one man responds:  
It’s just each person’s respected? You’re living in the elements, you’re getting 
rained on, food is scarce. Instead of fighting for your country, you’re fighting for 
your peers. By the end of the war, they’re fighting for that flag that they’re 
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holding up that represents them and who they were and where they came from… 
And it’s sad and it’s scary, but yet at the same time it’s romantic. Cuz that’s the 
love part of the war, how so many men—“uh, I can’t wait til this war’s over” and 
then when it was, “oh, what are we gonna do now?” well they all separated and 
went off. That’s what made the reunions so great.67 
The glory of war and the elevation of purpose are key elements of re-enactment. Being a 
part of the war, after the fact, allows them that feeling of higher purpose. Further, in this 
excerpt, we can see the performative desire to repeat—the original reunions of veterans 
are suggested, by some, to be the first reenactments. In these first meetings, at the end of 
the 19th century, veterans re-membered and re-lived their “glory days.” Contemporary 
Civil War reenactment is a simulated performance of those first simulated performances.  
Some of the reenactors long for the days when “men were men.” And some of the 
answers referring to manhood draw attention to the very hard and fast categories “man” 
used to encompass. When asked why he thinks the men (who didn’t own slaves, who 
weren’t in control of their lives) fought, another man responds, 
Questioning someone’s manhood is something really, really huge. I mean that is a 
very large issue. Those are ideals that those men held true to themselves and 
y’know we kind of think of it now and it’s kind of like, “phhhhhbbb.” We make 
jokes about us being wimps, about us being fatasses and all that kind of stuff 
y’know and but, no self-respecting man would have made that kind of joke about 
himself, especially not in public…I doubt seriously that anybody would impugn 
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another’s manhood back then without some serious repercussions. We’re talking 
dueling days, kind of thing.68  
It is an ideal and ideological image. These men from the past, these constructed men, 
knew how to live their lives according to rules that no longer apply, say reenactors. In 
that response is a subtle reference to the complicated state of current affairs: those men 
would never have allowed themselves to be the butt of jokes about their weight or roles.  
 This construction of memory provides a clearer, nobler role for men to play. 
Images of an Other who is sure of his role, is certain of his place in the world, is a 
desirable end, and all of the re-enactors with whom I spoke made some mention of 
manhood. One of the interviewees simplifies it, saying, “Boys are raised to be warriors, 
take care of your family…”69 implying, it seems, that they don’t get to do that so much 
anymore. In a Simulated History, however, they get to experience those simulated norms, 
thereby reinforcing them for each other and themselves. 
The second line of responses addresses a perceived connection with the Other. 
This response follows on the heels of the claims to manhood because these men often cite 
their current feelings of disenfranchisement within contemporary society as a reason to 
look backwards for answers. These answers appeal to Lost Cause myth in that they recall 
the imagery of the noble soldier. They also appeal to Lost Cause because they simplify 
the understandings of a complicated, messy war. Instead of recognizing the reasons their 
ancestors went to war as force and desperation, many re-enactors paint pictures of those 
soldiers with Lost Cause coloring: they were at war because they chose to be; they were 
united in their support of the “Cause”; they were unaware of the implications (racial, 
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societal) of their actions on both the future and the past; or, they were aware and 
contrarian because they sought to create a world in which everyone (except, I guess, 
slaves), regardless of governmental interference, could decide what their lives should 
look like. There is a purity in motives that re-enactors assign to the men they choose to 
emulate. 
Some of the men wanted to play this aspect of re-enacting down—intent on the 
historicity of it, they feel that this kind of question leads to silly conclusions. Of course 
we can’t identify with those guys! Our hardships are nothing compared to theirs. To the 
question, “Do you feel connected?”, one man responds:  
[dismissively] Oooohhhhh. Yes, because I want to be. No because I’m like a 
pimple on their butt. I’m a nothing. I mean, they lived it, I didn’t. [Pause]. If I was 
to be swept up in a time warp and put back into that time—me here—I’d be 
scared, I’d be out of place, and I probably wouldn’t understand them. And I know 
they wouldn’t understand me. Now, if I grew up then, I’d be a totally different 
person.70 
He leans toward a rational answer. He cannot know what they suffered because he is not 
there, and yet—if he were born then, he might be different. A consubstantiation of 
motives and intentions makes him question his distance. There is a connection, he 
implies, or there could have been.  
Along the same lines, another reenactor tells me that Civil War reenactment is 
“one of the best training modules for the U.S Army—the younger guys get the bug and 
they think the military is neat.”71 This response is an interesting juxtaposition of current 
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events and historical events; the connection this reenactor points to is more than just 
historical identification, it is performative to the point of making new soldiers for new 
wars. This observation is interesting for two reasons. The first reason relates to my 
observations; the second reason relates to his own conclusions about the relationship 
between simulational practice and contemporary war.   
The first reason is based on my own observations. The majority of these 
reenactors are well past army age. As we see in several of the previous interview 
excerpts, the men who reenact are often overweight, mostly middle-aged, and not in the 
best physical shape. The second reason this is an intriguing interaction relates to his 
observations. He goes on to provide one of the most disconcerting observations I heard 
during my research: “War in Iraq has hurt the hobby because we now have a modern war, 
a real war. The men who joined us before, joined before the war, because they liked the 
guns and the camping—well, they can go do that for real if they want to… Modern 
warfare has nothing like the casualties from previous wars.”72 This observation does 
several incredible things: first, it draws a synchronic connection between reenactors and 
soldiers; second, it draws a diachronic connection between the reenactors, contemporary 
soldiers, and soldiers of old; finally, his observation manages to belittle the sacrifices of 
current soldiers—in Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. According to this reenactor, not only has real 
war hurt the performance and practice of Simulated History, but perhaps it is not as 
scary/murderous/real as the simulated performances of contemporary reenactors. Even as 
he makes a connection between himself and the soldiers he seeks to simulate, he elevates 
the simulated performance of history to a place of experiential supremacy. Reenactors, 
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because they simulate the actions of real war, are more connected to the Civil War 
soldiers than current soldiers engaged in warfare. 
Finally, I asked all of the re-enactors to share memorable moments with me. What 
are some of your favorite moments in Civil War re-enactment? One man talks about the 
process of “first-person” re-enactment or living history—when the re-enactors try to 
embody the actions and speech of Civil War soldiers. In these first person actions, 
identification is key. In this situation, the speaker has taken a hit to the shoulder, and a 
minister approaches him on the battlefield:  
And I’m doing first person to him, and he gives me water. And uh I was thirsty. 
And then all of a sudden, he just drops me on the ground and he hightails it and 
runs. And I’m like, “What the hell?” I look, 20 feet away from me is hundreds of 
these Yankees. I hear, “Halt!” I start crawling back and I grab my rifle. And I load 
it. Fire off a round. I hear, “Aim! Fire!” and then I feel the Bonny and Clyde 
movie at the end—the bodies just go, [strange sound], and that’s what I did. I 
pretended like they hit me with a hundred bullets. And I’m just in pieces. And I’m 
laying there. And all of a sudden it hit me. I never wrote that letter…to my wife. 
Oh, you talk about the tears turning on. It hit me hard. Because I realized, floating 
to heaven, that uh the next letter she gets is going to be from the CO 
[commanding officer], saying “Your man, your husband died on the field of honor 
at the battle of Prairieville, December 7, 1862.”73  
All that weekend, he says, he planned to write a period letter to his wife—and he just 
never got around to it. Essentially, I am suggesting that the embodied performance of 
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these reenactors is, itself, an argument. They are doing things with history by simulating 
it—they are making history personal, they are making history myopic, they are making 
history work for them.  
SILENCES: LENTICULAR LOGICS AND IMAGES 
“And they looked like real Confederate soldiers, but to me they didn’t… because it 
wasn’t Hollywood.” 
  The practice of Simulated History creates its own reality—its hyppereal 
construction of the past becomes, in the language and performance of simulation, a 
reference point for itself. In the previous sections, I explore the ways in which those 
models, that precession of simulacra, gets constructed through Materiality, Perspective, 
and Practice. In this section, I investigate the spaces left by Simulated History’s 
construction of the past, the historical Silences created and fed by Simulated History’s 
performance of itself. 
  There are two aspects of Simulated History’s Silences: the first aspect is a 
performance of lenticular logic; the second aspect is the re-presentation of Lost Cause 
mythology. These two aspects work within and around one another. The performance of 
lenticular logic allows for only one version of the past at a time—one story, one series of 
events, one cast of players. Those particulars, in turn, re-present the myth of the Lost 
Cause: the story is one of inevitable, gorgeous defeat, the series of events designed to 
heighten a sense of romantic (if doomed) valorism, and the players are featured in the 
Lost Cause version of Civil War history. Therefore, in the following subsections, I 
explore the ways in which these two aspects work to hide certain elements of the past and 
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silence different historical voices. Lenticular logic paves the way for Simulated History’s 
Silences and the Lost Cause is a rhetorical and historical platform for the performance of 
Simulated History’s careful Silences.  
Simulated Silences 1: Performing Lenticular Logic 
  There are several Silences in the simulation of Civil War. Race is, of course, the 
obvious one. Class is another. Gendered roles and expectations also get mystified and 
ignored. These Silences grow out of the lenticular logic of the individual. The myopic 
focus on specifics, the one-person-at-a-time performance of the past is another 
methodological/structural Silence of Simulated History. When only an individual is 
speaking, the ideological, social facets of that particular understanding get muted (if they 
are mentioned, at all). How can one particular soldier, or farmer, or Russian peasant give 
an audience the ominiscient hindsight of a Tolstoy or the historical perspective of a 
Wells? In the process of teaching history, history teachers help to construct the cultural 
assumptions that drive social interpretation of the past. However, in a simulational 
experience, where the emphasis is on authenticity, immediacy, and sensuality, there is not 
a lot of room for intellectual percolating. 
  In his discussion of rhetorical identification, Burke tells us that both division and 
identification get revealed when “the continuity is snapped”—when “varying grades of 
compensatory deference” are languaged as substitutes for physical closeness (Rhetoric of 
Motives 139-140). The material and definitional construction of physical identification is 
Simulated History’s “compensatory deference”—a rhetoric of materiality, in which 
reenactors simulate the material experiences of their historical counterparts… up to a 
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point. The emphasis in these responses and discussions, while they are also about objects, 
pertain mostly to the ways in which bodies are shaped or constricted by clothing. The 
movement of bodies is prescribed by the manner of dress. Wearing a Civil War era gown 
inhibits one’s motions; we run differently when we are wearing shorts and T-shirt than 
when we are clad in petticoats and hoop skirts. One’s movements are shaped and molded 
by the clothing one wears—as is the history one remembers.  
  There are no slave bodies at these events; there are rarely camp followers or poor, 
starving prisoners. The movements of a certain section of the history, groups exclusive 
and historically rare, are the movements being documented at these events. Despite the 
obsessive call for authenticity, the historical silences at reenactments make the histories 
being told inherently inauthentic. Reenactors do not address the most difficult questions, 
nor are they ever expected to. Their version of history is equivalent to the Silent 
Establishment. Just as reenactment performs rhetorical actions, displaying the hardship of 
life during the war, or the nobility of soldiers, the silence of reenactors about slavery and 
race relations functions rhetorically to squelch possible debates and questions. 
Handler and Saxton analyze the obsession with authenticity, as well as the irony 
of an “authentic” historical experience: 
Living history, while envisioned by its participants and institutional managers as a 
means to realize and represent authentic existence, subverts its purpose by virtue 
of the very cognitive posture it must take toward its conduct and content… 
[F]eatures of authenticity… inform the sort of existence living historians crave, as 
well as the desired pre-reflexive understanding of that existence as an ecstatic 
 
215 
emplotment read in its authoring, are reduced by the inescapable reflexivity of 
reenactment to the inauthenticity of a life… Yet [there is an authenticity to 
reenactment]… in the sense of a symptomatically postmodern authenticity. (257) 
The story-telling of reenactment, the authentic narrative constructed around imagined 
figures and details, silences and ignored spaces, becomes an authentic search for identity, 
as it fails to authentically fabricate the experiences of wartime soldiers. But, that, of 
course, is another aspect of reenactment’s strategic silences. Reenactment is strategically 
silent about both race and the impossibility of time travel. By narrativizing the past, 
reenactors teach a sanitized, white-washed tale, and present a lenticular, ideological 
structure incapable of displaying whiteness and blackness at the same time. Each of these 
terrains gets ignored and/or covered over by reenactment. The reenactors focus on the 
battles, the guns, the explosions and the seams of their uniforms. Their emphasis on 
authenticity precludes any discussion of the contexts and issues at hand during, after, and 
since the War. The narrativization of Civil War through reenactment emphasizes 
(invents?) smooth connections between then and now, it highlights the details at the 
expense of larger questions about social, economic, and political issues. 
Simulated Silences 2: The Lost Cause 
 As I explain in the Perspective section, an important source of Simulated 
History’s persuasive viewpoint is the hidden nature of its ideology. To work, to be 
persuasive, the sources of this rhetoric must be silent ghosts—ghosts of Southern 
apologists, ghosts of Middle Passage victims, ghosts of the poor soldiers killed by the 
thousands. Popular culture, on the whole, strives to simplify, and in the performance of 
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popular culture, the lenticular logic of Simulated History allows for the telling of only 
one story. Limiting the sources (and keeping them quiet) makes the claims used more 
powerful; such unspoken warrants work extremely well if the audience being addressed is 
already partially persuaded—which is the case with the reenactors performing and re-
presenting history to one another. In his exploration of simulated culture, Baudrillard 
discusses the white-washing of history. Baudrillard links the contemporary drive to 
“memorialize as if there were no tomorrow” (Huyssen 28) to the turning of history into a 
smooth narrative. This transformation, this white-washing, seems to demonstrate a not-
so-secret fear of the past: 
Have we perhaps, propelled by the vain hope to evade our "abiding in our present 
destruction", as Canetti says, given ourselves up to a retrospective melancholy in 
order to relive and, make up for, everything; to relive for the sake of elucidating 
(as if the shadow of psychoanalysis is cast over all our history - as if the same 
events, the same circumstances were reproduced in nearly the same terms; as if 
the same wars broke out between the same people, and; all that had been stolen 
would resurge as if moved by an irrepressible fantasy so that the oeuvre itself 
would be perceived as the form of the unconscious, as primary process at work); 
are we to invoke all past events for the sake of comparison, to re-teach everything 
in terms of process? A delirium with process has quite recently gotten hold of us 
and, at the same time, a seizure or delirium with responsibility, precisely because 
it is becoming increasingly elusive. To remake history proper - to whitewash all 
the monstrosities: underlying the proliferation of scandals there is a vague 
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(re)sentiment that history itself, too, is a scandal. A retro-process that will steer us 
to a delirium with/of origin, to this side of history, to a conviviality driven by 
instincts (animal), to the primitive niche, which is already the way things stand in 
the ecologic flirt with an impossible origin. (“Reversion of History” 2) 
The scandalous existence of history gone bad—all of the things that happened in the past 
for which we have no explanation (or, worse, for which our only explanations are 
horrific)—leaves the contemporary understanding of history in an uncomfortable place.  
History, in a variety of ways, gets white-washed frequently—as we see in the 
discussion of Silences pertinent to each different historical rhetoric. If history, as we have 
been taught by the Enlightenment, is a continual process of improvement, then how can 
we explain the existence of poor choices, especially in a chosen country like the USA? In 
short, we must erase the mistakes. Simulated History, though, seems to be perfectly 
constructed for performed and re-presented erasures—Civil War reenactment is a literal 
white-washing of the past. Through a Simulated History, the Lost Cause becomes the 
“real” story, the simple, simulated reality of heroism and nobility that history books, in 
their relentless academic debates, can never present. The lenticular logic of Simulated 
History, however, eliminates the nasty details of the past and hides the bloody ghosts—
all while presenting a holistic narrative of the past. The reenactors are able to present a 
convincing, one-sided version of the past, and the other side of the historical postcard (the 
image of slaves and class-war and conscription and desertion) is invisible. 
The silence of an invisible body—the spaces where the slaves should be at the 
plantation house, for example, or the young men dying (invisibly) of dysentery during the 
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Civil War, or, for that matter, the millions who died in all the wars being reenacted by 
20th century war reenactors—all of those bodies are ignored. In a Simulated History, the 
meanings performed and re-presented ignore the silences—strategically—that other 
histories must acknowledge. In the quest for objectivity, Professional History explains its 
reasons for focusing on specific years, or people, or nations. Experienced History, relying 
on the rhetorical sway of individual experience, presents its stories of the past with a nod 
to the people who do not know the same history—because they were not there, or they 
were standing at different spots. And Collective Memory, focused on the construction of 
group identification and empathy, displays its particular perspective as exactly that—
particular to the nation or group it seeks to voice.  
 The claims made by the other three rhetorics are explicit—made in the light of 
day to people who are paying attention. Simulated History, though, disguises its 
rhetorical strategies—theirs is a world of implicit claims and quiet verification. Simulated 
History, instead, re-presents a very shiny, very fabricated, very researched performance 
of the past—all the while disclaiming that it is doing anything rhetorical at all. The goal 
of physical identification, the striving for authenticity—these standards of verification 
become the rhetorical method. Instead of explaining the larger details of the Civil War, 
for example, the medical reenactors discuss the specifics of wartime amputation. Instead 
of talking about the racism and classism that drove this country into a war (and linking 
those steps to other, more contemporary events), different reenactors talk about the ways 
to make a cannon look more authentic—and how the soldiers who fired cannons were 
affected, physically and emotionally, by the sounds and sights of cannon fire. 
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 Use and explanation of objects is about definitions, the function of different 
objects in the context of individual soldiers’ lives, as well as the lives themselves. These 
object definitions are also a break from the physical identification with historical figures, 
but performers of Simulated History can only relate so much. And the re-presentation and 
performance of the past can only cover so much area. Simulated History, in its inability 
to display complexity, is silent—about race and class, about gender and politics, about 
resource and rhetoric. The use and explanation of objects allows reenactors to create and 
reinforce their credibility—up to a point. After that, they’re rich, old, and fat—while the 
historical figures are poor and skinny. There’s also a connection between the consumer 
culture and reenacting—the people who reenact must have disposable capital and time. 
One of the problems with recruitment and authenticity is very much linked to this—in the 
old days, the guys who fought were young and poor, skinny and ignorant—however, 
these guys must travel long distances, they must purchase the materials required for 
authenticity (which costs money). Or they must make the uniforms (which requires time). 
Therefore, Simulated History must, in its lenticular logic, depend upon Perspective, as 
well. Perspective is the rhetorical space in which reenactors (and other Practitioners of 
Simulated History) use their simulational experiences to persuade. 
 Taking on the voice of the marginalized, the victims of history, the outnumbered 
truthsayers, Civil War reenactors cling to the power of those labels. The only time slavery 
was mentioned, it was cushioned in a narrative of blame and diversion. As Kirk Savage 
discusses in his reading of Southern monuments, the discussion of slavery—and its 
justifications—became an exercise in Southern imagination. Southern apologists became 
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ventriloquists—to defend their positions without actually saying that they were defending 
them, they would throw their voices into other places—monuments, letters to the editors, 
history books, novels. The same can be said of these reenactors. They mention slavery to 
explain two things: first, that the slaves were well-treated (as any property ought to be); 
and second, that slavery was caused and created by the people who were made into 
slaves.74 Both of these explanations serve to erase Southern culpability—and are major 
parts of the Lost Cause mythology. In the process of “clearing the record,” the 
Perspective of Civil War reenactment is an act of ventriloquism: they perform the voice 
of the victim, the people trying to tell a story long unheard, the truth-bringers. It’s a 
persuasive voice to perform. 
IMPLICATIONS, SIMULATIONS, AND HISTORY’S HOLODECK 
One of the most interesting things about Simulated History is not the difficulty in 
countering these performed arguments, it is that the performers and practitioners of 
Simulated History are constructing arguments at all. Theorists of argument recognize, as 
Toulmin did, that the world is not a perfect place. Human beings are, by nature and 
necessity, casuists. We stretch words to mean different things, we pull thin arguments 
taut to cover wider areas, we bend observations in order to make generalizations and 
predictions. The nature of language is inherently casuistic, Burke says, because language 
is a construction and, therefore, imprecise. But we continue to name things. Human 
beings are determined to argue, and so theorists of argument explore and explain the 
various ways in which arguments are made more or less valid, more or less sound. In a 
rhetoric of Simulated History, the rules of argument change once again.  
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The rules of human argument attempt to encompass the varieties and vicissitudes 
of life, but they are not exact. Human argument is not geometry (Jonsen and Toulmin 
Abuse of Casuistry 25-28). Therefore, points get dropped, ideas become hidden, and 
facets get underplayed—in order to create persuasive arguments. Typically, as inexact as 
such an examination may be, we may examine an argument and locate the holes. When 
we read an infuriating newspaper editorial, for example, we may identify the weaker 
parts of the argument, and bring those to light in our response to the paper. But, in a 
Simulated, performative History, what are the rules of engagement? It would seem that 
the only way to respond to one performance of the past would be to perform right back at 
them: perhaps an uninvited reenactment of slavery. That notion brings in another aspect 
of the changed argumentative environment: the issue of identity. Whose past is being 
performed? The political implications of Lost Cause performed suggest that there may be 
not “other side” to such a version. If that is the case, whence the reenactors' claims to 
marginality? Some of the most powerful rhetoric of this particular Simulated History 
depends upon the reenactors’ claims that they “are telling a history the books don’t tell.” 
The sources from which reenactors get their arguments are performative and re-
presentational; the simulation of historical experience becomes a source/resource of 
conviction and support. 
Finally, the myopia of Experienced History is one thing—to hear a tale of 
Auschwitz from the survivor who only knew a certain aspect of it is, I would suggest, 
very ideologically different (in our culture) from the Lost Cause reenactor. From the 
sources/resources mentioned above, then, reenactors (and other Experiential Tourists) 
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make claims that are brought to bear in a present that works for and around and against 
more than just the individual’s simulated understanding of the world. In an interpretation 
of the past taken from an individual stance, not only are certain whole groups excluded, 
but also excluded are the larger socio-political events, the movements of armies and 
philosophical thought, the process of war and its effects on other individuals in other 
situations. When history is whittled down to a “subject’s” perspective, all other possible 
interpretations of the past are missed. This exclusionary result is not unique to Simulated 
History—Judith Butler, in Gender Trouble, argues that the “subject” of any discursive 
identity formation is affected by the juridical and productive elements of discursive 
construction:  
The questions of “the subject” is crucial for politics… because juridical subjects 
are invariably produced through certain exclusionary practices that do not “show” 
once the juridical structure of politics has been established… Juridical power 
inevitably “produces” what it claims merely to represent; hence, politics must be 
concerned with this dual function of power: the juridical and the productive. In 
effect, the law produces and then conceals the notion of a “subject before the law” 
in order to invoke that discursive formation as a naturalized foundational premise 
that subsequently legitimates that law’s own regulatory hegemony. (37)  
Butler’s explanation demonstrates the careful argument construction occurring in Civil 
War reenactment: the myopia of individual understanding is lauded as “authentic,” while 
any possibility of distance or disagreement is both impossible and invisible. An 
individual in the middle of a maelstrom may be able to tell us how bad the storm is, but 
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she will not be able to diagnose the maelstrom, nor even make sense of the whirling wind 
in which she stands. Civil War reenactment, specifically, and Simulated History, 
generally, is an homage to the individual—at great cost to the collective. 
To prove that the Lost Cause is the only true version of the war, reenactors must 
perform a believable demonstration of the Lost Cause: the practice of Simulated History 
is a performance of credibility, experience, and hegemony. The reenactments are 
designed, through practice and embodiment, to perform (and reiterate) current 
conceptions of politics, gender, race, and class ideology. Reenactors are also reinforcing 
certain elements of the present by reenacting the past in such a way: notions of 
masculinity and femininity (firmly ensconced in the romantic past); understanding of the 
current war (as well as the people/structures that have put us there); 
awareness/appreciation of contemporary political inaction (when everyone is busy 
simulating the past—they are both reinforcing current bad ideas and ignoring the 
possibility of actually changing those bad ideas). Simulated History, as it is currently 
practiced, is a dangerous combination of pleasure and discipline—the logical endpoint to 
Modernity’s desire to fix things and Post-Modernity’s drive to consume them.  
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FOUR: WE COME NOT PRAISE THE PAST BUT TO BURY IT 
Nostalgia can then be seen as not only a search for ontological security in the past, but 
also as a means of taking one’s bearings for the road ahead in the uncertainties of the 
present… Nostalgia can be both melancholic and utopian. (Pickering and Keightley 
921)75 
 
 Nostalgia used to be a deadly sort of word, a word that basically meant “terminal 
homesickness” (Pickering and Keightley 921-922). The current understanding of nostalga 
may not be quite as moribund, but the connotations of nostalgia are still, on the whole, 
fairly negative. In the previous chapter, I explored the practice and process of Simulated 
History, and I ended with a damning interpretation—that Simulated History is nothing 
more than a terminal kind of cultural nostalgia, a performance of history without any sort 
of analysis or learning. Still, I do not want to write Simulated History off, entirely. The 
current practice of Simulated History may not be anything but shiny, simulated historical 
pageantry. But there may be more possibilities in Simulated History than we might at 
first assume—just as there may be more revolutionary possibility to nostalgia than its 
etymology might lead us to believe. 
  With those possibilities in mind, I would like to return to the Breisach quotation at 
the beginning of Chapter One: “Every important new discovery about the past changes 
how we think about the present and what we expect of the future; on the other hand, 
every change in the conditions of the present and in the expectations for the future revises 
our perception of the past” (Historiography 2). Breisach observes that the past and the 
present are never involved in a fixed relation; they are, in fact, constantly shaping and 
affecting one another. As we seek to learn more about the past, our perceptions of the 
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present change, and, as we seek to understand more about the present, our approaches to 
(and explorations of) the past alter. There is a mutually reinforcing rhetorical force to 
historical investigations and their connections to contemporary ends, and claims about the 
past are used to a variety of ends. Claims about the past justify war and revolution. They 
predict and prescribe understanding, shaping the ways in which we learn about history. 
They isolate and unify—consolidating identities both diachronically and synchronically. 
They work as sympathetic and pathetic appeals, placing certain folks at the center of 
history and leaving others outside. Claims about the past are used artistically—to 
construct nationally glorifying memorials like the Washington Memorial and nationally 
ambivalent works of art like Eisenman’s Holocaust Memorial in Berlin. And claims 
about the past are used rhetorically—to persuade, to construct, to abrogate. Claims about 
the past set boundaries; when one person (or family or nation) makes a statement about 
history, rhetorical, social and political lines are drawn. Maneuvering within and between 
and around those boundaries is the rhetorical practice of historiography; the results of 
those rhetorical maneuvers are the political practice of historiography. Claims about the 
past are used to do a bunch of things, and this dissertation is about those rhetorical uses 
and the boundaries that they establish. 
 In order to explore the uses to which claims about the past are put, as well as the 
rhetorical boundaries of different claims, I proposed a hypothesis: In a simulational 
culture, Simulated History is as rhetorically powerful as (and perhaps more rhetorically 
powerful than) the three main historical rhetorics described.  To address this hypothesis, 
I examined the methods of four historical rhetorics (Experienced History, Professional 
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History, Collective Memory, and Simulated History), explored the concept of a 
simulational culture, and rhetorically analyzed a case study of Simulated History. In this 
final chapter of the dissertation, I conclude by revisiting the original hypothesis and 
research questions. Generalizing from the case of Civil War reenactment, I provide some 
answers to each of the three questions. I also discuss implications of these answers and 
suggest some possible directions for future research. I divide the conclusion into three 
sections. Each section begins with one of the original three questions, and as I provide 
answers to these, I explain their relationships (or lack thereof) to my original hypothesis. 
I also explore the rhetorical and political implications of those answers. I begin with the 
first question. 
RESEARCH QUESTION ONE 
What are the dimensions of each method’s (Experienced History, Professional 
History, Collective Memory, and Simulated History) knowledge claims about the 
past?  
 There are four rhetorical dimensions to historical knowledge: Materiality, 
Perspective, Practice, and Silences. They work together as both sources/resources of each 
method’s argument construction. These dimensions also provide the uses to which those 
claims get put and proceed from the method they represent as they work simultaneously 
to construct believable claims about the past. The ideological, practical, and productive 
elements of these dimensions are constructed around and within their application—as, for 
example, historians look to writing to verify their claims, they depend upon the rhetorical 
power of writing things down. 
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 The first dimension, Materiality, is the construction of the tangible—the rhetorical 
makings of the touchable, sensual elements of an historical argument. Materiality works 
to persuade the audience by making history feel—it is a dimension of affective 
physicality, designed to make historical claims realistic. Experienced History is made of 
bodily material, the stuff of blood, skin, sweat, and suffering. Professional History is 
made from writing things down; written texts, fragments and documents all add to the 
material from which Professional History gets its rhetorical power. Collective Memory is 
made from speaking—the processes of spoken language, the shared interpretations of 
those languages, and the assumptions that those meanings could be no other way.  
  Simulated History, transcending some of the material limitations demonstrated by 
the other three (like limited experience, academic convention, and out-group viewpoints) 
works to construct a material of authentic identification; the emphasis is on definitions, 
objects, and the physicality of experience. Historical claims constructed via simulation 
depend upon several of the constructs provided by the three previous rhetorics, but when 
a Simulated History is being performed and re-presented, the past is simultaneously 
immediate and distant, both personally performed and professionally researched—
Simulated History is openly sensual and quietly limited all at once. Because of its 
reliance on technology and objects, the material of simulational histories is a transformed 
combination of all three historical rhetorics without the attendant rules and regulations of 
them because it creates a feeling of history and a knowledge of history in the same breath. 
  The second dimension, Perspective, is the ideological mantle taken on by each 
rhetorical method. Even if the ideologies presented under hidden (or implied), the goal of 
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studying each method’s Perspective is to provide a more thorough and detailed analysis 
of the argumentative sources/resources to which each different rhetoric looks for 
foundational structure. The Perspective of Experienced History is based on the notion of 
ownership—personal relevance and individual experience produce versions of the past 
that are accepted because they belong to the people who saw the past occur. The 
Perspective of such Experienced History makes that rhetoric’s interpretations of the past 
very particular. On the other hand, Professional History’s Perspective comes from the 
notion that objectivity is not only possible but desirable. To interpret the past correctly 
and completely, Professional History distances itself from the “object” being studied and 
provides a reading of the past that centers on the importance and value of the scientific 
method. 
  The Perspective of Collective Memory values empathy—connection and mutually 
acceptable interpretations of the past are the sources/resources from which Collective 
Memory draws its claims. These empathetic viewpoints, bolstered by intersubjective 
agreement and collective definitions make the Perspective of Collective Memory into a 
foundation for group understanding—an identity-constructing rhetorical move designed 
to both construct and reinforce notions of identification between and among group 
members.  
  The Perspective of Simulated History, again, uses and transcends these different 
rhetorically constructed points of view. Taking on the mantle of teachers, rhetors of 
Simulated History perform versions of the past. These performed re-presentations are 
offered up as pedagogical—designed to share some historical knowledge with the 
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audience. Often, the practice of Simulated History is described by participants in terms of 
its teaching capabilities. By combining the process of research (Professional History) 
with the individuality of simulation (Experienced History) and the identification 
possibilities of intersubjective agreement (Collective Memory), Simulated History draws 
from the resources of the other three methods and transforms them into a present-day 
performance of past re-presentations. 
  The Practitioners of each method demonstrate the uses to which many of these 
claims get put. The practice of each method shapes its outside—the ways in which 
Perspective and Materiality get put to work is in the practice of talking about history. So, 
the Practitioners of Experienced History, the mass cultural consumers, are the outward 
manifestation of basic assumptions in Experienced History’s interpretation of the past. 
Because the past is owned personally, because bodies are the material from which that 
ownership gets told—the consumption of a popular history (as in Jerome de Groot’s 
discussion of the increasing popularity of historical texts—from the Manor House to a 
mention of the History Channel by Tony Soprano)76 becomes a practice that regular 
people can do—and with some authority. The Practitioners of Experienced History are 
the living, popular manifestation of its grounds: each popular history constructed reveals 
a vernacular interpretation of the past that is open to, well, everyone with a body. 
  Professional History’s Practitioners are specialists—they are the Disciples of the 
Ivory Tower. In such a practice, training and disciplinization are key. Almost 
diametrically opposed to the practice of Experienced History, the practice of Professional 
History revolves around the rhetoric and exclusivity of expertise. Interpretations of the 
 
232 
past are limited to the people who know how to write things down. As Richard Evans 
mentions in Lying About Hitler, historians debate, discuss, and disagree with one 
another—there are many different interpretations of the past in the world of Professional 
History. But the expression of those disagreements occurs within a severely restricted 
sphere. To challenge another historian’s assumptions, one must follow the appropriate 
channels—via writing and specific disciplinary structures. The Practitioners of 
Professional History are trained, and their claims are used to demonstrate that the training 
and the conclusions reached through such training are appropriate.  
  The Practitioners of Collective Memory are members of a Kinship—the claims 
they design and use are specifically crafted to construct, maintain, and solidify identity—
as well as the validity of those collective particular interpretations of the past. To make 
claims about the past, Practitioners of Collective Memory draw from the 
sources/resources listed above (spoken language, empathy). Those basic assumptions 
verify the group identity while they simultaneously get used to justify various group 
actions and interactions. In the first chapter, I mention the debates over a Palestinian state 
as an example of current political ends to which claims about the past get put; 
Practitioners of Collective Memory create and maintain the memories of their 
collectives—those memories, in turn, function to support the identity of the group, as 
well as whatever political, cultural, or social ends the group may seek to achieve. 
  The Practitioners of Simulated History are Experiential Tourists. The 
sources/resources that they use to construct their claims are based very much in the 
assumed re-presentability of the past. They use the constructs of credibility and 
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knowability provided by the other three methods of historical claims-making, while 
simultaneously transcending the limitations of those requirements through performance 
and sensuality. To simulate a convincing history, the Practitioners must base their 
performance and re-presentation on the assumption that simulations will deliver a 
realistic-seeming, authentic simulational experience of the past. Those performed re-
presentations then work to bolster other knowledge claims (both overt and implied) about 
the past. The overt claims often look very pedagogical (as in the case of the gun-cleaning 
lesson)—the implied claims often manifest in the Silences of Simulated History, alluding 
to (and ignoring) various perspectives on the past without acknowledging the omissions 
at all.  
  The final dimension of these historical rhetorics is the Silences that they contain. 
Such Silences spring from many of the very same elements that construct claims. For 
example, the Silences in Experienced History are attributed to the limitations of 
experience—such limitations are assumed within the rhetorical spaces between the body 
and the concept of owned history. The Silences of Experienced History are fairly 
obvious—I cannot speak about the experiences I’ve not had, so I must speak only to 
those experiences I’ve personally known. Other people may speak to other experiences, 
and their stories may or may not be as politically or socially valuable, but if they are 
believed, they will be believed for the same reasons. The sources/resources of 
Experienced History cause the Silences contained within it. 
  Silences in Professional History also stem directly from its sources/resources. 
Because Professional History focuses on the careful, rigid boundaries and rule of a 
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Discipline, there are certain stories of the past that never get told. Sometimes, as in 
Experienced History, the omissions are openly admitted and mentioned—dismissed or 
explained by the procedural restrictions of constructing Professional History. Sometimes, 
though, the Silences are not mentioned—and here is where some of the major problems 
of Professional History exist. In a practice of discipline and exclusion, the histories that 
go un-included diminish in cultural importance and validity. In Western culture, for 
example, history classes include fairly comprehensive explorations of Western history 
(starting with people like our old friends, Plato and Socrates). But there are few, if any, 
references to ancient Eastern cultures—the dynasties and cultural archeology of China—
or the comprehensive histories of the Egyptians before Cleopatra met Caesar. Those are 
obvious examples of some Professional History Silences; there are many more current 
omissions, like the Chilean disappeared, the victims of the Middle Passage, the (good 
things about) Cuba’s political and revolutionary recent history.  
  These holes in Professional History often provide some of the fodder for different 
historical interpretations of Collective Memory. In the first chapter, I mention some of 
the contemporary uses of “unofficial” and Collective Memory—like the Mothers of the 
Disappeared—demonstrating the messiness of different kinds of memories, as well as the 
a few examples of the contemporary ends to which those messy memories get put. Where 
Professional History’s explanation of the past is very neat and tidy, the historical 
interpretations of Collective Memory are wild and fractious. Because people can often 
believe and construct histories from disparate groups simultaneously, the overlap of 
interpretations gets awfully confusing. In that confusion is where a lot of Collective 
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Memory’s Silences live. Such Silences fill the spaces between different collective 
understandings of the past, highlighting the identity boundaries and emphasizing 
difference. Now, that’s not always a bad thing, either. But, at times, the unacknowledged 
importance of, say, separate group’s interpretations of historical artifacts or city walls or 
genealogical links can turn from rhetorical violence into physical antagonism. The 
Silences of Collective Memory allow for the elision of identification—at the exact time 
that they provide firm support for in-group identity construction. 
  Silences in Simulated History are one of the reasons I wrote this dissertation. 
When I went to my first Civil War reenactment, smelled the smoke from campfires and 
heard the blare of bugles, I was impressed by the sensuality of historical rhetoric. And 
then I watched the battles get performed and re-presented—without any blood. And I saw 
the ladies walking around in beautifully made dresses—without any economics. And I 
heard the soldiers talking about the causes of the war—without any slavery. These 
“withouts” were disturbing to me, and I think they should be more disturbing to more 
people. Such “withouts” are the sources of Simulated History’s Silences—the immediate 
sensuality of simulational experiences, the careful selection of tangibility, the peculiar 
shape of Simulated History white-washed—these elements are the sources/resources of 
Simulated History. When living historians say that they were born in the wrong century, 
that they feel more comfortable and easy in different time periods, the Silences allow 
those proposals to stand. The kind of lenticular logic that allows plantation museums to 
describe the work that went into running a plantation without mentioning the thousands 
of black bodies on which those plantations are built, the kind of performed, re-presented 
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histories that display pioneering and 18th century farm practices and Battles of the 
Bulge—that kind of logic is dangerous—and the Silences in Simulated History are rarely 
(if ever) mentioned, so the dangers may go unnoticed.  
  The Silences themselves are not the only cause for concern in these Simulated 
Histories. In the other three historical rhetorics, there are spaces for debate and 
discussion—even as limited as those spaces may sometimes seem (especially in 
Professional History and Collective Memory), the fact that there are methods of 
disagreement is a good thing. In Simulated History, however, the possibility of debate 
and disagreement is severely curtailed. The performative, re-presentational nature of 
Simulated History makes the spaces for debate almost impossibly small. I still think that 
there may be possibilities for disagreement and debate in a Simulated History; one of 
those possibilities might exist in the very sources/resources used by simulation—the 
performance and re-presentation of historical elements relegated to Silences. At the end 
of this chapter, I discuss some prospects for simulated protest—specifically, the political 
possibilities and rhetorical implications of simulating the abject. But for now, I want to 
emphasize the difficulty of arguing with ghosts—which are the re-presentations offered 
in a Simulated History. Ghosts of the Middle Passage, ghosts of the people who fought 
and died not for honor and glory but because they had no other choice—these are the 
silent ghosts of Civil War reenactment. The powerless and degraded, the forgotten, the 





RESEARCH QUESTION TWO 
How has Simulated History come to be regarded as rhetorical valid/convincing? (i.e. 
what are the reasons (bases) for its increasing rhetorical validity?) 
  The different dimensions of these rhetorics are a way into the structural 
components of different knowledge claims about the past. In order to answer the second 
research question, though, we must look to the rhetorical function of simulational 
experience. Therefore, in this section, I examine three elements of Simulated History’s 
rhetoric, as well as how they inform one another. The first element I explore is particular 
to Civil War reenactment: military performative organization. By following the rhetorical 
structures and guidelines of the military, Civil War reenactment provides its members 
and participants with a familiar (and fairly immutable) rhetorical structure in which 
historical claims are made. The second element I explore is more generalizable to other 
simulations: practical reasoning by example. This element involves the practical results 
of simulated actions—it’s a process of reasoning by example. When a participant in 
Simulated History is told how to clean a gun, for example, they will learn the process of 
gun cleaning. However, by induction, they may ascribe rhetorical validity to other claims 
made by the teacher—each practical performance entails the learning of an activity. 
Those activities, if they are right, may convince the participant that other aspects of the 
simulation are true, as well. The third rhetorical element of Simulated History is related 
to the practical reasoning element; this is the Incidental element. Incidentals are 
rhetorically inserted into simulations in order to flesh out the simulational environment. 
Similar to the messiness of memory that we see in Collective interpretations, the 
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Incidental element of Simulated History relates to the process of interpreting the past. 
The careful constructed, conversational feel of Simulated History adds to its rhetorical 
validity—as the participants are asked to join activities, invited to ask questions, and 
made to feel a part of the simulational world, they are brought into the Incidental 
knowledge of the past. Here is how they planted corn, says a teacher of Simulated 
History, and by the way, did you know...? 
  First, I talk about the aping of military structure. This is very specific to 
simulational claims about war, but the notion of borrowing/simulating language 
constructs from another aspect of culture (military—war reenactments, courtly—
Renaissance festivals, agricultural—living history farms, technological—Star Trek and 
LOTR conventions) allows for simulations to create and maintain more authentic 
simulational environments. In this project, I talk specifically about the language of Civil 
War reenactment, but Civil War reenactment is not the only war reenactment performed 
and re-presented. In fact, as I mention in the second and third chapters, there are 20th 
century war reenactors, as well as reenactors of various European wars. The rhetorical 
structure of the military itself is a very powerful kind of persuasion. In the reenactments I 
attended, and according to the various players I interviewed, serious reenactors pay 
attention to the actual military layout of their groups. They attend to the numbers—a 
battalion does not become a battalion until it reaches the correct number of troops. A first 
lieutenant must be promoted according to the procedures provided by the group at hand. 
When a sergeant travels to an event without the rest of his platoon, then he may join 
another platoon—but he will be a grunt.  
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  Honoring the rhetoric of military procedure gives structure to the reenactments; it 
also provides a persuasive framework in which to draw conclusions about the past. If the 
reenactors are correctly following the military guidelines, then they must be attending to 
other historically important moments. Such dedication suggests a careful attention to 
details and a thorough knowledge of war minutiae.  
Along with a knowledge of the military structure, reenactors learn the specific 
details of cleaning guns, attending to uniforms, cooking over an open fire, packing sleep 
rolls and cooking utensils. They also learn to accept the teaching—if the military 
structure promotes worthy folks, then the promoted teachers must know more. The 
military itself leaves little room for conscientious objectors—what is the likelihood that a 
group of hobbyists, eager to impress one another, are going to disagree on doctrine? 
 Each of these minute details testifies to careful research, at the same time that it 
provides a convincing framework in which various reenactors learn particulars of the 
past. Here is where some of the particulars of Civil War reenactment may be generalized 
to other Simulated Histories—the carefully researched and painstakingly performed 
particulars are very persuasive. Knowing the order of rank, recognizing the numbers of 
troops required to form a platoon or a battalion may be specifically military, but the 
research required to construct such a knowledgeable environment carries over into other 
areas of Simulated History. 
  The second element of Simulated History’s rhetoric relates to the process of 
reasoning by example. As can be seen in the previous discussion, induction plays a big 
role in the rhetorical effectiveness of Simulated History. The relationship between 
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practice and beliefs that stem from practice is an interesting one. When I first get on a 
bicycle, I am not a bicyclist, I am a beginner. After a few tries, maybe a couple of 
wrecks, I begin to feel confident about my ability to ride a bike. Based on the practice of 
riding the bike, I begin to believe that I am a fairly competent bicycle rider. In a similar 
(and simulational) vein, Simulated History combines the notions of practice and belief.  
 If you are repeating the directions to “How to Cook over an Open Fire” because 
the teacher knows how, might you also not make an inductive connection that the teacher 
knows other things? This might have to do with the Experiential nature of Simulated 
History—in an isolated context, there might be no inductive leaps that a teacher who can 
Cook over an Open Fire would also know the details (correctly) of the pre-war Socio-
Economic situation of said war—but in an active, practice-oriented context, when the 
teacher is showing you how to Cook over an Open Fire and is also, incidentally, telling 
you about the pre-war Socio-Economic conditions, then you might make those leaps.  
 So, then, where do these particular Silences come from—and, are they specific to 
Simulated History? It’s all about what we can see right in front of us, what we can 
understand from the particular perspective of experience. By witnessing, participating in 
the birth of a baby, for example, we will be overwhelmed by the ontological, sensual, 
experiential significance of that birth. The blood, the yelling, the scents and scenery, the 
awe-inspiring happiness of the parents, etc. But those experiential, sensual, metaphysical 
revelations are not the only importat aspect of such a moment. We must remember that 
there are responsibilities and after-thoughts and potentialities that are not encompassed in 
the Awe-inspiring moment; sometimes, in fact, the process of inspiring awe is also the 
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process of shutting down careful, logical, investigative thinking. Experiencing the 
sublime does not preclude understanding it—but we’re definitely going to need  a 
winding-down minute after we come face-to-face with sublimity. 
 History is not exactly sublime, and reenacting the Civil War is not exactly the 
miracle of childbirth. That being said, though, there are valuable moments of thought and 
introspection allowed in reading history books and talking with survivors and visiting 
memorials. In those careful moments, people interested in learning about the past may 
take some time to think about the things that they are seeing and reading, the conclusions 
that are being reached, and the histories being presented. Simulated History does not 
always provide its participants and audiences with those moments of reflection—in the 
process of experiencing and cataloguing, performing and representing, bits get missed. 
Stories get skipped; Silences get lengthened. Simulated History is not innately evil, but 
there must be a balance between the sensual value of experience and the intellectual value 
of interpreting that experience. And, very often, the practice of Simulated History 
foregoes moments of reflection for the juggernaut of pedagogy, experience, and 
sensuality of simulation.  
 History, as I mention in the first chapter, is often considered to be a collection of 
statements—the collection and interpretation of those statements occurs within and 
among different groups. The practice of history, though, the moving, tangible presence of 
history does not get emphasized in any of the rhetorics except for Simulated History.77 
Such a sensualization of the past is persuasive. I learn to ride a bike, I learn to cook over 
an open fire, I learn to curtsy in a hoop skirt—these practices shape my understanding of 
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the past in a different way than reading about it will. History a collection of statements is 
one way to interpret the past; history as a collection of simulated experiences is 
something else. The inductive shift between how to do something and how to interpret 
something happens in Simulated History. Part of that shift occurs in the sharing of the 
incidentals. 
 Incidentally is a big word in Simulated History. Where there is deliberation and 
planning within other kinds of historical rhetorics, there is incidental information at a 
Simulated History. It’s the shake and bake theory of rhetoric: doing two things at the 
same time, in a very casual sort of way. An example incidental might look like this: by 
the way, did you know that most slave-owners were actually really good to their slaves? 
Simulated History often incorporates a by-the-way kind of teaching, a teaching that both 
highlights and downplays the importance of the information being shared. In this 
pedagogy the emphasis is on the activity—as can be seen in the inductive shift discussed 
earlier, the practical tangibility of Simulated History is the vehicle for all kinds of claims. 
Because, unless someone is unhinged, they will not make overt claims based on 
simulational experience—the claims are implied, they are side effects of the practice. So, 
in shake and bake rhetoric, the incidental plays a major role—providing definitions, 
shaping materials, delineating what is and what is not important about interpreting the 
past.  
 Civil War reenactment is a good example of Simulated History’s incidentals. In 
many of the interviews and observations, reenactors make a point to differentiate 
themselves from historians and survivors. But they also describe themselves as 
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teachers—people who can share ideas about the past that may not be re-presented in other 
forms of historical inquiry. While they teach each other the proper ways to light a 
campfire or the correct stitching on a particular uniform, they share views of masculinity 
that reify socially-shared understandings of how men should act. As the reenactors learn 
to drill and load their guns, they perform masculinity as they imagine it must have been—
providing both the evidence and the claim to an argument I had with several of them. 
Why can’t I be one of the reenactors in the infantry? I asked them. And, over and over, 
they told me that the particular group to which they belonged did not have any women 
soldiers who passed (several women passed as male soldiers in the Civil War)—in order 
to be authentic, I would have to pretend to be a man. Or I would have to wear a dress and 
do laundry. In this incidental kind of logic, the claims are implied. Male reenactors 
themselves are automatically more authentic than I am, even though, comparatively 
speaking, current reenactors are better educated than most of the soldiers, better fed, 
larger, older, etc. The basic lines drawn, incidentally, between the truly authentic and the 
truly farby begins, it seems, with reified conceptions like stratified gender roles, 
performances of economic equilibrium, and authentic time travel.  
Simulated History’s rhetoric is a strange combination of forensic and epideictic: 
like epideictic rhetoric, Simulated History reifies current conceptions of the past; and like 
forensic rhetoric, Simulated History purports to discover the truth behind events in the 
past. The result is a colloid of epideictic (praise and blame) with forensic (research) that 
bolsters contemporary practice/belief in the guise of historical exploration. The 
performance of masculinity is one expression of these results: the uses to which a lot of 
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these arguments get put is reinforcing and reiterating contemporary notions (ironically 
enough) of the “good old days,” when men were men and women were Scarlet O’Hara. 
Reenactors’ conceptions of their own masculinity and the masculinity demonstrated by 
the soldiers they emulate display this combination. Another demonstration of the 
epideictic/forensic combination exists in the repeated references to the contemporary 
insufficiency of the men simulating history—the “I am not worthy” themes of 
reenactment which are related, possibly, to the masculinity, to melancholy/nostalgia, and 
to the sepia-toned visions of the past as a time when things were as they should be.  
The practice and performance of Simulated History’s knowledge claims are 
designed to impress and overwhelm. In the process of simulating history, claims about 
the past take material forms (so that audiences can touch them), provide particular 
pedagogical perspectives (so that audiences know only one version of history at a time), 
become personal experiences (so that audiences may tour different times periods 
simulationally), and skip over the painful parts (so those simulational tours are more fun 
than frightening). After Simulated History’s experiential claims, the tourists is left with a 
feeling of nostalgia, a conviction that the history presennted can be no other way—such a 
simulational historical experiences is a model of itself, basing its claims to authenticity 
and realism on the models it provided before. Instead of Hollywood re-presentations of 
the past, Simulated History offers its own sensual and tactile models as re-presentative. 





RESEARCH QUESTION THREE 
What are the effects of simulational argument on the difficult questions of the past? 
(i.e. when there are no slaves at Civil War reenactments, for example, what do we 
learn about the past? Is it different from the pasts we learn in museums or history 
books?) 
The effects of Simulated History’s implied claims and by-the-way incidentals on 
contemporary understandings of the past are far-reaching. In our simulational culture, 
where simulational arguments are persuasive and immanent, simulating knowledge of the 
past works to shape both historical understanding and contemporary policy. Because of 
the incidental, by-the-way pedagogy of Simulated History, sometimes the direct 
relationship between simulating knowledge about the past and decisions made in the 
present gets lost… which is why I originally asked that question. In this section, I provide 
some answers to simulational argument’s effect on the difficult aspects of the past. Using 
some of the prior observations and descriptions, I suggest that simulational argument’s 
effects on the past manifest in two ways: debates over definitions and the (im)possibility 
of simulating the abject. These two effects are related—defining the abject occurs 
incidentally during Simulated History. And whether or not it is possible to simulate the 
historical abject is a definitional question open to both academic and lay debate.  
 First, I talk about the debates over definitions. Earlier in the conclusion, I 
provided an example of incidental teaching: as on reenactor is teaching another reenactor 
how to load a gun, he says, “By the way, did you know that most slave-owners were 
actually really good to their slaves?” This incidental lesson is a perfect demonstration of 
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the definitional assumptions that occur within and around Simulated History. A 
definitional question stemming from this observation might be: What does it mean to be 
“really good” to a slave? Here, the notion of slavery during the Civil War is 
acknowledged verbally, even though there are no simulations of slavery during the 
events. So, the assumption of slavery is always there—always lurking around the corners 
of the simulations. In such an assumed structure, then, the possibility of being “good” to a 
slave is opposed to the possibility of being “bad” to a slave.  
When I asked the men directly about their perceptions of slavery, they would 
often respond with these sorts of answers—that nobody in their right mind would abuse 
or mistreat a horse or another piece of property, so why would a slave-owner do those 
things to a slave? It is in the best interest of the slave-owner to have healthy, well-fed 
slaves. So, being “good” to an enslaved human being means food and water. Being “bad” 
involves some sort of physical abuse. Aside from being a skin-crawly sort of response, 
there are other problems with these pat answers. If there is really a goodness to slavery, 
then why are there no slave reenactments? Why are the Civil War events overwhelmingly 
attended and populated by whites? Simulated History provides the space to answer only 
certain questions of the past, certain definitions of history. In a simulated world of noble 
soldiers (and quietly good-natured slave-owners), the notion of human beings as property 
is incidental. Debates over superficial, functional definitions—like how to properly 
define a medical treatment or the proper way to plow a field—leave no space (most of the 
time) for deeper questions. 
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 The simulation of history focuses on the practice and performance of the past. 
Every once in a while, at an interactive museum or a historical farm, there might be some 
thought put into the social, political, and economic structures of the past—the underlying 
reasons why children died in coal mines, why debtors went to prison, why people harmed 
on the job were fired with no compensation—as well as the contemporary relationship 
between those matter-of-fact historical details and the creation of child labor laws and 
unions. But those discussions happen alongside the dramatic simulations; they are not 
part and parcel of a simulation because there isn’t room. Paying attention to the details of 
the uniforms distracts from the material and bodily effects of history. The blood of battle, 
the tragedy of Native American genocide, the crushing weight of economic 
disenfranchisement—these are realizations apart from Simulated Histories. To tell the 
whole story of the past is to allow for disagreement and debate—the sublime combination 
of history’s heroes with the lives of history’s abject. Without all the necessary disorder of 
the past, with only the order highlighted and simulated, the versions presented reveal an 
unethical, incomplete interpretation of the way things were. For example, if the nature of 
slavery is incidentally accepted, then the process of being “good” or “bad” to a slave 
should work within that knowledge framework. The weirdness of slavery itself gets 
wiped to the side in favor of the incidental, myopic details of individual lives. 
  The really intriguing part of simulating the abject is, of course, what it would look 
like. How would one, for example, provide a realistic, “authentic” simulation of the Trail 
of Tears—without starving people and inciting race riots? Or a slave auction? Or an 
industrial catastrophe? How might a rhetorician interested in history combine the 
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beneficial aspects of simulation (the sensuality, the tangibility, the personality) with an 
ethics of historical interpretation? Because there are some genuine revolutionary 
possibilities to a simulation of the abject. When the corners of history, the voiceless and 
disenfranchised, finally get seen, the possibilities of interpreting the past change. If, as 
Orwell says, those who control the past control the present, then a demonstration of 
terrible historical mistakes and catastrophes might open the eyes of audiences to actual 
power of the masses.  
  In a construction of popular histories, as gets done by Experienced History, there 
are openings for the abject. The horror of personal experience in the Holocaust is one 
such example. Jack Morgan, in The Biology of Horror explores the regenerative and 
poetic possibilities of horror stories. The ritual process of poeticizing the worst, he writes, 
may open up the prospect of balance and appeasement: 
[P]oetry as extreme sport… seeks to slip out of the systematized repression that 
characterizes ordinary living and dive to the grimmest of psychic depths. The 
attempt is to touch upon inconsolable darkness, to summon the worst… We are 
brought round again, however, by that journey, because there is no stopping at the 
end of the night; we are impelled back from death and abjection—thus horror’s 
regenerative effect. Through the literature of horror, Kristeva believes, the 
dreadful is ritually conjured and an appeasement, an expiation accomplished. 
(135) 
Morgan is discussing the literary elements and effects of horror, but stories of the past are 
poetic as well. Rather than the falsely white-washed perfection of history, as Baudrillard 
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laments in The Transparency of Evil, simulating the abject might provide Simulated 
History’s performance with historical equilibrium. Ignoring the bad, erasing dirty 
historical secrets, feeds the simulacra of contemporary culture, creating and sustaining an 
inability to mourn, a kind of historical melancholia. However, simulating the practice and 
performance of the erased elements of history, the people and stories that get swallowed 
up by the lenticular logic of Simulated History will not only provide a more thorough 
interpretation of the past, but may also present historians and rhetoricians with the 
revolutionary possibilities of historical interpretation. 
FUTURE HISTORIES 
 There are three places that I would like to see this study go—the first two are 
directly related to this project, while the last direction is a  bit more removed. In this last 
section of the dissertation, I briefly discuss some future research routes. 
 The first direction is to flesh out the different methodological analyses of each 
historical rhetoric. Like I did with Simulated History, I would like to find a particular 
case study for each method—spaces where Experiential History, Professional History, 
and Collective Memory are enacted. That way, I can demonstrate more particularly the 
rhetorical effects, similarities, and differences among and between them. Using the four 
dimensions I explain (Materiality, Perspective, Practitioners, and Silences), I can 
interrogate different instances of each method. One possibility for this kind of exploration 
might be the Yale collection of Holocaust survivor testimonies—how do different stories 
get told by the victims and survivors, as opposed to the people conducting the interviews 
and collating the information? How do the professed motives (to document their stories 
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before the people are gone) work in and around the different methodological assumptions 
of each rhetoric? Another possible (and more recent) place for such a study might be the 
documentation and exploration of online museums—the creation of community through 
ambient intimacy, a concept that, according to Lisa Reichelt in “Reboot 9.0-Ambient 
Imtimacy,” captures the “sense of connectedness  that you get from  participating in 
social tools online that… you are maintaining and, perhaps… increasing your closeness 
with people” (P 3). This process, simulating and stimulating as it may be, seems like an 
intriguing outgrowth of technological advances and the documentational drive to 
conserve/re-member different understandings of the past and the present. 
 The second direction I plan to take is specifically related to simulating the abject. 
Where does that happen, if it happens at all? Some possible answers to this questions 
might occur in other places of Simulated History—or there may be some online examples 
of abject simulation, as well. I would need to explore both definitions of the abject—as 
they range across the metaphysical and pataphysical spectrum—and I would also be 
interested in finding different aspects of abjection. Are there varieties? Are there levels? 
Or are they all on some sort of Kristevan level of “the outside”? Still, in order to explore 
(and demonstrate) any revolutionary possibilities in Simulated History, I would need to 
see some examples of abjection simulated—in a beneficial, redemptive way. And, 
honestly, I don’t even know what that might look like. 
 Finally, the last direction I hope to take this study is theoretical. There are quite a 
few interesting explorations of nostalgia—I would like to see what more could be done 
with the combinations of nostalgia (as a good and a bad), technology (as a good and a 
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bad), and simulation. Each of these elements works furiously in these Simulated 
Histories—but how are they related? When one is more present than another—like, for 
example, when someone is playing a history wargame online or when someone is staying 
overnight at the Washburn-Norlands Living History Center (think, 18th century hotel and 
chamberpots)—what are the rhetorical/historical effects of those combinations? The 
knowledge claims made by living history centers are fairly clear and obvious. What about 
the knowledge claims made by different simulational games and groups?  
Investigating the different ways that people make claims about the past reveals the 
relationships and responsibilities human beings bear one another—both contemporaries 
and hisotrical counterparts. An ethics of historical interpretation would provide better 
tools for Simulated History’s knowledge claims about the past. Historical responsibility 
exists in Experienced History—the Silences of experience are openly acknowledged. And 
the correctives of such Silences occur in Professional History and Collective Memory—
each of the three first methods responds to the problems associated with the others. 
Professional History excludes some voices, so Collective Memory highlights them. 
Experienced History and Collective Memory gives little to no basis for standards of 
evaluation, so Professional History establishes rules of historical engagement. Simulated 
History, on the other hand, seems to have little recourse to a corrective. Without some 
conception of historical responsibility (as we see, to some degree, in the other methods), 
the incidental nature of Simulated History and its Silences erases the most difficult 
aspects of the past, to the detriment of historical understanding. I do not think simulation 
is without hope. Instead, I think the current practice of Simulated History is ethically 
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unsound. One corrective to contemporary Simulated History exists, I think, in the 
simulation of the abject—the possibility of giving voice (and material and sense and 
perspective) to the really voiceless people of the past, rather than claiming voicelessness 
in order to gain credibility. If that could happen, simulational visions of the past might 
really provide audiences with some strange and sublime historical knowledge claims. 
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